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5I am pleased to present the Handbook on Protecting Elec-
tricity Networks from Natural Hazards. The Handbook of-
fers a comprehensive view of concepts and tools in risk miti-
gation and risk management, as well as a number of local and 
regional case studies. It aims to support participating States 
in protecting critical electrical energy infrastructure from 
natural hazards through increased threat resilience. 
Energy security provides the backbone of industrialized soci-
eties and economies. Without uninterrupted power supplies, 
modern economies could not function. As regional econo-
mies grow increasingly interconnected, they also become 
increasingly vulnerable to regional and supra-regional black-
outs. The consequences to the economy and the environ-
ment can be severe. Blackouts lasting several days can lead 
to the breakdown of communication,  transport, and  district 
heating systems.   They can threaten water supplies and sani-
tary systems. They can bring trade and production processes 
to a halt and oblige hospitals to work using emergency power 
supplies. In short, power blackouts can threaten the stability 
of entire regions. Recent data suggest  that climate change 
leads to an increased number of extreme weather events, 
thus increasing the likelihood of severe impacts on electric-
ity infrastructure that lead to blackouts. 
The protection of electricity networks from natural disasters 
is a highly relevant issue for the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) whose 57 participat-
ing States and  11 Partners for Co-operation  include some 
of the largest producers and consumers of energy as well as 
many strategic transit countries. In December 2013  OSCE 
participating States adopted a Ministerial Council Decision 
on Protecting Energy Networks from Natural and Man-
Made Disasters [MC.DEC/6/13]. Under this they commit-
ted to cooperation and improved consideration of all neces-
sary measures to increase the protection of energy networks 
from natural and man-made disasters. In the decision, the 
Office of the Coordinator of Economic and Environmental 
Activities (OCEEA) was tasked to facilitate the exchange of 
good practices, technological innovations, and information 
sharing on how to effectively prepare for threats to energy 
networks from natural disasters, with sole emphasis on elec-
tricity networks. 
In implementing MC.DEC/6/13 the OCEEA in 2014 or-
ganized an Expert Workshop on Sharing Best Practices to 
Protect Electricity Networks from Natural Disasters with 
key stakeholders from the public and private sector and aca-
demia, followed by the preparation of this Handbook on Pro-
tecting Electricity Networks from Natural Hazards, which is 
largely based on the recommendations of the workshop. 
The purpose of this Handbook is to raise awareness and build 
capacity among key stakeholders, namely, transmission opera-
tors, relevant ministries, national regulators, NGOs, and the 
private sector, to exchange best practices and knowledge on 
effective risk mitigation and management strategies before 
and after national and regional electricity networks are affect-
ed by natural disasters. The Handbook provides a unique view 
on the subject by including contributions from all key stake-
holders mentioned above. Mitigating and managing risks of 
blackouts in electricity transmission grids remains a complex 
challenge to all key stakeholders. Effective cooperation among 
OSCE participating States can be a powerful tool that helps us 
to make critical energy infrastructure more resilient to natural 
hazards. 
Foreword
Halil Yurdakul Ygitguden, Co-ordinator of OSCE 
Economic and Environmental Activities 
Yours truly,
Halil Yurdakul Yiğitgüden
Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and  
Environmental Activities
6
7Security of energy supply requires sufficient electricity to be 
generated to cover energy demand and its reliable transmis-
sion of electrical power from generation to consumption 
centers. Electricity transmission infrastructure is vital for 
functioning of modern economies and is, thus, regarded as 
a “critical” infrastructure. As industry, communication sys-
tems, transportation, and several other sectors depend on 
the secure and reliable supply of electricity, failures in elec-
tricity delivery can result in significant economic costs and 
the collapse of modern economic and social life. To protect 
electricity transmission and distribution grids from multiple 
risks, the functionality, continuity, and integrity of electric-
ity transmission networks must be ensured; this includes as-
sessment, mitigation, and effective management of blackout 
risks. Creating a resilient electricity transmission system will 
reduce the likelihood of damage to critical infrastructure, 
limit negative effects on national and regional economies, 
and shorten time needed to recover supply.
Today, the task of protecting electricity transmission systems 
has become a greater challenge than ever before: during the 
last decade the number of blackouts has grown steadily, as 
have their respective impacts, affecting an increasingly large 
number of people in developing, transition, and developed 
countries. The number of major blackout events – classified 
as disasters when 1000 people or more people are affected 
for at least 1000 hours or 1 million people are affected for at 
least one hour – has increased. These major blackouts have 
also grown in terms of their intensity and impact, both inside 
and outside the area of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). 1
Mitigating and managing blackout risks in electricity trans-
1 For instance, a major blackout in the USA and Canada took place on 9 November 1965, 
affecting 30 million people.  Subsequent blackouts in Thailand on 18 March 1978 and in 
Brazil on 11 March 1999 affected 40 million people and a record number of 97 million 
people, respectively.   The largest number of major blackouts have occurred post-2001. 
On 2 January 2001, 230 million people were affected in India. In the same year, 55 million 
people were affected by a major blackout in the USA and Canada. In 2001, 55 million 
people were affected in Italy and Switzerland. In 2005 a major blackout hit Java, Indonesia, 
affecting 100 million people. Five major blackouts occurred during the last six years: in 
2009 in Brazil and Paraguay affecting 87 million people, in 2012 in India affecting 620 
million, in 2014 in Bangladesh affecting 150 million, in 2015 in Pakistan affecting 140 
million, and in 2016 in Sri Lanka affecting 21 million people.  
mission grids is a challenging task because of the complexity 
of electricity transmission system and the number of com-
ponents involved, such as generators, transformers, and 
high- and low-voltage transmission and distribution lines. 
All these components are interdependent and include a large 
number of elements, such as interconnectors, edges, and 
nodes. Each element can become vulnerable to existing and 
newly emerging risks such as natural hazards, terrorist and 
cyber-attacks, or human failures. Electricity transmission 
grids can also incur multiple or multi-risks, including their 
conjoint and cascading effects, or systemic risks. Natural 
hazards like earthquakes, storms, floods, and heatwaves, are 
among the major causes of electricity blackouts. These can 
damage or destroy electricity transmission infrastructure or 
reduce its transmission capacities. Hydro-meteorological 
disasters or extreme weather conditions, such as storms and 
floods, are the most frequent events. According to the avail-
able scientific evidence, climate change impacts will be more 
frequent and intense in the near to medium term.
The OSCE is the world’s largest regional security organiza-
tion and, among other activities, focuses on critical energy 
infrastructure, including electricity transmission, which is 
an emerging and important security-related topic. In 2013 
the OSCE Ministerial Council in Kiev adopted a decision on 
“Protecting Energy Networks from Natural and Man-made 
Disasters” (MC.DEC/6/13). In line with this decision, the Of-
fice of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Ac-
tivities (OCEEA) of the OSCE prepared this Handbook on 
the Protection of Electricity Networks from Natural Hazards, 
based on an expert workshop on the same topic held in Vi-
enna, Austria, on 2 July 2014.  The objective of the workshop, 
“Protection of Electricity Networks from Natural Hazards” 
and of the present handbook was to contribute to enhanc-
ing the capacities of OSCE participating States to fulfill their 
commitments with regard to MC.DEC/6/13 by raising aware-
ness of, and facilitating dialogue and knowledge sharing on, 
the protection of electricity networks from natural disasters. 
The expert workshop brought together government officials 
from participating States as well as representatives of inter-
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8national organizations and institutions, specialized agencies, 
the energy industry (including transmission system opera-
tors), and academia. The scope of the workshop was limited 
to protection of electricity networks from natural disasters: 
geophysical (earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides); hydrologi-
cal (floods, landslides, avalanches); meteorological (storms); 
and climatological (extreme temperatures, droughts). The 
workshop provided insights into good practices and brought 
together knowledge and experience from different countries 
and stakeholders across the entire process of protecting elec-
tricity networks from natural disasters. These included risk 
assessment (to identify threats, assess vulnerabilities, identify 
and quantify potential losses); risk preparedness, prevention, 
and mitigation (including technical and physical protection 
measures and planning, as well as organizational measures, 
capacity building, early warning, and internal controls); risk 
management (disaster management); reconditioning (back-
up supply and provisional repair); and risk recovery (recon-
struction, financing, repairing, and restoring). 
This handbook integrates recommendations developed dur-
ing the Vienna workshop, such as the need for intensified 
cooperation among different groups of stakeholders, en-
hancement of risk awareness, and the stronger involvement 
of civil society. In particular, the workshop developed the 
recommendation to pursue a comprehensive approach to the 
protection of electricity transmission networks. This entails 
cooperation among all key stakeholders:  national govern-
ments, regional and non-governmental organizations, the 
business community, academia, development agencies, and 
financial institutions. 
The novelty of this handbook lies in the selection of contri-
butions it contains, which allow  the reader to gain a holistic 
view of efforts to protect electricity transmission networks 
across the entire disaster risk reduction cycle. It also brings 
together the views and perspectives of stakeholders from 
different sectors, such as transmission systems operators, 
insurance companies, national civil protection authorities, 
non-governmental organizations, international and multi-
lateral organizations, and academia. The handbook does not 
aim to be a  “step-by-step” manual. Its main goal is to collate 
information on a variety of practices available to stakehold-
ers from different sectors to facilitate the exchange of infor-
mation and to provide a “snapshot” of the existing heteroge-
neity of voices, experiences, and practices. 
The handbook has been designed as a guide for practition-
ers such as representatives of public and private stakeholders 
and also academia and civil society, to enable them to  benefit 
from the wide range of contributions presented in this hand-
book. It will serve as a reference for government policymak-
ers, state authorities, and regulators in charge of protecting 
energy networks, as well as public and private owners and 
operators of electricity networks. The handbook encourages 
infrastructure owners and operators, emergency responders, 
regulators, government stakeholders, and industry groups 
to work together more closely to improve the resilience of 
critical electricity transmission infrastructure.  With this 
in mind, the handbook shares advice and existing practices 
available to different stakeholders to continuously improve 
the resilience of electricity transmission infrastructure to 
natural hazards.
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1 
This chapter deals with key concepts of risk assessment, mit-
igation, and management of natural hazards affecting elec-
tricity transmission networks. The   chapter aims to provide 
a holistic and multi-risk view on the issue of protection of 
electricity transmission networks. It therefore not only in-
cludes natural hazards but also discusses other relevant haz-
ards and the systemic risks connected with different types 
of technologies of electricity generation. The chapter also 
discusses the relevance of human failures in a multi-risk per-
spective and the overall resilience of electricity transmission 
systems. Covering the entire disaster risk reduction cycle, 
it addresses the topic of risk governance and human fac-
tors affecting the implementation of risk management and 
mitigation measures. Risk governance also includes public 
and social acceptance of deployment of additional electricity 
transmission grids and should incorporate key concepts of 
an effective corporate safety culture. 
Contributions to this chapter comprise an overview of key 
elements of risk assessment by ETH Zurich, Switzerland, 
and key elements of multi-risk assessment by AMRA, Ita-
ly. The chapter also includes a multi-hazard perspective of 
electricity transmission network resilience by the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology, Germany, and Virginia Tech, USA. 
Contributions on risk governance then follow, including: so-
cioeconomic impacts of blackouts by the Johannes Kepler 
University, Austria and Virginia Tech, USA;  participatory 
governance to enhance electricity transmission systems re-
silience by Germanwatch, Germany; and safety culture by 
CESys, Slovakia. The chapter ends with a contribution by the 
Environment Agency of Austria on the vulnerability of elec-
tricity transmission system to climate impacts.
1.1. Key elements of 
risk assessment of 
electric power networks 
Wolfgang Kröger and Giovanni Sansavini
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), 
Zurich, Switzerland
The highly meshed European transmission system is grouped 
into five synchronous areas and managed by a network of 
41 transmission system operators (TSOs) from 34 countries 
across Europe (Figure 1). 
Current major energy political and organizational changes, 
namely, the targeted increase in the share of renewable en-
ergy resources (RES) and the European unbundled Interna-
tional Energy Market, are posing the following challenges 
to transmission systems: (a) the integration of intermittent 
asynchronous energy sources, which are usually abundant 
in scarcely populated areas and often available during low 
demand periods (e.g., night hours) thus requiring both mas-
sive power transfers over long distances and peak smoothing 
strategies; (b) close-to-real-time monitoring is commonly 
performed via unprotected communication channels and 
safety checking which entails ubiquitous use of commercial 
IT hardware and software; (c) short-term trading entails both 
SCADA data and cross-border power exchange.
The synchronous European transmission system is managed 
according to the instructions in the UCTE (now ENTSO-E) 
Operational Handbook (OH); this is a comprehensive collec-
tion of operational principles, technical standards, and rec-
ommendations for TSOs in continental Europe which aim to 
support safe operations of the interconnected, synchronous 
grid and to ensure interoperability among all TSOs, with 
each partner being responsible for its own network. In par-
ticular, TSOs are not allowed to interfere with market forces 
unless system safety is at stake.
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Power system reliability as a concretization of the concept of 
“safety” is defined as the ability to:
  Ensure normal system operation;
  Limit the number of incidents and avoid major incidents;
  Limit the consequences of major incidents whenever 
they occur.
To guarantee system reliability, protection must be provided 
against three main phenomena: a) cascade tripping; b) vol-
tage collapse or frequency collapse; c) loss of synchronism.
To ensure “security” against sudden disturbances in opera-
tional planning and real-time operations, the N – 1 principle 
is of major importance in preventing unplanned events that 
produce abnormal system conditions. Such “disturbances” 
may follow an unexpected failure or outage of a system com-
ponent or may also include multiple components, related by 
situations, leading to simultaneous component outages, all 
defined as “contingency.” According to the N – 1 principle, 
elements in operation after the failure of a single element 
of the interconnected network must be capable of accom-
modating the change of flows caused by the single failure; 
a cascade of trippings or the loss of a significant amount of 
consumption should be avoided. N – 1 security should be 
monitored at all times by the TSOs for their own systems and 
some defined parts of adjacent systems. After a contingency, 
each TSO is supposed to return to N – 1 compliant condi-
tions as soon as possible.
There are three types of contingency: “normal,” comprising 
the loss of a single element such as a line; “exceptional,” com-
prising elements such as two lines at the same tower over 
a long distance; and “out-of-range,” comprising losses of a 
very small likelihood. Lists of contingencies are developed by 
TSOs and need to be taken into account for N – 1 security 
calculations. Thus, N – 1 can be ranked as a best-practice 
deterministic criterion complemented by a probabilistic ap-
proach to exclude contingencies from ex ante simulations 
(see Figure 2 for summary).
The assessment of power system security can be broadly di-
vided into static and dynamic security. Static security assess-
ment is performed through the N -1 principle and includes: 
i) computation of the available transfer capability of trans-
Figure 1.  
The synchronous European 
Transmission System. 
Source: ENTSO-E Memo 2012
Key figures (2012):
•	 5	synchronous	areas	
•	 Network	of	41	TSOs	from	
34 countries
•	 Serving	534	million	citizens	
–	3’300	TWh	consumption,	
13% cross-border
•	 305’000	km	of		
transmission lines
Main goals:
•	 Security	of	supply,	
reliable operation
•	 Efficient	and	
competitive market	
•	 Optimal	management	and	
sound	technical	evolution	
of	the	system
ENTSO-E	members
Non	ENTSO-E	members
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mission links and identification of network congestion bot-
tlenecks for pre-contingency states; and ii) the evaluation of 
bus voltages and line power flow limits for post-contingency 
states. The main concern of static security assessment is cas-
cade tripping.
Static security assessment assumes that every transition 
from the pre- to post-contingency state takes place without 
any instability phenomena arising. Dynamic security assess-
ment evaluates the stability and quality of the transition from 
the pre- to post-contingency state. Its main concern is volt-
age collapse, frequency collapse, and loss of synchronism. 
The main components of the dynamic security assessment 
are described in CIGRE Report No. 325.
Security management has recently been challenged by i) the 
increase in the share of renewable energy resources; ii) the un-
bundled International Energy Market; and iii) the increased 
participation of an active demand side. Indeed, the interplay 
among these elements changes the system operating condi-
tions by affecting the generation output and the demand in-
put, and this forces the system operator to continuously moni-
tor and steer the system state within safety bounds.
1. Scope, goals and measures of 
risk analysis; illustration of results; 
contrasting terms
There is no commonly agreed definition of risk. To express 
risk in risk analysis there is the traditional interpretation that 
risk is a property of the system being analyzed and that it 
comprises the probability of whether or not undesired events 
will occur and an indication of how severe their consequenc-
es will be. A more recent interpretation claims that there are 
no inherent probabilities describing the system, and whether 
events occur or not and how severe their consequences might 
be is uncertain, being dependent on the state of knowledge 
(Hokstad 2012).
Regarding the operation of a power system, we accept the 
definition of a risk assessed by the product “Event probability 
x Expected loss.” The loss might be defined either by a finan-
cial loss or, more commonly for a power system, in terms of 
a potential power cut or energy loss. The following formula 
quantified the risk Ri associated to the event i:
 Ri =Pi  * Si where Si = Gi * Di
Where Pi is the likelihood of the event i for a given unit of 
time (namely, an hour), Si is the associated severity, expressed 
in terms of non-feeded energy (the severity is the multiplica-
tion of the gravity Gi and the restitution time Di ). 
As the above definition of the risk is based on the non-feeded 
energy, it is also possible to estimate the cost Ci of this risk:
Ci = Ri  * €
The results of a risk analysis can be illustrated in a risk reg-
ister, that is, a table with undesired events in separate rows 
Figure 2. Summary of the N – 1 principle according to ENTSO-E Operational Handbook
Source: ENTSO-E Operational Handbook
One goal
"No	cascading	with	impact	outside	my	border"
Two obligations
1 —	 Obligation	for	each	TSO	to	monitor	the	
consequences	of	the	events	defined	in	its	
contingency	list	(=	normal	+	exceptional	
contingencies)	and	warns	its	neighbours	when	
its	own	system	is	at	risk	at	any	operational	
planning	stage	and	in	real	time
2 —	 Mandatory	coordination	by	bi-multilateral,	
even	regional	actions	to	better	assess	the	
consequences	of	any	domestic	TSO's	decision
Three behaviours
1 —	 "Be	aware	of	the	risks",	even	if	not	sufficiently	
covered	by	remedial	action	due	to	too	high	
costs	(potential	emergency	situations)
2 —	 "Best	efforts"	to	set-up	remedial	actions,	that	
is	not	always	possible	or	sufficiently	efficient	
by	one	single	TSO	to	cover	exceptional	
contingencies
3 —	 Be	aware	of	impacts	of	domestic	operational	
decisions	(switching,	redispatching,	outage	
planning,	capacity	assessment)	on	neighboring	
systems
Risk assessment: a concern
Each	TSO	is	only	responsible	for	the	operation	
of	its	own	network.	But	it	is	required	to	inform	
relevant	neighbors	in	case	it	assumes	some	risks	
to	come	from	outside	or	to	come	from	inside	to	be	
propagated	abroad.
Inter-TSO coordination
Bilateral,	multi-lateral	or	regional	coordination	is	
requested	to	assess	risks,	to	ensure	efficiency	of	
operational	decisions	and	remedial	actions.
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and typical column headings such as i) hazard/threat con-
tingency; ii) possible corresponding event, disturbance; iii) 
probability of the event occurring; and iv) associated conse-
quences. The results might also be mapped in a risk matrix 
with probabilities and severity of undesired events as axes 
and colored acceptability regimes. The so-called Frequency-
Consequence diagram is one of the most meaningful ways to 
express the results of risk analysis and allows for risk levels 
that should be respected for all kinds of events and reference 
values as shown in Figure 3, formed by and taken from ENT-
SO-E Operational Handbook. 
The risk assessment of power transmission systems is usually 
performed after the system design and planning phase. As 
an example, although the N - 1 principle is limited to opera-
tions, it should already be enforced in the system planning 
process of electric power grids, with the risk related to a spe-
cific contingency having been included as a constraint at the 
optimization phase. 
Reliability is measured in terms of the probability that a sys-
tem or a component is able to perform its required function 
at a given point of time, or over a given period of time, for a 
given set of conditions. With respect to the electric power 
system, reliability describes the degree of performance of the 
elements of the system that results in electricity being de-
livered to customers within accepted standards and in the 
1 Disclaimer: “This document and other chapters of the UCTE Operation Handbook as well 
as excerpts from it may not be published, redistributed or modified in any technical means 
or used for any other purpose outside of UCTE without written permission in advance.”
 Copyright issues must therefore be discussed with ENTSO-E https://www.entsoe.eu/
publications/system-operations-reports/operation-handbook/Pages/default.aspx
amount desired. Thus, electric power system reliability can 
be addressed by considering the ability 
  to supply the aggregate electrical demand and energy 
requirements of the customers at all times, taking into 
account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled 
outages of system elements (“adequacy”) 
  to withstand sudden disturbances such as electric short 
circuits or unanticipated loss of system elements (“secu-
rity”) 
While the term risk is used primarily to express uncertainty 
regarding adverse events, the concept of vulnerability (Hok-
stad 2012) is more directly related to the characteristics of 
a system. The focus in a vulnerability analysis thus moves 
away from the possibility that adverse events occur to system 
properties determining how easy it is to eliminate major sys-
tem functions. For example, a vulnerability analysis of power 
supply aims to examine how the system is able to withstand 
adverse events and threats, such as line breaks, sabotage, 
and aging. Often, a vulnerability analysis extends the regular 
system limits, that is, it focuses not only on the number of 
affected end users, but also on the impacts, such as who is 
affected (e.g., a hospital or a key company in the region), and 
measures implemented to mitigate the consequences (e.g., 
mobile gasworks).
The concept of resilience has been developed and explored 
in various fields; there is no common accepted definition as 
yet. In general, resilience is the ability of a system to react 
and recover from unanticipated disturbances and events. To 
Zone 2
Unacceptable CONSEQUENCES zone
(e.g. cascading effects on neighbouring countries)
Zone 3
Unacceptable RISKS zone (e.g. domestic propagation)
Zone 4
Acceptable risks zone
Isorisk curve
(corresponding to the maximum accepted risk)
Expected loss :
€, MW, MWh
Zone 1
Zone of out-of-norm events
Unacceptable
consequences
limit
Probability
Generation set
outage
Line
outage
Auto-transformer
outage
EHV busbar / N-2 outage
Non-dimensioning events (outage of a nuclear site or of a 400kV substation)
Dimensioning events
Low probability
Figure 3. UCTE (now ENTSO-E)1 iso-risk curve.
Source: ENTSO-E Operational Handbook
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elaborate, resilience is the ability of a system or a “system-of-
systems” to resist/absorb the adverse effects of a disruptive 
force and the speed at which it is able to return to an ap-
propriate functionality; the essential patterns are shown in 
Figure 4.
Depending on the extent of the capability of the electric power 
system to adapt, self-organize, and recover, system perfor-
mance could either collapse to zero level or, on the other hand, 
recover and achieve even higher levels than before the shock.
The assessment of resilience in electric power grids helps 
identify best strategies to restore system operations and 
minimize performance losses. It also allows a quantification 
of the trade-offs between investing in system robustness or 
investing in system recovery. Indeed, a system which fails 
gracefully and does not experience large performance devia-
tion but cannot achieve the target performance for extended 
time may not be more convenient or viable than a system 
that fails abruptly but is capable of promptly recovering its 
target performance value. 
2. Characteristics of electricity networks, 
learning from past events
Electric power transmission systems are large-scale, multi-
component, wide-area, spatially distributed, interconnected 
networks with numerous interdependencies, that are open 
to direct impacts (local or spatial). Some impacts are attrib-
utable to the usage of the system by market players. Those 
networks are highly integrated systems with complex behav-
iors, that is, with the potential for nonlinearities, dynamics, 
cascades, collapses, feedback loops, with weak dependence 
on other CIs besides ICT, in particular, for black starts.
As a hallmark of their inherent complexity, power grids have 
witnessed several blackout events in the last decade, as re-
ported in Table 2. In particular, Figure 5 details the complexi-
ties associated with the system split that occurred in the syn-
chronous European transmission system in 2006.
3. Conceptual and analytical frameworks 
and phases of RA 
A conceptual framework for risk/vulnerability analysis of 
CI was proposed, for example, in Kröger and Zio (2011) to 
bring all system aspects and attributes together and to take 
advantage of the diverse capabilities of the available model 
and simulation approaches. Vulnerability analysis addresses 
several system issues: the end states of interest for the given 
systems; the boundary definition; the threats and hazards of 
relevance and the susceptibility of the system; the resulting 
cascades; system interdependencies and their impact; the 
uncertainties involved; the obvious and non-obvious (“hid-
den”) vulnerabilities to be reduced and managed.
The conceptual framework for vulnerability analysis follows 
a stepwise, problem-driven approach tailored to the needs 
of the analysis, and distinguishes five steps, several decision 
points, and feed-back loops (Figure 6).
Figure 4. The essential patterns of resilient response behaviors
Source: Heinimann, 2014
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The first step, the preparatory phase (step 1) integrates the 
task framing and definitions into the process of familiariza-
tion with the system. It is also important here to decide on 
the spectrum of hazards and threats to be included into the 
analysis. Furthermore, it is necessary to deeply understand 
failure models and effects on each of the components. For 
a more effective screening of the system vulnerability, some 
reasonable simplifications should be made that need to be 
revisited at a later phase of the assessment. Furthermore, the 
knowledge base should be checked with respect to the avail-
ability of methods suitable for the defined tasks.
The purpose and goals of the analysis affect the degree of de-
tail, for example, the assessment of interdependencies and 
cascading failures or the width of system boundaries. It is 
assumed that the vulnerability analysis should evolve in two 
steps where appropriate. A screening-type of analysis (step 
2) could be efficient and sufficient to identify eye-catching, 
obvious weak points (e.g., awkward topology, spatial prox-
imity of interconnected systems or bottlenecks) and further 
actions should focus on eliminating or reducing them. The 
screening analysis could also prepare the ground for, and give 
steer to, the in-depth analysis which may turn out to be nec-
essary and leads off with development of adequate system 
understanding; we assume that information provided from 
system owners/operators allows for general understanding 
of main functionalities, states of relevance, interfaces, and in-
terdependencies. In this phase, the main emphasis is placed 
on experts’ opinions, brainstorming, etc., rather than on ap-
plication of detailed models. If the results and insights gained 
by screening analysis are not satisfying (not “clear-cut”) and 
major hidden vulnerabilities are still feared, a more sophisti-
cated in-depth analysis (step 3) has to be launched. 
To achieve a higher degree of accuracy in the vulnerability 
evaluation, system understanding has to be further devel-
oped on the basis of additional information about the system 
and its operating environment. Special attention should be 
placed on interdependencies within or among systems. The 
reassessment of simplifications made earlier may call for more 
sophisticated methods of analysis and also for integrating a 
comprehensive spectrum of different phenomena. While full 
validation and verification of models and methods, and of 
results, seems infeasible, benchmarking against other similar 
Blackout Loss [GW] Duration [h] Nos. affected Main causes
14 Aug 03 Great Lakes, 
NYC
~ 60 ~ 16 50 m Inadequate right-of-way maintenance, EMS fail-
ure, poor coordination among neighboring TSOs
23 Sep 03 Denmark/ 
Sweden
6.4 ~ 7 4.2 m Two independent component failures (not 
covered by N-1 rule)
28 Sep 03 Italy ~ 30 up to 18 56 m High load flow CH-I, line flashovers, poor 
coordination among neighboring TSOs
12 Jul 04 Athens ~ 9 ~ 3 5 m Voltage collapse
25 May 05 Moscow 2.5 ~ 4 4 m Transformer fire, high demand leading to 
overload conditions
22 Jun 05 Switzerland 
(railway  supply)
0.2 ~ 3 200,000 
passengers
Non-fulfilment of the N-1 rule, wrong 
documentation of line protection settings, 
inadequate alarm processing
 14 Aug 06 Tokyo ? ~ 5 0.8 m 
 households
Damage to a main line due to construction work
 4 Nov 06 Western  Europe 
(planned line 
cut off)
~ 14 ~ 2 15 m 
 households
High load flow D-NL-maintenance, violation of 
the N-1 rule, poor inter-TSO coordination
 10 Nov 09 Brazil,  Paraguay ~14 ~4 60 m Short circuit on key power line due to bad 
weather. Itaipu hydro (18 GW) shut down
11 Mar 11 Northern 
 Honshu, Japan
21 days 40 m Grid destruction by earthquake & tsunami/
supply gap/rolling blackouts
22 De 13 USA/CND 
blackout
22 few hours to 
7 days
1 m Massive damage to electric power transmission 
and trees due to freezing rain and snow from ice 
storm
31 Mar 15 Turkey 33 8 76 m Combination of hydro production oversupply, 
reduced thermal generation and maintenance on 
east-west transmission lines
Table 1. Major recent blackouts
17
Chapter 1 | Principles of disaster risk reduction
analyses, plausibility checks, and checks against experienced 
events, if available, may help to support the credibility of the 
vulnerability assessment and build confidence in the decision 
making that follows. System improvements (step 5) may be 
proposed to further reduce and better manage vulnerabilities 
by all means of provisions.
4. Overview of methods and approaches; 
associated data needs and computational 
effort
Applied modeling approaches have different viewpoints (e.g., 
functional or structural, different levels of abstraction, differ-
ent focus, objectives and metrics, different degrees of matu-
rity) and are based on different levels of available information 
and knowledge. It is commonly agreed that a universal, all-
encompassing approach or model accounting for all issues 
does not exist. Three main methods can be distinguished, 
that is, knowledge-based investigations, model-based ap-
proaches, and best practices.
I. Knowledge-based investigations
These use statistical data, including information on blackouts 
and underlying patterns (see also Table 3.1) to make high-
level aggregate inferences regarding future system behavior. 
Their applicability to specific power grids is limited due to 
the generalized results they obtain. Empirical investigations 
or brainstorming aim to use data collected by interviewing 
experts and/or analyze past events to acquire information 
and improve the understanding of system vulnerability and 
risk. This knowledge-based approach is straightforward and 
easy to understand. It is capable of providing a qualitative 
assessment of the severity of system abnormal states and can 
be considered as an efficient screening method. However, it 
is a purely data-driven, knowledge-based approach, meaning 
that the accuracy of results depends on the quality and the 
interpretation of the information collected.
Data needs: statistical information on past events (e.g., trig-
gering causes, chain of events leading to major losses, re-
sponse of protection devices, impact on supply, duration of 
disruptions, etc.) can be accumulated from the reports com-
piled by the TSOs involved and national energy authorities.
II. Modeling and simulation
Advanced modeling approaches are available, have been ap-
plied, and are widely accepted, for example, Input-output In-
operability Modeling (IIM), Complex Network (CN) Theory, 
Agent-based Modeling (ABM), and others (see also, Kröger 
and Zio 2011). 
The IIM approach captures dependencies among infrastruc-
ture systems via mathematical models. It assumes that each 
system can be modeled as an atomic entity whose level of 
Figure 5. The system split that occurred in the Western European transmission system in 2006
Source: Final Report – System Disturbance on 4 November 2006, UCTE
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Decision on 
improvements 
1st Step: Preparatory phase 
1.1 Task framing and definitions 
•! goals, objectives and terms 
•! hazards threats, failure modes, system boundaries, etc. 
1.2 Provision of key information 
•! layout, (inter)dependencies, safety/security criteria, operational 
procedures, organizational factors, etc. 
•! data (performance, experienced failures/events, etc.) 
1.3 Permissible simplifications (decoupling, reductions, focal parts) 
1.4 Knowledge base (available methods, richness of experience, etc.) 
„Problem 
owner“ 
(orderer) 
Stakeholders Scientific 
Community 
2nd Step: Screening Analysis 
2.1 Development of adequate system understanding 
(functioning, dependencies, interconnectedness, etc.) 
2.2 Evaluation of historical data, empirical investigations 
2.3 Identification of obvious vulnerabilities 
•! bottlenecks, deficits in design, operation, maintenance, 
emergency procedures, etc. 
•! crucial contextual factors (stress level, lack of awareness, etc.) 
2.4 Structural analysis (awkward topology, etc.)  
"clear-cut"  
Indication assessment 
"not clear-cut" 
3rd Step: Detailed Analysis 
3.1 Development of detailed understanding of interconnected systems 
3.2 Re-assessment of permissible simplifications (see 1.3) 
3.3 Provision and application of detailed modeling and simulation 
techniques, coping with (inter-)dependencies, etc. 
3.4 Scrutinizing of results and accounting for uncertainties 
•! benchmarking, plausibility and experience check, “zooming into” 
results of simulation, etc. 
•! addressing types and causes of uncertainties 
5th Step: Identification of potential improvements 
aiming to reduce and better manage vulnerability 
"credible" 
 
Results assessment 
"not credible" 
4th Step:   
Enlargement 
of knowledge 
base, 
research and 
development 
work 
Figure 6. Conceptual framework for the risk/vulnerability analysis of interconnected infrastructures
(flow chart-type of illustration; double arrows represent two-way interactions)
Source: Kröger and Zio 2011
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operability depends on other systems and that propagation 
between them can be described mathematically based on 
the basic Leontief high order mathematical model. The IIM 
approach is capable of analyzing cascading effects into in-
terdependent economic industries (e.g., societal impacts of 
blackouts; Haimes et al. 2005).
Fundamental elements of the CN theory approach are origi-
nally formed by graph theory. It captures the coupling among 
systems as a set of nodes connected by a set of links and there-
by characterizes their topology. A number of modeling efforts 
have been undertaken to adopt this approach to develop infra-
structure system models and interdependency-related assess-
ments, and thereby demonstrate its capability of representing 
relationships established through connections among system 
components (Kröger and Zio 2011; Buldyrev 2010). The CN 
theory approach is based on the network model and maps 
physical configuration of the components (nodes) of studied 
infrastructure systems and their (physical or logical) intercon-
nections (links). An analysis of the topological properties of 
the network  reveals useful information about the structural 
properties, topological vulnerability, and level of functionality 
demanded for its components. However, this approach lacks 
the ability to capture uncertain and dynamic characteristics of 
infrastructure systems and system properties when dynami-
cal processes, acting on the network, occur. For instance, the 
underlying physics of voltage collapse or frequency instability 
in electric power grids is overlooked by CN theory models.
In the ABM approach, each agent is characterized by internal 
data, its behavior, and its environment, and adapts itself to 
environmental changes (D’Inverno and Luck 2004). An agent 
can be used to model both a technical component (e.g., trans-
mission line), and a non-technical component (e.g., human 
operator) (Schläpfer et al. 2008). The rules of the behaviors 
of each agent are represented by finite state machines and 
include both deterministic and stochastic time-dependent, 
discrete events. The ABM approach achieves a closer rep-
resentation of system behaviors by integrating the spectrum 
of different phenomena that may occur, for example, gener-
ating a multitude of representative stochastic, time-depend-
ent event chains. However, this approach demands a large 
number of parameters to be defined for each agent, which 
requires thorough knowledge of the systems studied.
Data needs: IIM requires the commodity flow exchange 
among the electric power sector and the other industrial sec-
tors of economies. CN theory requires the knowledge of grid 
topology, and it can complement this with physical informa-
tion, for example, line length, capacity, and impedance, for 
weighted approaches. ABM requires structural and electrical 
properties of the grid, and, depending on the level of mod-
eling accuracy, may require data about protecting devices 
and operational procedures. The computational resources 
required increase with the amount of data needed. 
These approaches are usually combined into hybrid mod-
els in order to synergistically profit from their strengths, for 
example, power flow models are integrated into ABM. As 
combined approaches are under development and subject to 
research advancements, they are not yet established as best 
practices.
III. Best practice methods with reference to Operational 
Handbook (i.e., N – 1 simulations for types of contin-
gencies, e.g., load flow analysis, Real Time Estimator, 
and EPRI best practice methods.)
 With respect to power system assessment models, three 
categories can be identified: I) security-constrained as-
sessment; II) online risk-based assessment; III) cascad-
ing outage assessment.
I) Models for security-constrained assessment are used in 
system planning. These models employ optimization with 
respect to total costs and constrain reliability parameters 
(e.g., line flow or other stability indicators to be within a cer-
tain range after a contingency occurs). Examples are secu-
rity-constrained optimal power flow for single (electricity) 
(Fu 2005) or multiple energy carriers (gas + electricity) (Liu 
2009). Markets can be embedded.
II) Online risk-based assessment is used to assess whether 
the real-time state of the power system is secure with respect 
to several indicators (i.e., overloads, voltage instabilities, or 
cascading overloads) (Ni 2003). They exploit a system per-
formance indicator for online assessment of the state of the 
power grid. Online assessment can also be included in an op-
timization loop; constraints include an indicator of cascad-
ing effects, called a cascading index (Dai 2012). Operational 
procedures or technical equipment are not captured by this 
assessment.
III) Models for cascading outages capture the propagation 
of a disturbance from the local level up to the systemic level. 
They rely on different level of abstraction. In power energy 
systems, these models represent the behavior of electric 
equipment following a system perturbation (Vaiman 2012). 
They can be static (use steady states solutions, i.e., power 
flow) or dynamic (include transients (Yan 2015)). 
As these models quantify the extent and magnitude of black-
outs, they fit a probabilistic risk assessment of power sys-
tems. Yet, they are difficult to develop and validate because 
the operational procedures executed by TSOs and techni-
cal equipment behaviors (automatic regulation) have to be 
captured. To this end, AMB may be helpful in representing 
operational procedures and technical equipment behaviors. 
The inclusion of operational procedures and technical equip-
ment behaviors entails specific assumptions and undermines 
the generality and applicability of these models. Data needs: 
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Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Character Triggered event Probability 
judgment
Natural (external) Meteoro-
logical
Strong wind m/p, d, a Failure of above-
ground power lines
Flooding
Extreme heat
Extreme cold, snowfall, ice rail
Extreme precipitation, induced 
landslides
Lightning
Geological/
geotechnical
Snow slide
Land slide
Earthquake
Tsunami
Volcanism
Fire Forest
Ling grass
Cosmic Solar flare
Objects
Medical/biological
Internal/external
Human Household disease
Pandemics
Technical Random 
failure
Line break S, d, e
Tower break S, d, e
Substation/transformers S, d, e
Systemic 
failure, aging
Line break S, d, e
Tower break S, d, e
Substation/transformers S, d, e
Structural collapse S, d, e
Accident, fire 
(internal)
Transformer, substation
Control room
Nearby 
accident 
(external)
Industrial fire/explosion
Transportation (rail, road, aviation, 
marine), toxic release
Failure of 
support 
systems
ICT
Unavailability 
of resources
Exchange/repair of components
Human 
unintentional
Failure Control room operator
Maintenance crew
Human-intentional 
behavior (insider, 
outsider)
Malicious 
acts (physical, 
cyber)
Terrorism, destruction of critical 
components
Manipulation of SCADA
Table 2. Checklist for the categorization of hazards and triggered events in the EPS
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Models III.1 and III.2 require structural and electrical prop-
erties of the grid. Models III.3 also require data about pro-
tecting devices and operational procedures, depending on 
the level of modeling accuracy. Models III.3 perform grid 
simulations and are much more computationally demanding 
than III.1 and III.2.
5. Classification of hazards/threats; 
identification techniques including 
check lists 
ENTSO-E OH provides a list of credible types of contingen-
cies, which must be taken into account for N – 1 simulations. 
They are divided in a) normal types, i.e., loss of a single ele-
ment; b) exceptional types, i.e., which could lead to cascade 
effects with non-negligible probability; and c) out-of-range 
types, i.e., loss of elements with very low likelihood.
To be more general and comprehensive, occurring hazards/
threats may affect a single critical component(s) or a number 
of those components (m) or parts (p) of the EPS, either di-
rectly (d) or indirectly (i), i.e., via a failure of another system/
service/function that the EPS depends on. The impact may be 
localized (l) or areal (a); the source can be external or internal.
For example, an earthquake is large-areal, external, may affect 
multiple parts of the EPS directly (p, d) and/or indirectly (p, 
i). It can trigger events endangering the continuous electricity 
supply (“hazard/threat events”).
Hazards/threats can be categorized, levelized, and charac-
terized, and triggered events can be associated to them. A 
probability judgment can also be assigned to these hazards/
threats in order to assess whether they can be credible and 
included in the risk assessment. Table 3 provides a checklist 
for the identification and categorization of hazards/threats 
and triggered events in the EPS.
Table 3 is meant for use of TSOs for the region of control as 
a checklist for the identification of the hazards in a specific 
area. Those hazards deemed irrelevant can be screened out 
from the following risk assessment. Table 6 has been filled 
with a few exemplary cases.
6. Identification of vulnerabilities 
and contingency scenarios, 
critical components analysis and 
countermeasures
TSOs use empirical investigations, statistical data, brain-
storming, and blackout patterns to assess the severity of 
system abnormal states and discover bottlenecks, critical 
points, and critical operations. However, these tools are 
based on past experience and might lack predictive capabili-
ties in some instances. They can therefore be complemented 
with model-based tools, which may unveil “unthinkable” or 
“unpredictable” scenarios.
Complex network theory methods can be applied to the 
analysis of CIs to a) help identify preliminary vulnerabilities 
by topology-driven and dynamical analyses and b) guide and 
focus further detailed analyses of critical areas. Topological 
analysis based on classical graph theory can unveil relevant 
properties of the structure of a network system (Albert et 
al. 2000; Strogatz 2001) by i) highlighting the role played by 
its components (nodes and connecting arcs) (Crucitti et al. 
2006; Zio et al. 2008), ii) making preliminary vulnerability 
assessments based on the simulation of faults (mainly repre-
sented by the removal of nodes and arcs) and the subsequent 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Character Triggered event Probability 
judgment
Management, 
organizational 
and operational 
activities (inside/
outside)
Lack of safety 
culture, risk 
awareness
Top management Interference with 
economic factors
Control room operators Inadequate 
N – 1 simulations
Other relevant actors Manipulated 
settings of 
protective devices
Lack of 
knowledge
Inadequate 
institutional 
programs
Lack of surveillance of safety-
relevant activities
Tree cutting programs Induced flashover
Market/economics-
related
Undue 
economic 
pressure
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reevaluation of the network topological properties (Rosato et 
al. 2007; Zio et al. 2008).
The two main outputs of the vulnerability assessment by 
network theory are the quantification of system vulnerabil-
ity indicators and the identification of critical elements. The 
information they provide is complementary: while vulner-
ability indicators are parameters encompassing the static 
or dynamic characteristics of the whole system, the identi-
fication of critical elements provides rankings of component 
criticalities with respect to their connectivity efficiency or 
their contributions to the propagation of failure through the 
network.
The pure topological structure can be complemented with 
weights extrapolated from the physical features of the power 
grid. For example, reliability and electrical “distances” can 
be combined in the vulnerability assessment of an electri-
cal transmission system and used as weights for the network 
arcs of the graph representative of the system; by so doing, 
the vulnerability and centrality measures evaluated in the 
weighted analysis encompass the information on the physics 
of the service provided by the CI under analysis. Further, the 
analysis of the vulnerability of the network in terms of the 
degradation of its global efficiency due to the disconnection 
of a set of links allows the network elements (arcs or nodes) 
to be ranked with respect to their role in the network global 
communication efficiency.
7. Characterization and evaluation of 
impacts and cascades
Power system states are classified in relation to the grid or 
load/frequency risk levels and urgency of actions related to 
risks of propagation: (a) Normal: no risk for interconnected 
system operation. All consumption and production are in 
balance and requirements on ancillary services and frame-
work conditions are met; frequency, voltage, and power flows 
are within their predefined and allowed limits, and reserve 
(margins) are sufficient to withstand predefined contingen-
cies. (b) Alert: risk for interconnected system operation. 
System within acceptable limits. TSO has uncertainties to 
come back to a normal state after one or more contingency. 
(c) Emergency: deteriorated situation (including a network 
split at a large scale). 
Higher risk for neighboring systems, security principles are 
not fulfilled, global security is endangered, and no guarantee 
of total efficiency of remedies to limit propagation to neigh-
boring systems or to the whole ENTSO-E system. From this 
state, once stabilized, restoration of parts of the system can 
be undertaken (e.g., after load shedding or system split). (IV) 
Blackout: characterized by the almost total or total absence 
of voltage in the transmission power system with conse-
quences abroad and the triggering of TSO restoration plans. 
A blackout can be partial (if part of the system is affected) 
or total (if the whole system is collapsed). From this state, 
restoration is undertaken with stepwise reenergizing and re-
synchronizing of the power system.
The complexity of electric power grids poses challenges to 
the most suitable methods or combination of methods to 
perform risk analysis. The specific characteristic of each 
method, the goals of the analysis, and the availability of data 
guide their selection. A general classification of all the pos-
sible combinations of these factors is achieved during the 
analysis of the specific system; nonetheless, specific exam-
ples can be identified. Models III.1 and III.2 (Section 4) do 
not allow for the quantification of events following a contin-
gency, therefore their use in risk assessment is limited. Mod-
els III.3 (Section 4) provide the phenomenological evolution 
of the system state following a contingency by steady-state 
or dynamic assessment. Models III.3 in combination with 
ABM seem the most promising for the quantification of the 
impacts and cascades following initial contingencies. These 
models are mainly static because the applicability of dynamic 
security assessment in large power grids is still unfeasible.
The societal impact of lack of power supply can be estimated 
by integrating models III.3 and IIM to propagate the demand 
not served to customers up to financial losses stemming 
from the various industrial sectors of economies.
Given the broad span hazards, which can trigger various con-
tingencies in the electric power grid, cascade diagrams might 
be useful for the assessment of the risk of cascading failures. 
These diagrams are represented in the usual frequency/mag-
nitude axes and portray the risk of propagating failures for 
specific system operation set points. The associated severity 
can be measured either in power not supplied (i.e., demand 
not served to the customers) or energy unserved.
In view of the assessment of power network resilience, the 
duration of a loss of supply or of a blackout is a relevant 
measure to quantify the restorative capability of the system 
during recovery. To this end, a combination of models III.3 
and ABM is suitable for capturing the interplay among TSO 
actions, operations of the power generating stations and the 
response of protection and safety equipment during the re-
energizing transient following a black start.
In case of incomplete data, CN theory methods can be use 
as approximation of best-practice models. This application 
entails a strong level of approximation because the physics of 
the electric flow is only partially approximated by CN theo-
ry, which only considers the propagation along the shortest 
paths connecting pairs of components. 
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8. Inclusion of corrective, risk reducing, 
and resilience increasing measures
As outlined previously, the ENTSO-E Operation Handbook 
focuses on security aspects in operation (not in planning) 
with N-1 as a key principle to avoid and manage abnormal 
and insecure situations. However, disturbances may occur 
and be propagated over a wide area and within a short period 
of time. To handle such “deteriorated situations,” in which 
security principles are not fulfilled, global security is en-
dangered, and the whole system may collapse (“blackouts”). 
Action must be taken against them either before automatic 
defense devices are activated or afterwards during restora-
tion. OH Policy 5 deals with “emergency operations”: main 
issues concern i) the awareness of the system states; ii) de-
fense plans at national level including under frequency lead 
shedding and secured functions of control rooms; and iii) the 
restoration processes to return to normal operation with a 
complex sequence of coordinated actions (for details, best 
practice standards and guidelines see UCTE Operational 
Handbook).
As shown by past experience the deterministic N-1 principle 
and the associated concept of prevention and mitigation in-
cluding emergency measures are – if diligently implemented 
– powerful tools to ensure high performance of the electric 
power system but insufficient to cope with multiple failures 
and a plethora of triggered, potentially cascading scenarios. 
This standard approach should therefore be complemented by 
a more holistic, probabilistic approach that strives to achieve 
increased resilience, in particular for planning purposes.
The robustness and resilience of the electric power supply 
system can be strengthened by following basic guiding prin-
ciples, all under cost–benefit constraints:
  Allocate resource buffers/reserves, implement functional 
redundancy and diversity, ensure functionality of key 
coupled components (nodes, links), implement physical 
redundancy and diversity
  Decrease system connectivity, perform decoupling strat-
egies (islanding, FACTS)
  Design a robust grid topology, i.e., balance interconnect-
edness by allowing both centralized and decentralized 
clusters, identify critical nodes and prevent them from 
spreading failures, optimize the grid structure (degree, 
connectivity) against random failures and targeted attacks
  Balance complexity as well as automation and human 
control 
  Design for operation within safety margins, for capability 
of system reorganization in response to external changes, 
and enable self-regulation
  Use real-time measurements and N-1 security checks 
and implement adaptive feedbacks based on these
  Span hazards and threats and associated scenarios to all 
imaginable, including malicious cyber attacks; strive for 
predictability by applying new knowledge and advanced 
modeling techniques, and use a framework to study in-
terdependencies.
As a general rule reduce interdependencies (particularly the 
dependence of the electric power system on other infrastruc-
tures), as interdependent networks are significantly more 
vulnerable than their non-interacting counterparts (Kenett 
2014).
9. Protection against cyber attacks/
manipulation of cyber-physical control 
systems
Electric power supply systems are automated and controlled 
by sensors and actuators and associated human interven-
tions. As they are spatially distributed, timely data flow be-
tween field devices and the central control room. Control 
data and commands are transmitted through communica-
tion channels. The SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) systems – as a prominent example – has tradi-
tionally been a dedicated proprietary system and not con-
nected to the outside world, while recently there has been a 
growing trend towards more general-purpose solutions and 
“commercial off-the-shelf software and hardware making it 
more vulnerable to a set of threats and risks they have not 
been exposed to before” (Hokstad 2012). For instance, con-
trol data are often of interest and used by trading units linked 
to the open access internet, thereby providing entry points 
to malevolent cyber-attacks, not directly constrained by the 
dynamics of the physical process.
There is clear evidence that industrial control systems such 
as SCADA systems are vulnerable to threats, STUXNET be-
ing the most informative example. Several types of targeted 
attacks can be disseminated through malicious links, for ex-
ample, stealthy deception and false-data injection attacks, 
replay attacks, denial-of-service attacks, infected worm at-
tack (manipulation of software).
Methods are available for both, for identifying threats and 
studying potential incidents/triggered event scenarios. Those 
methods comprise a standard on how to perform risk assess-
ment for ICT systems (e.g., IS0/IEC 27001 – 2005, misuse 
case diagrams and attack trees) (Hokstad 2012).
Estimating the likelihood of information security attacks and 
incidents is commonly difficult due to a number of fuzzy fac-
tors, including rapid changes in technology and threats, as 
well as dominating political targets, intentional (bad) charac-
ter of acts, and lack of available sound statistical data. There-
fore, designing and operating such vital control systems as 
dedicated, isolated systems seem to be imperative, or at least 
worth considering.
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1.2. Multi-risk assessment in 
critical infrastructure: The case 
of electricity transmission net-
works
Alexander Garcia-Aristizabal, Center for the Analysis 
and Monitoring of Environmental Risk (AMRA)
Introduction
Recent disasters highlight the fact that natural or man-made 
events can trigger other events, leading to a significant in-
crease in fatalities and damages. There is thus a growing de-
mand from risk managers to implement multi-type hazard 
and risk assessments that take into account scenarios of cas-
cading effects (Scolobig et al. 2014). The issue of vulnerability 
and performance of critical infrastructure is also attracting 
attention from both the policymaking and academic commu-
nities. The term “critical infrastructure” in general singles out 
those infrastructure elements that, if significantly damaged 
or destroyed, would cause serious disruption of a system. 
Disturbances in the services provided by these infrastructure 
systems can have serious implications for the economy, eve-
ryday life, and national security (e.g., Holmgren 2006). In this 
chapter we present a brief discussion of the implementation 
of multi-risk assessments for critical infrastructure, consid-
ering specific aspects of impacts of multiple natural hazards 
to electric networks (Figure 7). 
A typical electricity transmission network includes a number 
of elements that we can group in different classes as power 
generation (“sources” in Figure 7), high and medium voltage 
transmission, and medium/low voltage distribution (“sinks” 
in Figure 7). In network analysis, such elements constitute 
the vertices of the network and are the main points of inter-
est for the vulnerability analysis (e.g., Poljanšek et al. 2012; 
Cavalieri and Franchin 2014; Correa-Henao et al. 2013). 
Adopting a multi-risk perspective provides a number of ad-
vantages: (1) the intrinsic risk harmonization allows for the 
comparison and ranking of different risks; (2) the identifi-
cation and quantitative assessment of cascading-effect sce-
narios allows for the identification of possible consequence 
amplification, which is an important opportunity to increase 
preparedness; (3) a multi-risk perspective provides a frame-
work for assessing the effects of possible mitigation options. 
The intrinsic characteristics of both multi-risk analysis and 
network behavior make multi-risk implementation in net-
work systems a complex task. Natural hazards have the capac-
ity to cause physical damage to network elements; thus, the 
response of the infrastructure network is strongly dependent 
on the physical vulnerabilities of its constituent assets, which, 
in turn, are dependent on their structural characteristics (e.g., 
Poljanšek et al. 2012). The risks associated with different types 
of natural hazards, for example, volcanic eruptions, landslides, 
floods, or earthquakes (see e.g., Figure 7), are generally esti-
mated using different procedures, leading to the incompara-
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bility of individual results and the neglect of possible interac-
tions (Marzocchi et al. 2012). However, the events themselves 
can be highly correlated (e.g., floods and debris flows could be 
triggered by an extreme storm event); one type of threat can 
trigger another, for example, an earthquake triggering a land-
slide), or several independent events may occur close together 
in time (e.g., hurricanes and earthquakes) impacting the same 
elements. The potential consequences associated with differ-
ent hazards when considering their interactions may lead to 
the situation where their combination is much greater than 
simply the sum of their parts (Marzocchi et al. 2012).
Multi-risk assessment in network systems
The multi-risk assessment may be understood as the process 
to determine the whole risk from several hazards, taking into 
account possible hazards and vulnerability interactions (e.g., 
Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2015). Within this context, cascading 
effects are a consequence of interactions generated by cause-
effect relationships among different phenomena. In the case 
of network behavior, however, cascading effects pertain not 
only to the events impacting the network, but also to dam-
ages spreading through the network; the last, depending on 
the connectivity of the network, defines how the vulnerability 
of each element influences the vulnerability of the network as 
a whole. 
The nature of the interactions may be described by a wide set 
of phenomenological relationships, and this makes it difficult 
to set a generalized procedure for quantification of cascading 
effects. To simplify the setting of this problem in a multi-risk 
framework, we can consider the following two major sets of 
interactions: i) interactions at the hazard level and ii) interac-
tions at the vulnerability level (see e.g., Garcia-Aristizabal et al. 
2015a; Marzocchi et al. 2012). It is worth noting that complex-
ity and the ubiquitous random effects that may affect these 
processes make probabilistic approaches the most appropriate 
way of quantitatively characterizing such interactions. 
The interactions at the hazard level are relevant for the iden-
tification of sequences of events impacting one or more ele-
ments of the network. The problem at hand is to identify and 
quantify possible chains of adverse events in which the oc-
currence of one hazardous event entails a modification of the 
probability of occurrence of a secondary event, and where any 
event from the sequence can have an impact on the network 
system. The physical phenomena that can be grouped under 
this class are those cases in which an initial event produces a 
perturbation that, when acting on a given system, may bring 
it to an unstable state, forcing it to find a new equilibrium 
matching the changing conditions (e.g., a new morphological 
equilibrium after a debris flow event). Reaching this new equi-
librium may imply the occurrence of an event that, in this case, 
may be said to be triggered by the initial one (Gasparini and 
Garcia-Aristizabal 2014; Liu et al. 2015). 
Regarding the interactions at vulnerability level, the problem 
is to assess the consequences of the simultaneous action of 
two or more events (not necessarily linked among them) on 
the response of a given typology of exposed elements (e.g., a 
structure). This kind of interaction is therefore referred to the 
case in which the occurrence of one event (the first one occur-
ring in time) may alter the response of the impacted elements 
to another event. In this case, it is assumed that two or more 
events act on a set of network elements and that the additive 
or cumulated effect produces a change in the response of the 
system with respect to the conditions that existed before the 
first occurring event. The cases that can be grouped under 
this kind of interaction are of different natures; in general, the 
physical processes of interest are those related to the response 
of the system to the loads caused by different events, taking in 
account their additive or cumulated effects. Note that the dif-
ferent events may be of the same nature (i.e., same kind of haz-
ards, as, for example, two earthquakes shaking the same struc-
tures in a short-time window) or coming from different kinds 
of phenomena (e.g., the shaking caused by an earthquake as 
the first event, followed by loads caused by a landslide or by 
strong wind). Note also that the different events causing addi-
tive loads can themselves be the result of a common triggering 
event or may be independent events, and this relationship is 
important for the quantitative analyses. 
Figure 8 illustrates the main elements for the multi-risk as-
sessment of cascading effects with respect to electricity trans-
mission networks. First, an exhaustive set of cascading sce-
narios need to be identified and structured (Figure 8a). The 
relevant scenarios can be identified through implementation 
of an adaptive scenario-structuring strategy (e.g., Haimes 
2009), which results from combining forward and backward 
logic approaches. The forward logic analysis consists of iden-
tifying possible outcomes from each initiating event (e.g., a 
flood or an earthquake) following an event-tree-like struc-
ture. The backward logic strategy begins with an endpoint 
(effect) and works backwards to find the most likely causes of 
the effect, following a fault-tree-like structure. The combina-
tion of both approaches stems from the idea of iteratively us-
ing forward and backward logic approaches and combining 
the results obtained to exhaustively identify all the relevant 
scenarios for the specific problem at hand. A first screening 
of the identified scenarios can be performed using a qualita-
tive approach, whereas a transition to semi-quantitative and 
detailed quantitative analyses is required to analyze the most 
relevant scenarios. Liu et al. (2015) present a method for ob-
jectively driving such a transition from qualitative to quanti-
tative analyses in multi-risk assessments. 
Once the relevant scenarios have been screened, it is possi-
ble to proceed with detailed quantitative assessments of the 
interactions. To do this, the conditional probabilities repre-
senting the interactions both at the hazard (Figure 8b) and at 
the vulnerability (Figure 8c) levels need to be calculated. The 
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hazard level interactions are generally assessed with respect to 
the intensity of the triggering event and its capacity for trig-
gering a secondary event of a given size. This assessment may 
result from statistical analyses of databases or from perform-
ing physical modeling. On the other hand, multi-dimensional, 
damage-dependent fragility functions are required for assess-
ing the interactions at the vulnerability level (Figure 8c). Fragil-
ity functions are a widely used tool to assess the vulnerability 
of physical elements to a given type of hazard; they are de-
pendent of the intensity measure used to characterize the haz-
ard. The multi-dimensional fragilities are then functions that 
depend on a set of intensity measures from different hazards, 
taking into account their additive or cumulated effects (see 
e.g., Gasparini and Garcia-Aristizabal 2014; Liu et al. 2015). 
After calculating the failure probabilities of each element (by 
combining the hazard and vulnerability information), it is pos-
sible to use network analysis tools to assess the connectivity 
characteristics of the damaged network (Figure 8d). The aim 
of network analysis is to study how the performance of a net-
work is affected by the removal of elements; in this way, it is 
possible to determine how a change in the network’s structure 
affects the network vulnerability. It is worth noting that, in a 
given scenario, every element of the network can be exposed 
to different typologies of hazards, and likewise each hazard to 
different hazard intensities (this is a consequence of the spatial 
distribution of both the network and the hazard intensity). The 
damaged network configuration can be generated once we de-
termine which elements have failed; as the number of required 
scenarios is normally high, this process is generally compu-
tationally intensive. For that reason, Monte Carlo simulations 
are one of the most frequently adopted approaches to track 
this kind of problem (e.g., Cavalieri et al., 2014). The output of 
the network analysis generally relies on the analysis of prede-
fined performance measures such as, for example, connectiv-
ity loss or the impact on the population served. 
Applied example 
An example of a multi-risk assessment with respect to cas-
cading effects involving electric networks was presented by 
Garcia-Aristizabal et al. (2014, 2015b). In these studies, dif-
ferent possible scenarios of cascading effects triggered by 
earthquakes were analyzed. Beyond assessment of the di-
rect impacts of the earthquakes (main shock and triggered 
seismic sequence) on the built environment, the authors 
present a quantitative assessment of a cascading scenario in 
which earthquakes may cause a failure in a medium-voltage 
ith network element
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transmission line which, in turn, may potentially ignite a fire 
(Figure 9). The example is based on the simulation of an 
earthquake sequence occurring in the surroundings of 
L’Aquila province (Abruzzo, Italy). A set of cascading-event 
scenarios was identified for this example, a subset of which is 
represented in Figure 9a. Figure 9b shows a map with the as-
sessment of expected structural damages in buildings caused 
by the direct impact of the main shock, whereas Figure 9c 
shows an assessment of the expected impacts caused by the 
successive triggered seismic sequence. Regarding the sce-
nario involving the electric network, Figure 9d shows a map 
representing the probability of fire ignition, considering the 
potential damages in different segments of the electric trans-
mission line (caused by the earthquakes) and the availability 
of fuel in the surrounding areas. 
Final remarks
The discussion presented in this chapter focuses on a descrip-
tion of the physical aspects of multi-risk assessment. Howev-
er, the consequences of multiple natural events impacting a 
network system are of a different nature, ranging from direct 
to indirect consequences, both tangible or intangible. Ho-
listic multi-risk analyses also requires the indirect tangible 
consequences to be integrated (see e.g., Garcia-Aristizabal 
et al. 2015), but network analysis under such conditions is 
complex. Optimization-based approaches (e.g., Han and Da-
vidson 2012; Miller and Baker 2015) can be a valid strategy 
to make such a multi-risk analysis a computationally feasible 
task. Such approaches often use proxy measures as indirect 
indicators for network performance, which are usually more 
tractable measurements (Miller and Baker 2015).
Annex: Glossary
In the context of this chapter, the following definitions are 
adopted (adapted from selected references):
Cascading effect scenario: is a synoptical, plausible, and 
consistent representation of a series of actions and events, in 
which an event triggers or interacts with one or more sequen-
tial events. 
Fragility function: a probability distributions indicating the 
probability that a component, element, or system will reach a 
damage state as a function of a predictive demand parameter.
Multi-risk assessment: determining the whole risk from several 
hazards, taking into account possible interactions at the hazard 
and vulnerability levels (see also “cascading effect scenario”).
Vulnerability: this concept is defined, interpreted, and ap-
plied in various ways depending on the research field and 
context in which it is applied. In the context of this chapter we 
adopt the “physical” dimension of vulnerability, understood 
as the probable damage to an element at risk given a level 
of intensity of an adverse event (see also “fragility function”).
Earthquake
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Damage to
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Fire ignition
Damage to
electric network
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Figure 9. Cascading effect scenarios triggered  
by earthquakes as example of implementing a  
multi-risk assessment framework considering  
an electricity transmission line  
(modified from Garcia-Aristizabal et al. 2015b)
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1.3. Multi-hazard perspectives 
for power network resilience
Friedemann Wenzel and Christopher Zobel, 
Geophysical Institute of the Karlsruhe Institute of 
Technology (KIT), Germany and Pamplin College of 
Business, Virginia Tech, Dept. of Business Information 
Technology, Blacksburg, USA
Abstract
In recent years there have been many power interruptions 
and failures caused by natural disasters, some of them in-
fluenced by more than one type of hazard. Because of the 
inherent complexity of such situations, multi-hazard and 
multi-risk analysis are needed to appropriately manage their 
impacts. On the risk side, power supply interruptions can 
affect an area much larger than the hazard-stricken region 
itself, and there is a high potential for such interruptions 
to cause indirect losses to businesses. Such events can also 
have a significant continuing impact during post-disaster 
response and reconstruction. To add to this complexity, not 
only do power supply networks change over time, but they 
can also change their characteristic features as networks. Ap-
proaches for managing such disruptions must therefore be 
responsive and flexible, and they must consider both the im-
mediate impacts of a disruption and the longer-term process 
of recovery. To address this need, this chapter adopts a resil-
ience perspective on the process of managing multi-hazard 
situations and conducting risk assessment and mitigation. 
 
Cases
There are many reported cases of natural disasters causing 
power losses. We begin by providing a number of examples 
of such disasters in order to illustrate the wide range of haz-
ards, from hydro-meteorological and geological/geophysical 
incidents to space disasters, to which power systems may be 
exposed.
Despite the variety of different events represented in this list, 
notice that each one is nevertheless presented as involving 
only a single type of hazard. Almost without exception, such 
situations will typically involve multiple interrelated hazards 
that occur either simultaneously or in a cascading fashion. 
The recent Nepal M7.9 earthquake of 24 April 2015 is an 
example of a multi-hazard situation: the ground shaking 
triggered widespread landslides, which not only destroyed 
residential buildings and caused loss of life but also blocked 
roads and interrupted the power supply. This initial combi-
nation of events led to significant economic losses and made 
relief operations much more difficult. The situation also in-
creased the potential for the displaced soil masses to become 
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Brush fires: On 17 May 1985, a 10 acre brush fire in the Florida Everglades damaged overhead 
transmission lines, causing a blackout across much of South Florida for several hours. A total 
of about 4.5 million people were impacted, including the entirety of the cities of Miami and 
Fort Lauderdale (Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, 1985).
Storms and  hurricanes: On the night of 16 October 1987, the strongest storm in England for nearly 300 years, the 
so-called Great Storm of 1987, blacked out the City of London for six hours, and caused 
approximately £2 billion in damage (Kinder 2013).
Winter storm Anatol struck Europe on 3 December 1999, and was followed on 26–28 
December 1999 by extratropical cyclones Lothar and Martin. The combination of storms 
brought severe damage to thirteen countries, and 10 million people across France and 
Germany were left without power. A fourth of France’s high-tension transmission lines were 
destroyed and 300 of its high-voltage transmission pylons were knocked down; it ultimately 
was described as one of the most significant energy disruptions ever been experienced by a 
modern, developed country (Tatge 2009).
When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on 29 August 2005, it led to more than 2.7 million 
people in Louisiana and Mississippi losing power (USDOE 2005). This was in addition to the 
1.3 million people who had lost power in southeastern Florida when it made landfall there 
several days earlier (NOAA 2005). 
On 27–28 August 2011 Hurricane Irene caused over 4.3 million people on the east 
coast of the United States to lose power, ranging from North Carolina to Massachusetts 
(Gonzalez 2011).
On 29 and 30  October 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck the eastern United States, bringing 
high winds and significant flooding. It ultimately left an estimated 8.5 million homes and 
businesses without power across 16 states and the District of Columbia (WITN 2012).
Earthquakes: 1.4 million PG&E customers lost power on 17 October 1989, when the Loma Prieta 
earthquake struck Northern California and damaged a number of transmission substations 
(National Research Council 1994).
On 22 February  2011, a 6.3-magnitude earthquake struck the city of Christchurch, New 
Zealand. Direct costs to the electric power distribution network operated by Orion New 
Zealand Limited were estimated at over $40 million, and it took approximately 10 days before 
power was restored to 90% of the company’s customers. The underground cable network was 
particularly impacted by the earthquake (Kestrel 2011).
As a result of the Tohoku earthquake of 11 March 2011 in Japan, the Tohoku Electric 
Company immediately lost about 55% of the gross capacity of its fossil-fired and geothermal 
plants. As a result, around 4.4 million of their customers lost power (Kazama and Noda 2012).
Landslides: On 29 July 1999, a landslide in Taiwan cause the #326 transmission tower to collapse, 
disconnecting about 8.5 million people from the electric power grid (Lee and Hsieh 2001). 
Geomag-netic storms: On 13 March 1989, a geomagnetic storm caused the entire Hydro-Québec power system to 
collapse in just over 90 seconds. The predominance of hydropower generation in the system 
allowed for 83% of the total load to be restored within 11 hours (Kappenman 2010).
Ice storms and snow: A severe ice storm impacted Spokane, Washington, on 19 November 1996, causing half of 
the city to lose power and leaving some residents without electricity for up to two weeks. The 
total damage were estimated at over $22 million (NOAA 2013).
Heat waves: On 10 August  1996 power surges due to high summer heat caused a cascading power failure 
that forced the Pacific Intertie, the main power artery between the Northwest and California, 
to shut down, blacking out power to more than four million people in nine states (Golden 
1996).
Table 3. Cases of natural disasters causing power losses
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mudflows once the monsoon started in June. If some of the 
slopes had been brought close to failure by the ground shak-
ing, they could easily have slid with the increased precipi-
tation that comes with the monsoon. This could then have 
distorted the initiated reconstruction efforts as well. 
In the following discussion we reflect on current definitions 
used in the multi-hazard context and plead for simplification 
that seems to be justified from a resilience management per-
spective. Methodologies used in hazard and risk assessment 
are briefly presented and a more systemic view is developed 
by considering power supply systems not as static but as dy-
namic structures. Finally, we introduce the notion of resil-
ience and explicitly address potential options for improving 
such resilience in these complex situations.
Multiple hazards – Definitions
Multi-hazard and multi-risk assessment can be understood 
in different ways. For risk management one tries to include 
different perils in the risk assessment process by making their 
impacts comparable. This can be done easily if the impacts 
are quantified strictly in monetary values, as this provides a 
common basis for comparison. Otherwise, if the risk metrics 
are more complex, for instance, because they include intan-
gible items such as cultural heritage and political stability, 
then indicator-based systems or rankings following expert 
judgment are common. 
In contrast with cases where the events in different perils are 
independent and have no temporal relationship, there are 
also cases where several hazards and risks can coincide in 
time and even be causally related. These events are mostly 
addressed in the current scientific and engineering debate 
(Schmidt et al. 2012; Kappes et al. 2012; Marzocchi et al. 
2012). The causally related hazards and risks are of particu-
lar interest as they are more demanding in scientific and op-
erational aspects and have the capacity to develop into great 
disasters through cascading effects. In mountainous areas an 
earthquake often triggers landslides. If a large rock or soil 
mass slides into a dammed reservoir, it may spill over and 
create a flood downstream from the river that was dammed. 
Volcanic eruptions and earthquakes occur frequently togeth-
er or in sequence, sometimes also generating a local tsunami. 
These interconnected events can be addressed either by logic 
trees or Bayesian chains (Mignan et al. 2014).
However, we adopt the view that the hazards in the cases 
mentioned are – from a risk management perspective –
one hazard only. A major earthquake with magnitude large 
enough to rupture the entire crust of the Earth includes 
the “secondary” hazards of triggered landslides, liquefac-
tion, tsunami, and if the fault is located in the ocean and the 
earthquake has a significant thrust component, seiches, af-
tershocks, and earthquakes triggered in the vicinity. These 
are not separate events but expressions of the same main 
phenomenon.
Different hazards may occur more or less simultaneously by 
chance. This appears at first glance very unlikely. However, it 
is actually not if we (a) look at combinations of rare events, 
for instance, a big earthquake and more frequent events and 
(b) understand disasters from a resilience perspective so that 
one looks at the impact, the response phase, and the recovery 
period, which may range on a scale of years. The immediate 
impact of an earthquake in terms of economic loss and fa-
talities does not strongly depend on the weather conditions. 
However, adverse conditions like very low temperatures or 
heavy monsoon, which may occur every few years, will make 
rescue and response much more difficult and cause conse-
quential losses. 
The relevance for power supply networks depends very much 
on their resilience. If repair and restoration times are short, 
as provisions against disasters have been implemented, the 
chance of a multi-hazard impact is reduced automatically. 
For operational purposes it is important to distinguish be-
tween brownouts (partial outages) and blackouts (total out-
ages), rolling black-outs, etc. Different conditions with re-
gard to safety, losses, and restoration times apply if only parts 
of the network are without power instead of the entire one. 
In the following we ignore these distinctions, as the focus of 
the paper is on the hazard aspects.
Methodologies for multi-hazard and  
multi-risk assessment
Disasters can have wide-ranging implications for the gen-
eration of power, its distribution, and its customers or users. 
The potential loss pattern is thus far more complex than is 
indicated by the assessment of risk for a particular building 
or set of buildings. When the interrelated potential impacts 
of multiple events of such a kind are also taken into account, 
this further complicates the situation and the analysis.
In risk analysis for natural disasters, one considers the hazard 
in a particular parametrization, the vulnerability of struc-
tures, the exposure of these vulnerable entities, and finally 
the expected losses within a given time period. Hazard pa-
rameters are chosen after consideration of the structures at 
risk. For earthquakes this is ground motion, as peak accelera-
tion or peak velocity of the surface, duration of shaking, etc. 
For floods this can be height, duration, streaming velocity, 
etc. of the inundation. For storms, it is usually gust veloc-
ity. A hazard’s characteristics can be provided by scenarios 
and also as probabilistic quantities, where the exceedance 
probabilities for values of the hazard parameter within a pre-
defined period of time are specified (for instance, 50 years 
for buildings). Vulnerability is then measured as the mean 
damage ratio (= mean expected percentage damage) of the 
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object at risk, given a certain level of the hazard parameter. 
The financial component of risk can be measured, with many 
metrics related to direct economic losses (for instance, the 
replacement value of the damaged parts of the power genera-
tion and supply system), as well as indirect economic losses 
(consequential losses to objects, businesses, institutions, that 
while experiencing no direct damage did not function due 
to loss of power). Such economic losses, which are strongly 
dependent on downtime, are obviously a significant part of 
risk analysis in the context of power systems. Another type 
of loss is that associated with social impacts related to the 
loss of power (non-functional hospitals, lack of heat in win-
ter or cooling in hot summers) that can create injured and/or 
traumatized persons. On a local scale, individuals can be im-
pacted by live electric lines brought down by strong winds. 
On a larger scale, the loss of power during periods of very hot 
or very cold weather can negatively impact large numbers 
of people, particularly the more susceptible segments of the 
population, such as the elderly or infirm. 
Different disasters vary in terms of their hazard parameters 
and in the associated frequencies of their occurrence, the in-
verse of which is the return period; they also vary in terms of 
the real extent to which they might be affected by the disas-
ter, its duration and evolution. Earthquakes occur suddenly 
without warning but are short on the scale of minutes. At 
higher magnitudes they affect large areas but are then rare at 
a given site. Floods may occur much more frequently and can 
have a long duration if precipitation is extensive. They also af-
fect large areas. However, they are dependent on topography 
and evolve over time subject to the amount of precipitation 
(also how saturated the soil is from previous weather condi-
tions). They propagate along the rivers in the catchment area 
so that early warning and appropriate response can save lives 
and property. Apart from the hazard the loss pattern is also 
different. 
The key point here is that different hazards are difficult to 
compare. If the risk metric is direct economic loss, the differ-
ence is only the hazard. In this case, the rare earthquake can 
cause much higher losses compared with the more frequent 
floods with their smaller losses. This was actually found in 
a study (Gruenthal et al. 2006), which compares direct eco-
nomic losses to the city of Cologne in Germany for floods, 
earthquakes, and winter storms. The value of interest is the 
annual average loss that is comparable between floods and 
earthquakes.
A standard approach to “compare” and weight the impact of 
different disasters on a risk target, which can be applied even 
in cases where detailed probabilistic hazard and loss models 
are not available, is the “risk matrix” (Garvey 2008). Different 
disaster types are evaluated in the form of scenarios, which 
need to be associated with a frequency of occurrence, the 
losses being evaluated in terms of intensity of impact. Fre-
quency and intensity are often categorized as high, medium, 
and low, which requires appropriate expert judgment. 
Hazards and changing power 
supply systems
Several countries are in the process of changing their power 
supply systems from centralized to decentralized systems. 
This is one consequence of the widespread introduction of 
renewable energy forms which implies the introduction of 
many decentralized power generation methods (wind, so-
lar, geothermal, bio), the reduction of base supply capacity 
by the big utilities, and higher reliance on the networks that 
distribute power to industrial and private customers with 
networks of growing complexity.
The distribution systems are the most vulnerable parts of the 
system. Most failures occur because of damage to this system 
that propagates across the network. In some cases (geologi-
cal disasters) sub-stations are also damaged. Nevertheless, 
the growing complexity of the distribution system represents 
an immanent exposure to natural disasters.
The intent of the smart grid is to use technology to make such 
decentralized networks more effective and more efficient. By 
implementing technology that allows for localized control, 
power networks can take advantage of several opportunities: 
i) grow from the bottom up in a modular way – complement 
the existing structure without needing to replace it; ii) dif-
ferent modules can continue to function whether connected 
to the main grid or not; iii) disruptions can be isolated from 
the rest of the system to reduce cascading failures; iv) unused 
energy can be fed back into the system to better balance de-
mand between peak and off-peak hours; v) renewable energy 
sources can more easily be connected (Farhangi 2010).
Issues with the smart grid include the lack of robust stand-
ards for new technologies, and the associated difficulty of in-
terfacing new and old technologies. Cost is also an issue, as 
is governmental support; the potential for cybersecurity is-
sues is also of increasing concern, as more control is brought 
online, particularly with the growing complexity and less hu-
man oversight (Holmukhe and Hegde 2015). 
The resilience perspective 
Disaster resilience has many definitions, but is generally con-
sidered to provide a means of representing a system’s ability 
to rebound from a disaster. Much work has been done on 
characterizing the inherent characteristics of communities 
that support resilient behavior (Cutter et al. 2013), but it is 
also important to look at the system behavior in response to 
a particular event – how much loss and when and where, and 
to what, and to whom, and how quickly over time can the sys-
tem recover? And what can we do to either reduce the losses 
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or speed up recovery, or both, so that the amount of time 
spent in a state of loss is minimized? We can start with the 
physical system, that is, the ability to resist or recover from 
an actual physical disruption. The impacts of that disruption 
to the economic or social side is critical to keep in mind. It is 
not just the physical system that needs to recover – the inter-
related networks that it supports are also impacted. 
Strengthening is important for resilience, so that the infra-
structure does not suffer a loss in the first place. Avoidance 
is also important, such as burying power lines underground. 
Preparedness also helps with resilience – by prepositioning 
resources in the run up to a storm, they can be mobilized 
more quickly. Because of the uncertainty of occurrence 
(earthquake, landslide, tsunami) and of the impact (hurri-
cane, winter storm) associated with different types of events, 
the ability to change plans and adapt as needs become more 
apparent is also critical. Redundancy provides flexibility 
(with an associated cost), and good connections with neigh-
boring or regional communities can help to facilitate pro-
curement of more or different types of resources.
Tools to improve resilience
As complex relationships make multi-hazard difficult to plan 
for, the notion of flexibility is very important. Problem-solv-
ing is important in human resources, as is practice – sim-
ulated drills, etc. Stress-testing is a useful methodology to 
capture some of the complexity and to help anticipate not 
only cascading features in the evolution of a disaster, but also 
the different impacts on different sectors of society. There is 
no standard methodology for stress tests, as no systematic 
scientific basis for them has yet been developed.
The planned capabilities of the smart grid can potentially 
improve power network resilience by both reducing im-
pacts and speeding recovery: i) reducing cascading impacts 
through isolation of the impacted portions of the network; 
and ii) providing the ability for sub-networks to function 
(possibly at a reduced level) and regulate power usage, even 
if not connected to the main network. They can be self-heal-
ing in the sense that components can also come back online 
automatically once loads return to standard levels, and they 
can adapt to the situation, perhaps by shifting to a higher 
percentage of renewable energy generation, as necessary, to 
offset other losses. With advances in standards, the support 
for modularity can also help with bringing emergency power 
sources quickly online.
Mitigating one disaster can have impacts on others. Mitiga-
tion saves. Strengthening a substation against an earthquake 
can also protect against a landslide or bomb attack. Preemp-
tively shutting down a substation can protect against electro-
cution and allow for quicker post-flooding recovery. Incre-
mental improvements can have big effects, as demonstrated 
by cost-benefit analysis.
While early warning, particularly for hydro-meteorological 
disasters, is considered as key mitigation measure against 
loss of life and injuries, we doubt that its full potential has 
been explored for mitigating power supply losses and their 
adverse impacts.
Recommendations
Although multi-hazard events that cause or aggravate power 
systems failures have not been widely observed to date, they 
do pose a challenge, as they add significant complexity to 
risk assessment and mitigation strategies. The lack of pos-
sibilities to “predict” all conceivable impacts, cascades, and 
their implications for various societal sectors requires a high 
degree of adaptability in developing resilience for those sys-
tems. This is particularly true if we understand power supply 
systems as dynamic systems that change characteristics quite 
rapidly in time.
One cannot predict everything, so one has to be flexible 
enough to adapt. Some events may be likely, making it eas-
ier to focus on and prepare. Scenarios and stress-testing to 
understand the range of possibilities will allow people and 
systems to get prepared. We need to better understand 
multi-hazard events and cascading impacts. Incremental 
improvements can help to protect against multi-hazard, but 
there are trade-offs because it may never come to pass. De-
veloping the scientific background around these issues will 
be very important for understanding cause and effect and 
implications across the different dimensions of a disaster and 
fostering the efficiency of operational approaches against ad-
verse impacts.
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Abstract
This contribution investigates the socio-economic relevance 
of electricity supply security, and some challenges to main-
taining the current level of reliability in Europe. Thus, firstly, 
historic evidence of large-scale power interruptions are pre-
sented and their socio-economic ramifications are discussed. 
Secondly, a newly developed analysis tool, blackout-simu-
lator.com, which assesses the social consequences and eco-
nomic damage from power outages in the European Union 
(EU) up to now, is presented. This  open access analysis model 
allows, for the first time,  an evaluation of the effects of user-
specified power interruptions at a fine scale, both geographi-
cally (266 Nuts-II regions at state level for 27 EU member 
states), and for all sectors of the economy and households 
(10 customer groups in total). This section also contains a 
damage assessment of the September 2003 blackout in Italy.
Thirdly, this contribution contains the first trans-European 
evidence as to how infrastructure projects such as power 
grid expansions are seen by the public, and what factors 
influence these public perceptions. The empirical analysis 
conducted finds, for instance, that while a priori opposition 
to new grids exists at different degrees across EU member 
states, auxiliary information regarding the positive effects of 
a grid development project can have a substantial impact in 
terms of decreasing the opposition of local stakeholders. This 
knowledge is paramount in being able to support required 
energy infrastructures and to ensure a reliable power supply 
in the future.
1. Introduction
For highly specialized societies in Europe, a reliable electric-
ity supply is more than an amenity and an input factor for 
productive processes. This is reflected by substantial societal 
vulnerabilities in the case of a power interruption and by the 
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evidenced level of personal discomfort resulting from power 
outages. Public attention in this regard has increased in past 
years, which has brought about a plethora of research dedi-
cated to this topic.
This contribution summarizes recent evidence on the impor-
tance of electricity supply security, both economically and 
socially; it also provides an overview of the societal challeng-
es associated with maintaining the current level of reliability. 
We first elaborate the dimension and consequences of actual 
power outages, then evaluate the public perception of energy 
infrastructures such as power grids.
1. Socio-economic dimension of 
power outages
One reason for the increasing public and scientific attention 
to electricity supply security is rooted in the experiences of 
adverse effects to society from actual power outages. For in-
stance, within a couple of weeks in 2003, a series of blackouts 
left over 110 million people in Italy, Sweden, Denmark, UK, 
Canada, and the USA without electricity (Bialek 2004). Not 
only did social and economic life come to a stop for up to 
24 hours, but because of the large-scale incidents, hundreds 
of thousands were stranded as private and public traffic col-
lapsed, and had to spend the night far from their homes. As 
another example, Detroit had to ban the drinking of munici-
pal tap water for 72 hours after the restoration of power fol-
lowing a blackout. The threat of epidemic reached a critical 
level after water pipes could not be rinsed during the black-
out, leading to further critical situations, for example, in the 
medical system (Klein et al. 2005). Thus, it is important to be 
aware of the scope and damage categories of power outages, 
especially for long-term planning of the required infrastruc-
tures. Table 5 provides an overview of various historic black-
outs and highlights their technical or human-induced caus-
es. Only when the origins of power outages are considered 
in the course of developing countermeasures, can protection 
against cascading effects and other malfunctioning be devel-
oped and the proper functioning of critical infrastructures 
assured. 
The consequences of cascading effects are especially devas-
tating, as evidenced by the Italian blackout of 28 September 
Date Country People Affected Origin
Mar 2015 Turkey 70,000,000 Technical problem at transmission level
Jan 2015 Pakistan 140,000,000 Militant attack
Jul 2012 India 620,000,000 Overload 
Feb 2008 USA (Florida) 6,000,000 Transformer station 
Jul 2007 Germany (Düsseldorf ) 150,000
Jul 2007 Spain (Barcelona) 350,000 Defective switchgear
Jul 2007 Georgian Republic (Tiflis) 1,100,000
Nov 2006 Germany/NW Europe 10,000,000 Switching error at high voltage-level
Nov 2005 Germany (Münsterland) 250,000 Buckling pylons
Jun 2005 Switzerland 200,000 Error in railway grid
May 2005 Russia (Moscow) 2,000,000
Nov 2004 Spain 2,000,000 Fire in transformer station
Sep 2004 Germany (Rheinland-Pfalz) 1,000,000 Short-circuit
Dec 2003 Germany (Gütersloh) 300,000 Sabotage
Sep 2003 Sweden / Denmark 4,000,000 Switching error
Sep 2003 Italy 56,000,000 Breakdown of high-voltage line
Aug2003 USA / Canada 50,000,000 Computer error / ageing grid
Aug 2003 UK (London) 1,000,000 Wrong safety device
Jun 2003 Italy 6,000,000 Insufficient KW-capacity
Jan 2001 India (New Delhi) 200,000,000
Dec1999 France 3,400,000 Hurricane “Lothar”
Dec 1995 USA (Oregon) 2,000,000 Storm
Jul 1977 USA (New York) Lightning strike
Nov 1965 USA / Canada 25,000,000
Table 4. Overview of historic power interruptions, their dimension and their origin
Source: RWTH Aachen, Verivox, Spiegel, primary research
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2003. Triggered by smaller incidents at different parts of the 
power interconnections with neighboring countries, this 
outage finally affected 56 million Italian citizens. It is a vivid 
example of current vulnerability and preparedness patterns. 
For this and other reasons, this power outage has been inten-
sively researched. The investigation of blackout characteris-
tics helps shed a light on the societal importance of power 
supplies. Bompard et al. (2011), for instance, compares the 
Italian blackout with – in total – 34 blackouts (of which an 
excerpt for Europe is provided in Table 6). The estimated 
costs, the amount of energy not supplied, and the number of 
interrupted end-users are discussed in detail. 
This summary of various outage characteristics highlights 
the correlation between the scope of blackouts and the num-
ber of residents affected. In addition, an estimate is given 
with regards to the macroeconomic costs of these power 
interruptions. However, for a holistic analysis of electricity 
supply security, various additional damage categories ought 
to be accounted for. Thus, personal effects, such as stress, 
mistrust, and other utility losses need to be taken into con-
sideration. In addition to personal effects, the inclusion of 
business damages is paramount. Even the location choices of 
businesses are affected by the prevailing level of supply secu-
rity. Finally, the knowledge of the value of electricity supply 
security is particularly relevant, as infrastructure investment 
costs in particular need to be counterbalanced by quantifi-
able monetary infrastructure benefits.
To provide sound quantifications of the value of supply secu-
rity, the European FP7 project SESAME2 conducted a thor-
ough investigation of the socio-economic dimension of large 
power interruptions. This led to the development of the – 
open access – analysis tool blackout-simulator.com, which 
2  Sesame is a FP7-security project co-funded by the European Commission under grant 
number 261696, aiming to provide a contribution to the development of tools and 
a regulation framework for the security of the European power grid against natural, 
accidental, and malicious attacks. https://www.sesame-project.eu. The views expressed 
herein are those of the SESAME consortium and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect 
the official position of the European Commission.
allows an efficient estimation of the ramifications of power 
outages for all European provinces. The next section briefly 
shows how objective measurements of the costs of power 
interruptions can be conducted and highlights how the pre-
sented model can be used to elicit the ad hoc costs of power 
outages. 
2. Economic dimension of power outages 
Decisions to invest in or maintain the current transmission 
and distribution infrastructure rely on scientific assessments 
of the economic worth of supply security. 
While developing the necessary measures to enhance supply 
security is mainly a challenge to the engineering disciplines, 
it is the task of economic research to support the develop-
ment of a system of incentives to counterbalance possible 
market failures. Obviously, supply security constitutes a 
non-market good and can be purchased only in combina-
tion with the product (electricity). Thus the value of supply 
security cannot be determined directly. That is why the fail-
ure of electricity supply, and in particular the costs occurring 
when electric power cannot be accessed, are usually used to 
assess the value of supply security (Baarsma and Hop 2009; 
de Nooij et al. 2007). Generally, the economic costs of power 
outages can be divided into three categories (Munasinghe 
and Sanghvi 1988): (i) direct costs, (ii) indirect costs, and 
(iii) resulting long-term costs of macroeconomic relevance. 
While in the public eye direct economic losses are typically 
at the top of the list, they are usually subordinate to indirect 
economic losses. Indirect costs also arise as a consequence of 
power outages, yet they belong to that part of the total losses 
resulting from the absence of electricity supply in the after-
math of the power cut, which includes the cost of production 
outages or lost value added due to inputs or logistics being 
unavailable (Centolella, 2006). 
Social impacts 
Country & year Number of end-users interrupted Duration, energy 
not supplied
Estimated costs to whole 
society
Sweden/Denmark, 2003 0.86 million in Sweden and 2.4 million 
in Denmark 
2.1 hours, 18 GWh  €145-180 m 
France, 1999 1.4-3.5 million, 193 million m3 wood 
damaged 
2 days -2 weeks, 400 
GWh 
€11.5 bn
Italy/Switzerland 2003 55 million 18 hours 
Sweden, 2005 0.7 million, 70 million m3 wood 
damaged 
1 day-5 weeks, 111 
GWh 
€400 m 
Central Europe 2006 15 million households Less than 2 hours 
Source: Bompard et al. 2011
Table 5. Summary of historic power outages
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blackout-simulator.com takes these into account and com-
bines direct and proxy measurements with a third assess-
ment category – contingent valuation methods (CVM) – 
which forms the cornerstone of the evaluation of household 
damages. CVM permit the valuation of power outage-related 
losses incurred from the customers’ perspective (Reichl et al., 
2013). Thus, the model includes 8,336 interviewees from all 
EU member states (at least 250 in each country) to evaluate 
the willingness of households to pay (WTP) to avoid power 
outages. The chosen sample of survey participants is consid-
ered representative of the European population. Results were 
checked for consistency. For instance, households typically 
show higher WTP to prevent (geographically) larger inter-
ruptions compared to outages, which affect only their neigh-
borhood.3 
Importantly, the season in which a power interruption oc-
curs is found to significantly influence the damages assigned 
to an outage. European households have a significantly lower 
WTP to prevent an outage in the summer than during the 
winter. This can be explained by lower dependence on elec-
tricity for lighting and the fact that crucial services such as 
heating are likely to be primarily affected during the winter 
season.4 Table 7 presents a summary of influencing factors 
with respect to the valuation of supply security. It should be 
interpreted in the following way: if a household belongs to 
the 20% highest income group, then this household is – on 
average – willing to pay 8.6% more to avoid a power out-
age than the average household in the European Union. The 
same applies to the other variables. 
To summarize, the combination of household and non-
household modeling approaches allows blackout-simulator.
com to assess 266 (of the original 271) Nuts 2 regions in the 
European Union. In total, nine economic sectors, as well as 
households, are incorporated into the analysis. This high 
level of detail is important, especially if results are utilized 
in regional infrastructure planning, regulation, and energy 
policy. Thus, blackout-simulator.com can assess various 
outages with different properties. The database was designed 
to control for the outages’ and residents’ properties, such 
3  In absolute terms WTP to prevent a five-hour power outage affecting the entire country 
increases from €4.4 to €5.9 on average across all 27 member states in the European Union 
(2012) when compared to smaller blackouts.
4  The WTP of European households in this case on average decreases from €4.4 (winter) to 
€2.9 (summer).
as season and time of an outage, household characteristics 
such as level of education, degree of urbanization, previous 
blackout experience, age and household income, as well as 
the geographical extent of the outage. An application of this 
tool is presented subsequently.
2.1. Demonstration of blackout-simulator.com – 
Assessment of September 2003 power outage in Italy
A prominent example of a large power outage in Europe oc-
curred on 28 September 2003 in Italy. The outage was due 
to a series of transmission failures and subsequently affected 
all of Italy (except Sardinia). Figure 10 and Table 8 show the 
extent of this power outage and the average time needed to 
fully restore the electric power supply to different parts of 
the country. The economic losses are modeled for the period 
from 3am until full recovery. The total duration was 3 hours 
in the north, 9 hours in the center, 12 hours in the south, and 
16 hours in Sicily. Figure 10 also depicts the characteristics of 
this outage scenario. In blackout-simulator.com, the affected 
areas are selected by means of an interactive map function.
The economic losses and effects due to this power outage are 
presented in Figure 10. The damage to businesses is calculated 
at €897.5 million. Households’ change of utility, both material 
and non-material amounted to €285 million. This substantial 
damage corresponds to .08% of the annual Italian GDP.
All damages to the different NACE sectors are reported in 
million (m) €.
The results were compared with other relevant studies, such 
as an assessment by a dedicated board of Italian experts and 
scientists (Commissione di Indagine, 2003) which found the 
outage caused costs of approximately €640 million and a loss 
of load of 160 MWh. While this only takes into account non-
household damages, it only marginally deviates from the 
damages of businesses and the public sector calculated using 
blackout-simulator.com as given in Table 8. Figure 11 pre-
sents a summary of the power outage assessment with black-
out-simulator.com and its intuitive assessment procedure.
As shown, blackout-simulator.com provides an intuitive5 and 
rational means of evaluating the value of electricity supply 
5  Depending on the desired level of detail, the elicitation of power outages is now a matter 
of about two minutes and five to ten mouse clicks.
Variable WTP Increase compared to mean of entire sample
Belonging to country’s highest 20% income group 8.6%
Children below 14 in household 4.4%
Spare time is affected 14.6%
Whole country is affected (instead of residential street only) 32.7 %
Table 6. WTP increasing factors for European households to avoid power cuts
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stability-enhancing investments and other energy policy de-
cisions. In making this tool available for the broader public, 
the model allows the economic valuation of supply security 
on the basis of blackout costs for companies, institutions, and 
households’ willingness to pay (WTP). For its development, 
an unprecedented survey incorporating over 8,300 house-
holds in all EU member states was conducted. In the light of 
the presented – substantial – value of electricity supply se-
curity, measures to secure this amenity have gained increas-
ing public attention. In this regard, social factors such as the 
perception of grid developments are highly important to en-
sure a smooth interaction with the public when investing in 
a secure network infrastructure of the future. The following 
section thus presents a novel assessment approach making 
use of a trans-European quantitative framework, which has 
recently become available.
 
3. Social perception of electricity 
infrastructures
The challenge to maintain high levels of reliability will re-
quire an adaptation and modernization of energy infrastruc-
tures. Furthermore, the current European Union vision for 
a low-carbon electricity system requires the large-scale ex-
pansion of overhead transmission lines to integrate renew-
able energy sources (RES) while ensuring a secure electricity 
supply for the future. However, especially in the recent past, 
new installations – for instance, of overhead transmission 
lines – across Europe have been stymied by local opposition 
which causes long delays in project completion and occa-
sional cancellations. However, the implementation of renew-
able electricity sources in particular hinge on increased grid 
connectivity (ENTSO-E, 2012). To overcome this dilemma, 
knowledge of the public perceptions of infrastructures and 
the influential factors of such perceptions is paramount. This 
is the case not only for the electricity system.
 
To this end Cohen et al. (2016) present the first empirical 
assessment of the social acceptance of electricity infrastruc-
tures with a focus on transmission lines. They find sub-
stantial differences across Europe, with a strong tendency 
of locals to initially oppose nearby grid development in the 
Western European countries, and a more welcoming view 
in the new (Eastern) EU member states. In many cases, the 
resistance against power infrastructure is understandable 
from a personal perspective, yet a profound assessment of 
this problem has so far been missing. The importance of tak-
ing into account these perception patterns has nevertheless 
been acknowledged. For instance, a recent ENTSO-E report 
states, with respect to grid enhancement, that “overall, there 
has been material delay to the delivery of one third of the in-
vestments, mostly because of social resistance” (ENTSO-E, 
Date of start of outage 28 September 2003
Start time of outage 03:00 am
Duration in hours 3-16h depending on the region
Provinces affected Italy (except Sardinia)
Public holiday Yes (Sunday)
Figure 10: Evaluation of the power outage in Italy on 
28 September 2003
Primary  
sector
Secondary 
sector
Tertiary  
sector
Total  
losses 
WTP 
Households
Total losses  
in region
Region North 5.3 136.7 60.8 202.8 43.0 245.8
Region Center 20.6 217.6 154.6 392.8 98.2 491.0
Region South 20.9 82.8 97.5 201.2 94.3 295.5
Region Sicily 12.4 33.7 54.6 100.7 49.5 150.2
Total 59.2 470.8 367.5 897.5 285.0 1182.5
% of GDP 0.004% 0.031% 0.025% 0.060% 0.019% 0.079%
Table 7. Total losses across all regions and sectors; summary of blackout-simulator.com
3	hour	outage
9	hour	outage
12	hour	outage
16	hour	outage
Legend
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Figure 11. Implementation of the assessed power outage in Italy on 28th September 2003  
using blackout-simulator.com (own depiction).
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2012). The tendency whereby a general acceptance – name-
ly, of the transition towards a low-carbon society – meets 
resistance for nearby, yet necessary, development is often 
referred to as a “not-in-my-backyard,” or NIMBY issue. An 
analysis of this “NIMBY-Status-Quo”6 as provided by Cohen 
et al. (2016) is presented in Figure 12. This depicts the gener-
al perception of electricity networks being built 250 m from 
the home of surveyed residents. 
The fact that Western European countries tend to exhibit 
greater tendencies to reject energy infrastructures is clearly 
visible. Apart from this analysis of the Status-Quo, Cohen et 
al. (2016) also provide an assessment of the effects of infor-
mation regarding an infrastructure project’s advantages. In-
terestingly, a strong effect of upfront information campaigns 
is found. As soon as locals are informed that power lines will 
have a positive economic or environmental impact, these 
projects will generally meet less resistance than those having 
only compensatory benefits to the community (e.g., building 
public infrastructure). In particular, emphasizing any long-
term carbon reduction potential or economic benefit of a 
particular project will, on average, decrease the likelihood 
that a locality is strongly opposed to the project by 10-11%. 
The relative effects of different information campaigns are 
displayed in Figure 13. 
It can therefore be concluded that, in fact, it does matter 
what kind of information regarding the – possibly – posi-
6  In particular, this concerns the share of residents who strictly oppose the presented 
development. In this regards DNA corresponds to “Definitely not accept” as shown in the 
figure.
Figure 12. Social acceptance of power infrastructure 
and grids in Europe
Source: Cohen et al. 2016 
Figure 13. Evaluation of perception-changing 
information campaigns
Source: Cohen et al., 2016 
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tive effects of a certain infrastructure project are transmitted 
to residents. This is very important for project managers to 
know so that they can adapt and plan their information strat-
egy accordingly. 
Overall, the results show that if the positive benefits of a 
proposed energy infrastructure can be presented to locals, 
acceptance of a project raises substantially. The strong posi-
tive effect on acceptance induced by two out of three benefit 
packages suggests that many locals can overcome NIMBY 
sentiments when presented with the proper information. 
In addition to the country-specific analysis, particular atten-
tion has been paid to the effects and prevelance of electricity 
greening strategies. Recent findings dwell upon the fact that 
the national use of renewable energy sources (RES) influenc-
es both acceptance levels and the efficacy of treatment effects 
to change a potentially negative (i.e., rejecting) precondition. 
Figure 14 shows that the larger the proportion of RES in final 
energy consumption, the lower the chance of outright oppo-
sition to new grid projects (Cohen et al. 2016). 
The same is the case for the efficacy of information cam-
paigns. When compared and correlated to the share of RES, 
they are found to have less – positive – effect.
The summarize, the data suggest that if renewable sources are 
already heavily used, the likelihood of immediate rejection is 
reduced, but also that information campaigns have less of an 
effect once residents are strictly against an energy infrastruc-
ture project. More generally,  research on social acceptance 
of electricity networks has shed light on the driving factors 
behind people’s perceptions regarding new infrastructures. 
The empirically rooted results emphasize the need for devel-
opers to tailor their acceptance strategies to the specification 
of projects and the special situation of nearby residents. As 
Figure 14. Acceptance of energy infrastructures and share of renewable energy utilization 
Source: Cohen et al. 2016 
Figure 15. Average effects of information campaigns vis-a-vis renewable energy presence.
Source: Cohen et al. 2016 
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already discussed by Cohen et al. (2014), the development of 
nearby energy infrastructure incurs a real cost to local stake-
holders; thus, acceptance strategies should be focused on fa-
cilitating quick and efficient negotiations between locals and 
infrastructure developers, and not on ignoring the claims of 
locals. 
This contribution shows which information strategies will 
have the largest positive effect in terms of reducing outright 
opposition, which would make reaching a compromise with 
local residents difficult. This is available for each country in 
the European Union separately and enables project manag-
ers to tailor specific information campaigns with particular 
features. Thus, for instance, any economic ramifications 
of new transmission lines should be flagged in France and 
Spain, whereas any benefits to the environment should be 
the focus in the Netherlands and Belgium.
4. Summary
The supply of electricity is considered highly reliable in Eu-
rope. However, maintaining this degree of reliability in the 
future involves a number of challenges. Despite high levels of 
supply security, large scale interruptions – which are shown 
to occur even in Europe – bring about substantial challenges 
for societies, businesses, and every individual. 
Efficient decisions regarding investment in energy infra-
structures are possible only if the value of electricity supply 
security to households and businesses can be determined. To 
obtain a holistic valuation of supply security, a model-based 
approach is presented: blackout-simulator.com. This includes 
precise information from over 8,300 European households 
and accounts for damages to businesses, administration, and 
public institutions using a split accounting approach.
As a result, not only particularly vulnerable sectors, such as 
the semiconductor industry, papermaking, or data-generat-
ing processes, but all branches of the economy (NACE 2008 
economic classification) can be modeled. It is thus possible 
for the first time to judge subsectors of the European econo-
my province by province with respect to their degree of de-
pendence on a reliable supply of electricity. 
This contribution contains a demonstration of this tool, 
which analyzes the effects of the 2003 power outage in Italy 
affecting over 55 million people. It lasted for three hours 
in the north, nine hours in the center of Italy, 12 hours in 
the south, and up to 16 hours in Sicily. The macroeconomic 
damage of this power outage in its entirety was calculated 
to be €1.18 billion (in 2003 €). The level of detail is unprec-
edented and includes economic damage data for every sec-
tor and for households (€897.5 million and € 285.0 million, 
respectively).
Finally, a presentation of the public perception of power 
infrastructures highlights the differences among European 
countries and presents opportunities to support appropriate 
information campaigns. It was found that environmental and 
economic advantages should be presented in most of the EU 
member states in order to bring affected – and mainly op-
posing – residents to the table for further discussions and 
explanations of a project’s specifications. Generally, however, 
although energy infrastructures are regarded as necessary, 
the challenge of social acceptance is among the main causes 
of big delays in European grid infrastructures. Using novel 
evidence, this can now be addressed and best-practice infor-
mation campaigns can thus be developed based on country-
specific preference structures.
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5. Appendix
1.1. Economic Sectors
Based on data availability we determined nine economic sec-
tors, which are based on the NACE Rev. 2 System.
  (A) Agriculture, forestry and fishing
  (B,D,E) Mining and quarrying; 
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Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply;
Water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities
  (C) Manufacturing
  (F) Construction
  (G,H,I) Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehi-
cles and motorcycles;
Transporting and storage;
Accommodation and food service activities
  (J) Information and communication
  (K) Financial and insurance activities
  (L,M,N) Real estate activities;
Professional, scientific and technical activities;
Administrative and support service activities
  (O,P,Q,R) Public administration and defence, compulsory 
social security;
Education;
Human health and social work activities;
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
1.5. Transition to a renewables-
based power system: 
Why public participation has 
an important role to play in 
power grid planning
Rotraud Haenlein, Germanwatch
Summary
An upgrade of the European electricity infrastructure is cru-
cial for the future renewables-based low-carbon power sys-
tem that will ensure energy security and sustainability. We 
see more and more evidence that a power system based on 
fluctuating energy sources such as wind and solar can provide 
a secure, low-carbon supply even in a highly industrialized 
Europe. But at the same time, these new renewable energy 
sources pose a challenge in terms of network integration. At 
the same time, transmission grid projects have turned out to 
be at the center of the public debate on the local level. 
Enhanced stakeholder engagement, public dialogue on cor-
ridor finding and technology, and a transparent planning 
procedure based on high environmental standards may help 
overcome public concerns about new transmission grid pro-
jects. Several European transmission grid operators (TSOs) 
have tested different innovative approaches to achieve early 
cooperation with environmental groups and to involve the 
public at a very early stage in the planning procedure. Their 
experience shows that it is worth cooperating early with local 
stakeholders. At the same time, this remains a field of con-
tinuous learning. 
Power grids of the future
Power grids form an integral part of energy transition in Eu-
rope and have an important role to play in the future Euro-
pean low-carbon power system based on renewables (Balke 
2014). They are cost- and energy-efficient compared to other 
infrastructure options such as storage technology. More and 
smarter power grids can help balance fluctuations in renew-
able energy supplies. Therefore, the upgrade of European 
power grids is an important part of restructuring our energy 
system.
In the context of this ongoing transition, we are facing both 
technical and social challenges. Often, when large transmis-
sion lines are being planned or constructed there are local 
protests. Those conflicts should be addressed through early 
and meaningful participation with affected communities and 
other stakeholders. This article outlines general principles 
for meaningful public participation with reference to expe-
riences from the European BESTGRID project. Within this 
project, five European TSOs have closely cooperated with 
environmental NGOs and over the period 2013-2015 have 
tested different approaches of early cooperation with civil 
society stakeholders in Belgium, the UK, Italy, and Germany. 
Other examples throughout Europe support their learning 
that early stakeholder engagement may help in finding plan-
ning options that have better local acceptance (Sander et al. 
2012).
Figure 16. The future renewables-based power system 
in Europe requires new interconnections to transmit 
renewable electricity from remote generation sites to 
consumption centers and storage sites.
Source: Germanwatch 2015
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Transparent planning procedure
Planning a power grid is highly complex, making it difficult 
for transmission system operators (TSOs) to provide clear 
and useful background information. Most people would not 
want to read long reports or consult numerous studies and 
other documents. Also, different stakeholders will want dif-
ferent information: experts might want to know about com-
plex technical issues, while non-expert local residents might 
want easily understood information that is relevant to their 
communities. 
The relevant authorities, as well as the TSOs, must take re-
sponsibility for providing information early in the planning 
process to experts and others interested in being consulted. 
Those responsible for grid planning should make use of all 
means of communication to reach broader audiences and 
provide different types of information. They need to commu-
nicate clearly how the power grid planning procedure works 
in the respective country. A key condition of an open, trans-
parent planning process is that all concerned understand the 
structure of the planning procedure and know the major play-
ers with legal planning responsibility in power grid planning.
Early participation in corridor finding 
procedure
Transmission system operators wishing to develop an in-
novative and participatory approach to power grid planning 
will ask themselves at an early stage of the process: 
  Who should be involved, when and how?
  What level of participation is appropriate and feasible at 
which stage of the planning process?
To answer these questions, two planning levels – needs as-
sessment and corridor and route planning, as shown in 
Figure 17 – should be analyzed separately from each other. 
At both planning levels, public participation might follow a 
five-step approach (Rottmann 2015):
1. A thorough and diligent stakeholder analysis (“stake-
holder mapping”)
2. A tailor-made and transparent public participation 
strategy to be used during the needs assessment or for a 
specific project
3. Sound implementation and execution of the participa-
tion strategy
4. Presentation and discussion of the outcome of public 
consultations, including room for feedback from the 
stakeholders concerned
5. Evaluation of the public participation strategy
 In addition to these general guidelines for effective par-
ticipation, TSOs will also need to develop strategies that 
relate to the interests expressed by stakeholders con-
cerned with a specific power line project. 
Options for and limits to public 
participation in power grid planning
Stakeholders engaging in planning processes often have high 
expectations about the outcome. To avoid disappointment, 
grid planners and operators need to clearly explain what they 
mean by participation.
Until now, public participation in the grid planning process 
has usually been limited to the first two levels of participa-
Figure 17. Planning procedure for transmission lines
Source: Germanwatch, based on Bundesnetzagentur 2015
Needs assessment
Level 1
Corridor / route planning
Level 2  
(a two-step procedure in some countries)
Construction 
and operation
Scenarios Grid development 
plan
Corridors Detailed routes Construction and 
operation
Scenario development 
EU / national
Grid or network 
development plans EU 
(TYNDP) / national
Corridors Detailed 
determination of 
routes
What are the likely 
future developments of 
electricity generation 
and demand?
What projects are 
needed?
In which corridor 
should the  power line 
be built?
Which route should be 
determined in detail? 
Where will pylons (or 
cables) be built?
Spatial planning Corridor and route 
planning
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tion.7 This is because planning a power grid requires expert 
knowledge in a range of fields, including energy economics, 
electrical engineering, planning law, and nature protection 
law, to name a few. Power grid and energy experts thus take 
the final decisions related to the needs assessment. These 
experts may include “trusted experts” from different stake-
holder groups, but in addition, local knowledge needs to be 
taken into account by these experts. However, public partici-
pation may go further in the corridor planning process and 
involve some form of co-decision making (third step on the 
“ladder of participation” shown in Figure 18). There are good 
opportunities for public participation in power grid planning 
at the level of information and consultation. Public participa-
tion can be extended to the level of co-decision, especially 
when it comes to determining corridors and routes.
Grid operators, politicians, and public authorities have gone 
beyond the formal requirements and extended their scope 
of engagement by organizing informal information and dia-
logue events at an early stage of the planning. There are vari-
ous reasons for this: first, early engagement can contribute 
to finding more suitable planning options. Second, iden-
tifying the concerns and needs of local and environmental 
stakeholders at an early stage helps to more effectively deter-
mine local mitigating measures. Finally, various stakeholder 
groups have expressed their dissatisfaction that legally re-
quired planning procedures do not take their interests suf-
ficiently into account.
There is still much more to do: ways should be sought how 
best to incorporate the conclusions of informal dialogues, 
in which concerns raised by locals and other relevant stake-
holders are discussed, into the formal planning procedure.8
Stakeholder interests and public concerns
A broad range of stakeholders may be directly or indirectly 
affected by a power line project. Their legitimate yet some-
times conflicting interests and arguments need to be taken 
into account and carefully balanced during the planning pro-
cess. There are, however, various public concerns, which are, 
from the point of view of numerous local stakeholders, not 
sufficiently addressed within the formal planning procedure:
  Landscape: New power lines and new power generating 
facilities, like wind turbines, change the appearance of 
familiar landscapes. Local residents, tourists, or people 
7  With reference to the “Arnstein ladder of participation”: Sociologists suggest that public 
participation can be divided into four levels, ranging from pure information to self-
governance. Arnstein, Sherry R (1969). A Ladder of Citizen Participation. JAIP, Vol. 35, 
No. 4, 216-224. www.lithgow-schmidt.dk/sherry-arnstein/ladder-of-citizen-participation.
html. Rau, I, Schweizer-Ries, P & Hildebrand, J (2012). Participation Strategies: The Silver 
Bullet for Public Acceptance? In: Kabisch, S et al: Vulnerability, Risk and Complexity: 
Impacts of Global Change on Human Habitats, Leipzig, 177-192.
8  Further information on the options for participation within formal and informal planning 
procedures in European, German, and UK legislation can be found in Harrison K and 
Verheyen R (2015, in press). Opportunities and Restrictions for Public Participation in 
European Transmission Grid Projects (www.germanwatch.org).
who love a particular landscape may feel strongly about 
their area and thus oppose a project they feel will nega-
tively impact on the environment, landscape, or residen-
tial areas. Concerns about impacts on landscapes and 
nature may add to public pressure that aims to prevent 
projects going ahead. Grid operators often struggle with 
addressing the interests and heightened emotions of con-
cerned residents during the corridor planning process. 
They have to take account of various legitimate and le-
gally protected goods and interests, including property 
law, nature and conservation regulation, and emission 
control legislation. Landscape protection is, in some 
countries, part of nature conservation law, but in a large 
number of countries, the law does not sufficiently pro-
tect the legitimate interests of stakeholders such as tour-
ist associations and local residents. As a result, little or 
no attention is paid to their concerns about protecting 
their surrounding landscapes during the formal planning 
procedure. Similarly, no regulation has been enacted to 
require that power lines be built far from residential ar-
eas. Any such attempt, however, may prove challenging, 
given that within such a legal framework no new power 
line could be built in densely populated countries, for ex-
ample, Belgium.
  Concerns related to electromagnetic fields (EMF): 
In spite of national exposure limits based on scientific 
knowledge, public concerns about the possible health 
impacts of magnetic fields surrounding power lines have 
not been sufficiently overcome by international research. 
Certain health issues remain a concern. For one, the ques-
tion as to whether EMF exposure might have additional 
adverse impacts has not been satisfactorily explained by 
Figure 18. Public participation levels in  
power grid planning
Source: Germanwatch: based on Arnstein (1969) and Rau et al. (2012)
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the international research community. Second, on a more 
general level, people are uncomfortable with the invisibil-
ity of EMF, which they feel is not addressed satisfactorily 
either. Therefore, further research and transparent infor-
mation about the impacts of EMF is needed. Power grid 
planners need to take health-related issues very seriously. 
They should provide detailed information on the poten-
tial impacts of electromagnetic fields and cooperate with 
experts from universities in explaining their potential 
impacts.
  Decrease in property value: In many cases, public ob-
jections to a grid extension project may remain despite 
efforts to reduce impacts, as some power lines will need 
to cross private property, particularly in densely popu-
lated areas. There are different types of compensatory 
measures which need to be considered or taken accord-
ing to national law, including:
  Financial compensation for land, forest, or prop-
erty owners: Property owners are compensated ac-
cording to national law when the approving author-
ity obliges them to accept a pylon being built on their 
property or spanning a line over their property.
  Compensation for communities: In some countries, 
for example in Germany, TSOs pay compensation for 
the construction of new transmission lines on munici-
pal territory. Compensatory measures for communi-
ties can also include non-financial measures that re-
duce the negative impacts of other local projects.
  Compensatory measures for environmental im-
pacts: If environmental impacts cannot be avoided, 
then compensation must be awarded according to Eu-
ropean and national nature conservation legislation.
Technology: Overhead line or 
underground cable?
Faced with the upgrade or construction of new power lines, 
many affected communities or civil action groups have been 
requesting that grid operators use underground cabling in-
stead of overhead power lines. However, there are compel-
ling economic and technical reasons to do otherwise.
In general, the voltage at which electricity is transmitted or 
distributed determines the technology applied. In various 
European countries, grid operators use underground ca-
bling for a large part of the low- and medium-voltage net-
work. For extra-high voltage lines in the transmission grid, 
this is very rarely the case. This is due to several technical 
and economic constraints for underground cable technol-
ogy at higher voltage levels. At the extra-high voltage level 
(EHV), technical restrictions and risks, especially within 
the AC technology, as well as the substantially increased 
costs, explain why overhead technology is the world’s most 
commonly used technology. 
Figure 19. Power grids: Technology depends on the voltage level
Source: Germanwatch, based on 50Hertz transmission
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However, “partial undergrounding” has become prominent 
in some parts of Europe. Underground cables in AC technol-
ogy at the extra-high voltage level are sometimes used for 
small sections of the transmission grid (mostly about 3-5 and 
up to 10 km in length) in densely populated areas. Several 
small-scale projects have been implemented, one of the larg-
est being the Dutch Randstad 400kV AC cable, spanning over 
10 km, laid near Rotterdam and operated by the transmission 
system operator TenneT. Other such projects are planned in 
Denmark, Belgium, and Germany. 
Due to technical challenges and economic restrictions, under-
ground cable technology will presumably not prove to be an 
easy solution for the upcoming transmission grid projects. But 
partial undergrounding may in some cases contribute to ac-
ceptable solutions for some projects. The use of underground 
cables should be based on the development of comprehensible 
criteria developed in a transparent procedure. This requires 
consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. The feasibil-
ity of different technology options needs to be addressed and 
communicated in public consultations. This includes an open 
and honest dialogue about the feasibility, restrictions, disad-
vantages, and advantages of different technology options.
Nature conservation
Power grid extension projects, which form part of the energy 
transition, have impacts on the landscape and the natural 
environment. Therefore, environmental impact assessment 
plays an important role in the planning procedure. The EU 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive and nature 
conservation directives determine common, high environ-
mental standards that are applied in grid development. But 
there is considerable scope for advancing good practice in 
complying with these regulations and in other areas of nature 
protection and enhancement.9 
Early cooperation between grid operators 
and environmental groups
The BESTGRID project partners, TSOs and NGOs alike, 
have discovered that local stakeholders are highly interested 
in being involved in the corridor- and route-finding proce-
dure. They rightly demand a transparent explanation of the 
criteria for choosing one or several route alternatives. 
However, early stakeholder engagement per se does not of 
course mean that all concerns can be dispelled. Even the best 
participatory approach cannot provide a generally accepted 
solution, bearing in mind that a broad range of differing in-
terests is affected by large transmission grid projects such as 
the Belgian Stevin project. Those who live near the power line 
may, understandably, reject the project as such and will not be 
9 See Part 2 of the BestGrid handbook “Protecting Wildlife and Nature in Power Grid 
Planning” (2015, Birdlife Europe, 2016)
satisfied even by a procedure that follows good practice. But 
a transparent and participative approach may result in a bet-
ter and more legitimate final decision reflecting the concerns, 
suggestions, and interests of a broader range of stakeholders.
European TSOs have tested and analyzed new ways of allow-
ing early public participation within several BestGrid pilot 
projects (ie., the NemoLink interconnector and the Belgian 
StevinLink project). 
Learning from these experiences, they are fully aware that this 
is the beginning of a long but important and fruitful process of 
establishing a regular public dialogue on the future power grid 
development in European countries. They see the dialogue as 
a joint learning process, not as a “push and accept” strategy. 
This process needs strong backing by national policymakers 
who must explain the importance of power grid infrastructure 
for the transition towards a low-carbon power system that can 
guarantee a safe, secure, and sustainable energy future.
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1.6. Safety culture in high risk 
industry and main principles
Lubomir Tomik,  
Consulting company CESys Ltd.
Safety culture plays an important role for all high-risk in-
dustries, including energy and transmissions systems opera-
tions. Improvement in human safety behavior is the most 
cost-effective solution to strengthen risk management. Hu-
man factors play a decisive role in failure management and 
account for about 80% of all events. To increase network re-
silience and improve disaster risk management, a solid and 
practical safety culture is essential. 
What is Safety Culture?
Simply put, safety culture (SC) is that part of a culture which 
relates to safety. It is a subset of the following elements that 
relate to safety: shared mental content, norms, institutions, 
and characteristic of physical items, such as things that peo-
ple make, have, use, or respond to, for example, forms, pro-
cedures, signs, equipment (Corcoran 2010).
One example is nuclear energy. The following differentiations 
and categories of safety culture are given by the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG): i) individual com-
mitment to safety, which includes personal accountability, 
questioning attitude and effective safety communication; ii) 
management commitment to safety, which includes leader-
ship safety values and actions; iii) decision-making and re-
spectful work environment; and iv) management systems, 
which include continuous learning, problem identification 
and resolution, and the right environment for raising con-
cerns and work processes. 
According to INSAG, safety culture can be defined as fol-
lowing: “Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes 
that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues re-
ceive the attention warranted by their significance.”
Figure 21. Safety culture
Source: Corcoran 2010
James	Reason	–	Five	components	of	Safety	Culture
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The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) de-
fines the following approach to safety culture, based on eight 
principles: i) everyone is personally responsible for nuclear 
safety, ii) leaders demonstrate commitment to safety, iii) 
trust permeates the organization, iv) decision-making re-
flects safety first, v) nuclear technology is recognized as spe-
cial and unique, vi) a questioning attitude is cultivated, vii) 
organizational learning is embraced, and viii) nuclear safety 
undergoes constant examination.
Another example is the aviation industry. For instance, ac-
cording to the document published by UK CAA in 2002, there 
are the following recommendations to aviation maintenance 
organizations: general and introduction to human factors, 
safety culture and organizational factors, human errors, hu-
man performance and limitations, environment, procedures, 
information, tools and practices, communication, teamwork, 
professionalism and integrity, and an organization’s human 
factors program.
According to psychological theory, safety culture is very 
complicated as “most of the culture is below the surface. 
Above the surface we find the visible aspects of culture: ar-
tifacts, people’s actions, and language use.” (Schein, 1985). It 
is impossible to underestimate any details. Preventing failure 
and critical thinking can prevent fatal outcomes. 
One of the examples of implementation of safety culture is 
the project, being carried out by Slovenske elektrarne, the 
Slovenian part of the ENEL group. The approach is based on 
the following performance drives: equipment performance, 
organizational culture, processes, human performance, 
performance excellence. To achieve a common approach 
to safety, the project has the following deliverables: revised 
corporate policies, development of clear set of values and be-
havior that support safety, preparation of new tools and op-
erational procedures, implementation and communication 
plan, specific training for workers and management, regular 
self-assessment and benchmarking on the application of the 
principles of safety culture.
Another example of the tools used is an employee award 
program. This reinforces exemplary behavior on the part of 
all employees through visible positive support and the pres-
entation of awards to those who act as role models in terms 
of observing safety principles; it also motivates employees 
to actively report their concerns, weaknesses, and safety im-
provement issues. Another important aspect is to reinforce 
Figure 22. Just Culture Process
Source: Reason, 1998
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trust between management and employees using various fi-
nancial and non-financial awards.
A further tool is the Culpability tree implementation in 
the Just Culture (Figure 22). According to this tool there are 
several forms of unsafe behavior: human error, which in-
cludes an unintentional act; an act carried out unwillingly 
by a person; negligent conduct, when a person did not pay 
enough attention; reckless conduct, when a person did not 
care about what happened; and intentional “willful” viola-
tions. We can transform such a culture to a process diagram 
(see Figure 23).
Confidential reporting is another tool. A confidential chan-
nel for the reporting of issues should be established at each 
plant to allow reporting of any kind of safety issue without 
disclosing the originator of the report. According to WANO, 
eight out of ten events regarding fuel damage in reactor core 
are caused by human failure; 75% of reported events at NPPs 
is caused by human error; 15-20% of production losses result 
from incorrect company decisions. 
Implementation of the tools should be accompanied by a 
proper communication process such as weekly safety mes-
sages, the main goal of which could be to initiate a regular 
discussion between management and employees on safety 
issues. There needs to be reinforcement of a risk awareness 
environment and every employee should be involved in and 
responsible for improvements to the safety culture and fi-
nally achieve common understanding and implementation 
of values and behaviors supporting SC principles. Usually 
the content, topic, schedule and type of communication is 
prepared by the plant SC committee. Topics are identified 
to support expected behaviors, good practices, and lessons 
learned (Figure 23).
The tools introduced in this article are examples of tools for 
use only in high-risk industries. Safety culture, like culture 
generally, is difficult to measure. However, in several high 
risk industries, the evaluation of safety culture is a regular 
activity carried out a few times per year, and usually divided 
into two parts: anonymous self-evaluation by workers and 
evaluation by an external third party,  usually a specialized 
Safe behaviour examples
When lifting, slinging and handling loads safety is a priority
Safety Message 
of the Week
Area : Occupational Health and Safety
Risks and unacceptable behaviours
Author: Maintenance – B2000
I only carry out lifting and slinging work 
with the required qualification.
As a slinger I monitor the whole path of the 
load. I make sure it is not transported over 
people working below and I myself do not 
stand under the load.
As a slinger I warn people about the load 
moving above them in a timely manner.                                    
When a load is lifted in a complex 
environment, an independent supervisor is 
called for.
Before working with lifting equipment I 
review its functioning and make sure there 
are no unsecured objects that may fall. 
Persons passing under the moving 
load do not avoid the load being 
transported.
When transporting the load, the 
slinger does not move along with the 
load to warn the persons passing by.  
Managers are not trained about the 
basic rules of load lifting and slinging.  
Issues and near - misses related to 
slinging and lifting are not reported or 
investigated. 
Week 16
Relates to SC principles: 1 , 6, 7
1. Everyone is personally responsible for safety. 
2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety. 
3. Trust permeates the organization.
4. Decision making reflects safety first. 
5. The nuclear technology is recognized as  
special and unique. 
6. A questioning attitude is cultivated. 
7. Organizational learning is embraced. 
8. Safety undergoes constant examination. 
Figure 23. Safety Message
Source: Slovenske Elektratne
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company, which uses sophisticated methods and tools to 
measure various criteria.
Today, the science of safety culture is well developed par-
ticularly in the aviation, nuclear, and space industries. Im-
plementation of this knowledge with respect to electricity 
transmission networks will provide additional synergies for 
overall protection, reducing negative trends and operational 
risks, given that human error is the biggest contributor to 
industry disasters. 
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under climate change
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Introduction
Electricity grid infrastructure is highly exposed to weather 
and climate as the sum of all weather conditions at a certain 
spot. The line-bound infrastructure of electricity transmis-
sion and distribution is also crucial, as damage at a single 
spot could lead to failures across the network. Several pro-
jects of the Austrian Environment Agency in recent years 
have shown how vulnerable these infrastructures are to cli-
mate impacts and how important it is to take action to in-
crease their resilience.
While mitigating greenhouse gas emissions has been the fo-
cus of climate action for decades, adaptation policies are a 
new but vital approach to coping with the effects of changing 
climatic parameters. Indeed, different studies suggest that cli-
mate change has significant impacts on the energy sector and 
emphasize the need for adaptation in the sector (Rademaek-
ers et al. 2011; Ebinger and Vergara 2011; Williamson et al. 
2009). Climate change impacts, such as increased frequency 
of extreme weather events or changing water and air tem-
peratures, affect energy demand, supply, and transmission. 
Adaptation should therefore be considered at the planning 
and operating stages of energy systems at all territorial levels, 
from local to European. While adaptation is not necessarily a 
separate field of action, it is, suitable for mainstreaming into 
existing energy policies on, for example, the internal energy 
market, TEN-E/CEF, the energy road map, energy efficiency 
policies, and other strategies already set by important play-
ers in the field, like the European Union (cf. Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan and Smart Grid initiative). Furthermore, 
grid operators should factor (changing) climate parameters 
into their network security plans and maintenance.
A great number of greenhouse gas mitigation measures and 
policies have the potential to indirectly include and main-
stream adaptation, that is, to maintain/enhance security of 
supply. This includes measures not only on the demand side 
of electricity consumption, but also those connected to the 
extension of renewable energy systems, such as diversifica-
tion of energy supply to reduce energy imports from po-
litically instable regions and decentralization of electricity 
Figure 25. Ice crusts damaging power lines in 
Carinthia, Austria, in winter 2014
Source: KELAG
Figure 24. Power line damages caused by wind throw. 
Source. FF Güssing, www.feuerwehren.at
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production. It is important to stress that mitigation efforts 
sometimes go hand in hand with adaptation in terms of rais-
ing resilience. For example, cutting summer-time demand 
peaks reduces the risk of failure in the electricity grid due to 
overloads and so-called flashovers (high-voltage discharges 
caused by lightning). This concept is further elaborated in 
the background report for the European adaptation strat-
egy (McCallum et al. 2013). In general, climate change and 
changing patterns of extreme weather events and periods are 
hitting a European infrastructure that was constructed 50-60 
years ago and an energy market that is more interconnected 
than ever before with highly loaded transnational grids.
Vulnerability of grid infrastructure
Electricity grid infrastructure is directly exposed to extreme 
weather conditions Overhead lines as well as substations 
and transformers are potentially threatened by storms (wind 
throws, see Figure 24), icing (see Figure 25), wet snow de-
posits, lightning, floods, and mass movements such as ava-
lanches, landslides. and rock falls.
Heatwaves are also a stress factor for the transmission and 
distribution grid. In transmission terms, they constitute an 
indirect stress factor because the use of air conditioning 
creates a higher demand/load, resulting in a higher risk of 
flashovers In distribution terms, heatwaves are a direct stress 
factor due to heating of cables – overhead and, even more so, 
underground (urban) cables.
Figure 26. Per capita average minutes without electricity (based on the SAIDI index, i.e., average outage time 
per capita). Note that exceptional weather events and planned (technical) interruptions as well as interruption 
below 3 minutes are not considered for the SAIDI index. 
Source: CEER (2015).
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There is, however, no clear evidence of a correlation be-
tween blackouts. This is indicated by the performance of 
the Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI; 
for 16 European countries in 2004/2005) (Figure 26) on the 
one hand and rising temperatures, droughts, or increased 
frequency of extreme events on the other. We are thus un-
able, as yet, to fully assess the impact of climate change on 
electricity supply security. Current documentation by en-
ergy regulators, however, suggests an already high share of 
weather-related outages and even blackouts.
Some examples of major weather-related blackouts:
  Blackout in September 2003 in Italy, caused by a flasho-
ver from trees to the heavily overloaded Lukmanier and 
San Bernardino highest voltage transmission lines, storm 
events, and heavy demand for cooling purposes.10
  Blackouts in Sweden in September 2003 and January 
2005, when a series of rainstorms caused blackouts for 
3.5 million and 400,000 people, respectively.
  Blackout in Germany in November 2005 where wet 
snow deposits caused a long-lasting blackout for around 
250,000 people in the Münster region.11
These, as well as numerous small-scale blackouts, show how 
vulnerable the electricity grid is to weather and climate ex-
tremes. The large-scale event in 2003 in Italy shows how ac-
celerated electricity demand due to a heatwave and severe 
weather can collude to produce highly adverse effects. In 
fact, the event in question constitutes a clear warning sign 
for hot summer threats and vulnerabilities across Europe.
Special attention should be given to the fact that grid lines, 
when pushed to the limits of their capacities, are more vul-
nerable to flashovers from trees. There is thus a correlation 
between reduced grid transmission capacity due to weather 
and climate extremes12 and the occurrence of blackouts.13  
In principle, all European citizens can expect to be affected 
by blackout threats, particularly because of the cascading ef-
fects that come into play when blackouts occur. In fact, coun-
try comparisons of the average per capita minutes without 
electricity per year, as depicted in Figure 26, show different 
vulnerability patterns emerging across Europe. 
Disparities at the regional level
Differing regional vulnerabilities result from discrepancies 
between urban, rural, and higher-scale high-voltage trans-
10 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3146136.stm and SFOE (2003) for more details
11 Cf. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_historischer_Stromausf%C3%A4lle and http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-03/15/c_13211267.htm 
12 Cf. NatCat Service data from MunichRe at for example: http://www.munichre.com/
app_pages/www/@res/pdf/NatCatService/great_natural_catastrophes/NatCatSERVICE_
Great_1950_2011_losses_weather_de.pdf
13 Cf. CEER (2008) at http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/
EER_PUBLICATIONS/CEER_PAPERS/Electricity/2008/C08-EQS-24-04_4th%20
Benchmarking%20Report%20EQS_10-Dec-2008_re.pdf
mission and distribution in (remote) regions. According to 
qualitative data gathered, most cities across Europe use un-
derground cabling to some extent as distribution infrastruc-
ture for electricity. That is why, for example, Wien Energie14 
(Vienna’s main energy supplier and Distribution System 
Operator [DSO]) with its 83% share of underground cabling 
can be regarded as climate- resilient, at least in terms of the 
distribution infrastructure. Urban heatwaves are also prob-
lematic – especially for underground cables beneath dark 
surfaces with low albedo such as pavements (which heat up 
fast due to their low reflective properties). Substations and 
transformers, however, are still exposed to extreme events 
and can fail; so, too, are interconnections to and from the 
overhead grid.
The differences in vulnerability between overhead and un-
derground cables come down to the fact that underground 
cables are per se protected from direct meteorological im-
pacts like wet snow deposits, icing, and storms. Neverthe-
less, in urban areas heatwaves remain a risk factor, as do mass 
movements (especially landslides) in mountainous terrain.
DSOs play an important role in the design of resilient grid 
structures, as they are the most vulnerable towards extreme 
weather events such as wind, snow, and ice load; this is be-
cause their infrastructure – especially medium- and low-
voltage overhead infrastructure – is particularly vulnerable 
14  www.wienenergie.at
Figure 27. Damage parameters (for example, storm), 
grid topology, and number/type of households and 
companies, determining the vulnerability of grid 
infrastructure and the impacts of failure. 
Source. Offenthaler, 2015
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(see Martikainen et al. 2007) on Finland. However, the big 
energy producers own a good share of the distribution net-
work – either directly or through subsidiaries.   
Vulnerability is a function of exposure (of the grid infrastruc-
ture to weather influences), its sensitivity (i.e., its physical 
strength), and the capacity (of grid operators) to adapt to or 
cope with meteorological/climatological challenges. Thus, 
regional impacts are affected by the number of components 
and the physical strength of the grid infrastructure (includ-
ing power poles, power line configuration, transformers, 
substations, etc.); the meteorological hazard potential (e.g., 
susceptibility to storms, mass movements, icing, wet snow 
deposits, etc.); and the number of households and companies 
that depend on the infrastructure for their electricity supply. 
The respective layers are shown in Figure 27.
Example of Austria: National climate 
change strategies as a response to climate 
change 
Electricity and grid resilience have been incorporated into 
several national climate change adaptation strategies. In the 
Austrian adaptation strategy, some of the measures in the 
energy/electricity sector focus on the grid. These are:
  Optimizing the grid infrastructure to avoid bottlenecks 
and overcapacities
  Development and promotion of decentralized energy 
production and supply
  Adapted system planning for the transmission and dis-
tribution grid
  Reduction of energy demand especially peak demands 
(BMLFUW 2012)
Type Natural hazard Risk Time frame of expected 
impact
Main affected area
Transmission 
and distribution 
networks directly
Extremely high 
temperatures
Decreased network 
capacity
Medium negative (2025) to 
extreme negative (2080)
EU-wide
Snow, icing storms Increased chances 
of damages to 
energy networks 
and blackouts
Medium negative to low 
positive (2050)
NW-EU
Heavy 
precipitations
Mass movements 
(landslides, mud 
and debris flows) 
causing damages
Time frame, magnitudes, and 
frequencies uncertain
Especially 
mountainous regions
Energy demand 
indirectly affecting 
electricity 
transmission and 
distribution 
Higher 
temperatures
High AC demand in 
summer;
high cooling 
demand by food 
industry
Short-term medium to long- 
term strong negative (i.e., 
rise in electricity demand in 
summer season)
EU-wide
Droughts Low heating 
demand in winter
Positive (for both; cf. studies 
by Dolinar et al. 2010 for Sl, 
Mirasgedis et al. 2007 for GR 
and Christenson et al. 2006 
for CH)
Southern and eastern 
Europe
Droughts High energy 
demand from 
pumping for 
irrigation
Low negative
Table 8. Climate impacts and risks for electricity transmission and distribution 
Source. König in Altvater et al. (2011)
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Measures to increase the resilience of the transmission/dis-
tribution grid infrastructure can be classified into 1. techni-
cal measures; 2. measures on standards and regulations; 3. 
capacity building; 4. communications and awareness-raising; 
5. guidelines, and 6. EU financing schemes (McCallum et al. 
2013) as follows:
1. Technical measures 
1 Making the grid climate-proof (measure 13-15) 
Transmission: Installing additional network capacities with 
a special focus on volatile base load countries and regions 
with high potential and future dependence on non-base 
load capable renewable energy sources. This measure refers 
to smart grid activities that have already been implemented 
(e.g., EDSO-SG) but do not, as yet, take into account the 
threats of climate change to the security of supply through 
the stepwise implementation of renewable energy goals.
Transmission: Installing additional network capacities with 
particular respect to countries and regions with storage po-
tential. For instance, in Norway there only pumped storage 
units currently exist (cf. ENTSOE 2010). However, water 
pumping storage capacities have the highest efficiency.
Distribution: Making stronger use of the electric railway 
network to further decentralize the distribution and trans-
mission network (measure 12). This measure would allow for 
cost-efficient support of additional urgently needed distribu-
tion capacities while using small-scale facilities to decentral-
ize energy supply. 
2 Transmission: Detect vulnerability hotspots (William-
son et al. 2009), for example, in the overhead transmis-
sion networks (measures 16 and 18) towards monitor-
ing of mass movements, storms, floods, and overheating 
(measure 10)
3 Transmission: Install underground cables at vulner-
ability hotspots, which are expensive, according to ZEW, 
costs may be over ten times the costs of ordinary over-
head transmission; the conductivity of underground 
cables is also limited due to fast warming and the ad-
ditional cooling facilities needed.
4 Transmission: Expand aisles through forests to the de-
gree necessary, which is controversial, but in some ex-
plicitly storm-exposed regions possibly unavoidable.
5 Transmission/Distribution: Depending on the scope of 
the measure, slope stability measures such as protective 
forests or technical measures are put in place.
6 Transmission/Distribution: Set up an early warning 
system (Williamson et al. 2009; Ebinger and Vergara 
2011) for energy shortcuts.
High demand, for example, during heatwaves or cold 
spells leads to overheating of the network due to overu-
se. Extreme events are events, such as storms, icing, hail, 
or periods of droughts, combined with low hydropower 
and wind power, and heatwaves leading to overheating 
of the transmission of cables due to high temperatures 
(measure 16).  
Storage:
7 Install new storage facilities, such as pumped storage 
units, especially in regions with volatile base load (Ibra-
him et al. 2008).
8 Explore potential of other storage methods, for exam-
ple, hydrogen (H2) or methane (CH4) that can be built up 
in parallel with expanding the renewable energy share 
(Ibrahim et al. 2008, URS 2010).
9 Mid-term: Make use of and maintain existing gas distri-
bution network for CH4 transmission and storage, once 
the SABATIER process (“solar fuel,” or other biochemi-
cal methods) reach industrial application/marketability. 
(Currently, research is progressing fast on new methods 
for electrolysis and methanizing H2 to CH4).
2. Standards and regulations
Transmission:
10 Higher standards for overhead transmission cables with 
respect to increasing demands by climate change, such 
as temperature increase, and also energy demands, such 
as overheating (measure 2.d)
11 Empower ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Eu-
ropean Regulators) to unbundle the distribution and 
transmission network and promote competition among 
transmission system operators leading to enhanced in-
vestments in energy distribution and transmission net-
works. Most of these measures have to be financed by 
power suppliers/TSOs and should not be subject to pub-
lic spending, only co-funding, as put forward in meas-
ures 21-23.
12 Foster standards in power transmission to further enable 
electrified railway networks to be used for decentralized 
distribution (measure 1.c)
3. Capacity building (measures 1-6) 
13 Transmission: Engage in strong cooperation with the 
European Transmission Operators via ENTSO-E (man-
dated by internal energy market directive 2009/72/EC) 
to climate-proof the transmission network
14 Transmission: Enhance cooperation of ENTSO-E with 
small electricity producers to make the transmission net-
work more resilient to natural hazards by better connect-
ing decentralized energy supply facilities to the network
56
15 Transmission/Distribution: Promote cooperation 
among the European Electricity Grid Initiative (EEGI), 
the EDSO-SG (European DSO Association for smart 
grids), the grids R&D Roadmap 2010-2018, and ENT-
SO-E’s R&D activities towards European smart grid so-
lutions that are not only suitable to optimize supply and 
demand issues but also to allow for emergency switches 
(“detours for transmission”) of the network in the event 
of local/regional disruptions caused by meteorologically 
extreme events
4. Communication/awareness raising
16 Transmission/Distribution: Provide information such 
as impact/vulnerability maps and good practice exam-
ples (Ebinger and Vergara 2011) and easy access to in-
formation to ENTSO, EDSO and all energy producers 
(e.g., communicate results from research projects such 
as AEOLUS to the wind power producers) (measure 2)
17 Transmission/Distribution: Take care for adaptation 
to be taken into account in further integration (Ebinger 
and Vergara 2011) of the national networks into a pan-
European one (i.e., mainstream adaptation into further 
proceedings of ENTSO, EDSO, ACER, EEGI, and the 
execution of the SET plan.
5. Guidelines
18 Transmission/Distribution: Develop check list and 
guidance for TSOs and DSOs to assess vulnerability and 
possible adaptation options (measure 2)
19 Transmission/Distribution: Develop guidelines for 
setting up pan-European early warning systems for en-
ergy shortcuts (measure 6)
6. EU financing scheme 
20 Increase funding within EU RTD funding schemes, most 
importantly for the following:
  Storage: Electricity storage systems and methods
  Transmission: New material for transmission cables
  Transmission/Distribution: Smart grids managing 
new demand patterns, system operations after dis-
ruptions and larger share of renewable energy
21 Transmission: Use market-based instruments such as 
tax reduction schemes to create incentives for TSOs to 
invest in further climate-proofed networking capacities. 
This would be a classic no-regret measure, since these 
investments have to be made anyway.
22 Transmission/Distribution: Use the European Com-
mission-European Investment Bank (EIB) initiative “EU 
Sustainable Energy Financing Initiative” and the Mar-
guerite equity fund (led by EIB) to mainstream adapta-
tion into funded projects.
23 Transmission: Utilize EU Cohesion Funds to support 
large-scale energy adaptation projects
Conclusion
Increasing the resilience of the electricity grid infrastructure 
– and especially the distribution grid – is a core task for in-
frastructure providers. Special attention should be given to 
the privatized networks and the need to increase investment 
in electricity transmission infrastructure to make it more re-
silient to climate change impacts.
These investments are necessary as meteorologically trig-
gered outages and blackouts are already significant and their 
frequency will increase in the future. The economic costs of 
service interruptions are extremely high. 
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Chapter 2 includes different case studies of electricity black-
outs and power outages in Europe, in countries like Italy, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Germany, France, Serbia, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia as well as an example 
from China. The contributions in this chapter are provided 
by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA), ETH Zurich, Electro Lubliana, Slovenia, Energy 
Community Secretariat, Réseau de Transport d’Electricité 
(RTE), France and Human and Environment Linkage Pro-
gram, an NGO from the US and China.
2.1. Case studies of three 
blackouts: 2003 in Italy and 
Switzerland as well as in 
Sweden and Denmark, and of 
2006 in Germany
Nadejda Komendantova
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis and ETH Zurich
Introduction
The recent power outages in several countries of Europe 
showed vulnerability of electricity transmission grids to 
multiple hazards, when interactions between different risks 
resulted in interruptions of electricity transmission. This 
contribution reviews three historical cases of blackouts 
in Europe, such as the blackout in the year 2003, which af-
fected Italy and Switzerland, the blackout in Sweden and 
Denmark, which happened during the same year, and the 
blackout which happened in the year 2006 in Germany. The 
review of these case studies illustrates the variety of factors, 
which currently affect vulnerability of electricity transmis-
sion networks in Europe. It also shows the need of a multi-
risk approach to build resilience of electricity transmission 
infrastructure and to address systemic risks, which affect 
electricity transmission infrastructure. 
Background
In the year 2011 the European Commission published the 
roadmap towards the reduction of green house gas emis-
sions in electricity generation by at least 80% by 2050, mainly 
through scaling up of renewable energy generation (COM, 
2011). The 2030 EU policy framework on climate change and 
energy foresees an increase of the share of renewable energy 
by at least 27% (COM, 2014). Considering that the most of 
energy generated by renewable sources is consumed and 
transmitted as electricity, the 2030 target also increases the 
importance of electricity transmission networks as a major 
critical energy infrastructure. Also the European Union En-
ergy 2020 Strategy identifies development of grids as a key 
factor for further deployment of renewable energies. 
However, achieving the renewable energy targets, such as 
decarbonisation of electricity generation sector by 2050, will 
require substantial changes in quality and quantity of the 
grid infrastructure, including an increase in the number of 
international interconnectors, construction of long-distance 
transmission grids, a denser network of grids to connected 
distributed generation facilities and smart grid technologies 
to manage different energy supply options. The achievement 
of the 2030 target also requires providing security of electric-
ity transmission. 
Already in 2008 the European Council was highlighting 
the growing need to protect critical infrastructure, includ-
ing electricity transmission grids, against multiple hazards 
(Directive 2008/114/EC). Currently protection of the grids, 
including blackouts prevention and minimization of their 
impacts, is in the responsibility of national states and the 
owners or operators of infrastructure, as a primary respon-
Chapter 2
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sibility to secure electricity supply (Directive 2008/114/EC). 
In the year 2009, the European Commission settled the over-
all framework for disaster prevention and minimization of 
the disasters impacts and advocated for the development of 
national policies based on the disaster management cycle, 
including such phases as prevention, preparedness, response 
and recovery. The European Commission also underlines the 
usefulness of a multi-hazard approach to prevent disasters 
(COM, 2010). The UN process also speaks about the need 
to strengthen multi-risk assessment “research methods and 
tools for multi-risk assessments should be developed and 
strengthened” (UNISDR, 2005) to address the vulnerability 
of the European Union infrastructure to multiple natural 
hazards such as earthquakes, floods, droughts, storms, heat 
waves, icing, fires and others, which not only damage infra-
structure and its elements but also reduce capacities of elec-
tricity transmission (UNISDR, 2013). 
Methodology: three case studies
The blackout of the year 2003, which started in Switzerland 
and then also affected Italy, left 56 million of people without 
electricity. The blackout was caused by cascading effects of 
several failures. For instance, the overload of the 380 kV line 
between Mettlen and Lavorgo led to the raise of core tem-
perature of the grid, which affected nearby trees and resulted 
in a flashover.  The further failure of the Mettlen-Lavorgo 
line resulted in an increasing loading of the 380 kV Sils-Sosa 
line. The domino effect from the Swiss line put the entire Ital-
ian line out of synchronization with the Union for the Coop-
eration of Transmission Electricity (UCTE), and led to the 
power outage in Italy lasting up to 16 hours. 
Another blackout, which took place during the same year, 
affected 1.6 million people in Sweden and 2.4 million people 
in Denmark. It also resulted that 4.700 MW of load was lost 
in Sweden and 1.850 MW in Denmark. This was the most 
severe disturbance in the Nordic power system for the last 
20 years. The blackout was caused by coincidence of several 
risks, which increased burden on the electricity transmission 
system. Prior to blackout, two 400 kV lines were taken out 
for service for maintenance works as well as the High Voltage 
District Current link between Poland and Germany. The fail-
ure disconnection of two busbars resulted that two nuclear 
units with total output of 1.750 MW were tripped, the grid 
lost its transmission capacity along the west coast, increasing 
heavy load of the grid in the remaining south-east and south-
central parts. At the same time the demand in the area re-
covered and this lowered further the voltage of 400 kV, which 
ended in a voltage collapse in a section of the south-west grid 
close to Stockholm. Following this, the southern part of the 
grid between Sweden and eastern Denmark remained inter-
connected but was affected by massive inadequacy of gener-
ation. The remaining generators in Denmark were not able to 
increase capacity to satisfy the demand and within seconds 
the frequency and voltage of the grid dropped and the en-
tire subsystem collapsed. The major reason for this blackout 
was that a severe grid fault, such as failure of double busbar, 
which shutted down two major nuclear units and reduced 
transmission capacity, occurred only couple of minutes after 
the ordinary fault, such as the loss of a 1.250 MW genera-
tion unit. The probability of such coincidence is very low, but 
it shows the requirements of grid security standards, going 
beyond n-1 level (Larsson and Ek, 2003). 
The blackout of 2006 in Germany lasted for up to two hours. 
This was a major blackout, which affected more than 15 mil-
lion people. The blackout had cascading effects on people in 
Poland, Benelux countries, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece, 
Balkans and even Morocco.
The German TSO E.ON Netz had to switch off a high volt-
age line to let a ship pass underneath. Simultaneously there 
was a high amount of wind electricity, which fed into the grid 
10,000 MW from wind turbines to Western and Southern Eu-
rope grids. Insufficient communication about this switch-off 
led to instabilities of the frequency in the grid and to over-
loading of lines. Devices had to switch customers off the grid 
in the affected countries. This was necessary to cope with the 
lack of power in the Western zone automatic. The investiga-
tion, carried by the Union for the Coordination of Transmis-
sion of Electricity (UCTE), identified three factors, which af-
fected vulnerability of the grid. The first one was the absence 
of security tools by transmission system operator, which did 
not allow verification that the system was operating at secu-
rity limits. The second was the absence of communication 
between European transmission system operators, who did 
not receive information about actions of the German trans-
mission system operator. The third one was the lack of invest-
ment into reliability and operation of the grid (UCTE, 2006).
Results: factors influencing vulnerability of 
electricity transmission grids
The three above mentioned case studies allowed identifica-
tion of the following factors influencing vulnerability of elec-
tricity transmission networks: new requirements for elec-
tricity infrastructure in Europe, current state of electricity 
infrastructure, barriers for upgrading of infrastructure and 
enhancing its capacity, existing interdependencies between 
different electricity transmission systems and existing and 
emerging multiple risks.
Worldwide renewable power capacity grew by 85% over the 
past 10 years and reached 1.700 GW in 2013, making over 
30% of all installed capacity (IRENA, 2014). The currently 
existing in Europe electricity transmission system was de-
signed half a century ago to integrate electricity generated 
close to major energy consumption centers and mainly from 
the large-scale fossil fuel capacities.  Today requirements for 
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the grid are changing and include the need to integrate grow-
ing volumes of renewable energy, which is located in different 
geographic areas and also often in the areas with low popula-
tion density and low level of consumption. Renewable energy 
generation creates new challenges for electricity transmis-
sion grids, such as the difference in pick loads for demand 
and supply, need for adequate infrastructure to integrate 
varying outputs of renewable energy sources, fluctuations in 
demand and generation side changes. The so-called power 
ramps, which result from intermittent character of renew-
able energy generation, can seriously affect electricity grids. 
The grid stability is also affected in the areas of interconnec-
tors, which were constructed to ensure stability of the grid 
and the back-up to adjust transmission systems. Deployment 
of renewable energy sources far away from the consumption 
centers requires that grids will be also able to gather and 
transmit electricity from different sources. If existing and 
future flexible and back-up units cannot be located close to 
renewable energy generation and use the same transmission 
grid, the need for more lines and smarter grid management 
will increase (Eurelectric, 2011). 
Another challenge is the current shape of electricity trans-
mission grids, which are aging. The majority of the grids is 
30-40 years old, several thousands kilometers of grids need 
to be upgraded or replaced. In many countries grids are al-
ready at the border of their capacities and it is questionable 
if this capacity will allow integration of the growing volumes 
of electricity generated by renewable energy sources (EWEA, 
2010). Also cross-border interconnectors need upgrading 
(Battaglini et al., 2012).
The European high voltage transmission grid is composed of 
high and low voltage lines. Vulnerability of electricity grids 
in Europe is also affected by interdependencies between dif-
ferent systems and potentials for cascading effects (Poljanšek 
et al., 2012). Integration of renewable energies and resil-
ience of electricity grids to multiple risks require substan-
tial upgrading of existing grids as well as deployment of new 
grids. Around 42,000 km of transmissions lines need to be 
upgraded or constructed to secure market integration, se-
curity of supply and to accommodate the renewable expan-
sion planned for 2020 (ENTSO-E, 2010). There are different 
challenges for further deployment of electricity transmission 
grids, which go beyond the technical and financial barriers. 
Rather the lack of regulations and acceptance for further de-
ployment of electricity transmission infrastructure are major 
bottlenecks. The inability to properly address public and so-
cial acceptance issues may cause enormous delays and even 
cancellation of the projects. For instance, in some countries 
no single line at voltages higher than 200kV was construct-
ed during the last 10 years (ETSO, 2006). Only in Germany 
3.600 km of new 380kV lines have to be constructed until 
2020, however, since 2005 only 80 km of new grids were con-
structed (DENA, 2012). 
Public acceptance is currently one of the major bottlenecks 
for upgrading of the grids.  The EU supported BESTGRID 
project identified that inhabitants of communities, which 
will be affected by planned electricity transmission infra-
structure question on the first hand the need of such pro-
jects. The review of pilot projects realized Elia, TenneT and 
50 Hertz in Germany and Belgium showed that concerns 
about the need of such projects were the most frequently ex-
pressed concerns (figure 28).
A number of events, which we designed in frames of the 
BESTGRID project, showed the successfulness of the actions 
to provide more information about the need of the electric-
ity transmission projects, such as round table discussions of 
information markets.
Stakeholders especially appreciated actions on providing 
more information in the form of detailed maps about alter-
native corridors, possibilities for direct discussion with the 
representatives of the companies realising the projects and 
involvement of local NGOs into organisation of public infor-
mation events.
Discussion:
As recent blackouts in Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark 
and Germany showed, the electricity transmission infrastruc-
ture is a very complex system, which can become a subject 
to cascading effects of different risks and to trans-boundary 
risks, affecting several countries. Reducing vulnerability of 
electricity transmission grids requires consideration of mul-
tiple risks as well as interdependencies between these risks. 
Figure 28: Concerns according to five 
guiding principles
Source: Komendantova et al., 2015
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This already extremely complex system is currently undergo-
ing changes, which might increase its complexity and vulner-
ability. For instance, electricity transmission architecture is 
changing and is facing challenges of intermittent renewable 
electricity, decentralized electricity generation, two-ways 
electricity flows, from producer to consumer but also from 
consumers back to the grid. Besides of this, grid becomes a 
subject to multiple risks, which includes already existing and 
known risks but also includes emerging and new risks.
All these factors require a multi-risk and a systemic approach 
in risk assessment, which will consider conjoint and cascad-
ing effects of multiple risks as well as a multi-risk governance 
approach in risk mitigation and management.
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2.2. Slovenia: Icing in 2014
Matjaz Kersnik, Electro Lubliana
Abstract
Severe icing caused a big power disturbance in Slovenia in 
February 2014. This paper outlines the circumstances that 
led to the icing, the damage caused over a large territory 
and the main ensuing problems, the extreme duration of the 
disturbance, and how the problems were managed. The con-
clusions and possible solutions for future mitigation of dis-
turbances of electricity disturbances due to extreme weather 
conditions are provided.
Introduction: weather conditions
At the end of January 2014 there was a red alert in Slovenia 
for extreme weather conditions. The storm caused the big-
gest damage of the century with severe icing over almost the 
whole of the country. In many places the higher than average 
rainfall froze immediately on contact with the ground and 
electrical facilities, leading to massive damage. In some plac-
es the layer of ice was several centimeters thick. This was too 
heavy for many trees and power lines and there was major 
damage to the overhead lines. Figure 30 shows the first days 
of the storm:
The consequences were catastrophic and the authorities an-
nounced a state of emergency. Damage occurred to overhead 
transmission lines (400 kV, 220kV, 110kV), overhead distri-
bution lines (110kV, 20kV), and LV (up to 1kV) lines for a 
total length of more than 1,000 km. About 5,000 x 20/0.4kV 
substations were affected. Over 250,000 people were with-
out electrical power, and some were left completely without 
electricity for over 10 days. After the blackout, some parts of 
the networks were found to have been totally destroyed and 
only emergency electricity from diesel generators was avail-
able until the end of April. In total, over 100 diesel generators 
up to 1MVA were used to generate electricity. At the peak, 
over 1,500 workers from electrical distribution companies 
and other emergency services, such as civil protection, fire 
fighters, army, as well as volunteers, construction companies, 
and foreign expert workers were working together to rees-
tablish the supply of electric power to at least the cities and 
bigger settlements. The estimated damage to the electricity 
distribution network was estimated at €70 m
The communications lines failed almost immediately because 
the GSM base stations had no power, and in due course the 
station batteries also ran out. Because of the failure on the 
110kV lines, the FM signal also disappeared. There was no 
information on the situation. As there was no remote control 
Figure 30. Rates of weather risk in colors, red 
representing the highest level and yellow the lowest.
Source: ARSO, National Meteorological Service, Bureau of Meteorology
Figure 31. Broken overhead network lines
Source: Elektro Ljubljana
9.2.2014 09:17 ceT
9.2.2014 09:10 ceT
2.2.2014 00h - 3.2.2014 ooh (ceT)
31.1.2014 00h - 3.2.2014 00h
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everything done manually. To repair damage, fault handling 
was carried out working from high to low voltage.
For some important HV overhead lines, modular Emergency 
Restoration Structures (ERS) were used temporarily to bring 
electricity to 110kV/20kV transformer stations. Using ERS to 
repair damaged high-voltage overhead power lines allowed 
quick and effective recovery after the extreme weather con-
ditions damaged the towers; ERS is a quick way of tempo-
rarily replacing damaged lines after natural hazards strike. 
It also allows the owner of the high voltage overhead power 
line to systematically prepare for permanent recovery via 
problem analysis, development of new documentation, high 
quality preparations for construction, and construction of 
new high voltage overhead power towers. It also allows for 
regular inspections and dealing with faults detected on high 
voltage overhead power line towers or consoles (brackets). 
Elektro Ljubljana uses ERS for damage of this nature. Other 
damage was treated as routine damage. But the number of 
faults and the highly difficult circumstances over the country 
caused many problems.
Applying the ERS approach creates a number of challenges 
and issues, that need to addressed to ensure an effective re-
sponse and crisis management, most importantly: 
  Timely activation of maintenance personnel
  Effective management of staff
  Providing sufficient numbers of specialists for implemen-
tation 
  (Regional) Cooperation with foreign specialists 
  Public response
  Availability and satisfactory condition of work equip-
ment, including personal safety equipment and materials 
  Transportation and logistics 
  Functioning communication systems (FM, GSM) 
  Keeping records of the works, material consumption, and 
final remediation of defects
  Keeping records of aggregates, fuel consumption, and 
consumers connected on aggregates
  Deployment of volunteers and retirees
  Organization of nutrition and rest times
  Contractual relationships with hired maintenance workers
  Documentation for work safety and full compliance with 
security measures and rules 
In the following, after explaining each of these challenges, 
we will examine how in our case study, they were addressed. 
Worker activation implies a rapid response to disturbance 
messages and takes place at the level of the unit or company. 
In this case, response was 10 minutes or less in some areas. 
Companies and operators monitoring events are responsible 
for setting response times. Staff deployment, number of spe-
cialized staff, and where they operate depends on the extent 
of the emergency. For instance, some staff initially work in-
dependently, then get deployed to a higher level. Local coor-
dination played an important role in this case because of the 
exact knowledge locals had of the terrain.
Extensive damage needs clear and coordinated management 
and operation of active Distribution Control Centers: the lo-
cal distribution control centers are particularly important. 
The number of active workers includes all available workers, 
and also non-technical staff who helped in locating errors. 
Foreign workers (civil protection, fire fighters, military, con-
struction contractors, foreign technical groups, cutters, aid 
from other electro-distribution companies, aid from abroad) 
in the most affected area can exceed the local workforce by 
500%. In the first week over 1,500 workers were deployed 
simultaneously at different sites (distribution and foreign 
workers). Good cooperation was established especially with 
the locally based contractors, who were familiar with the ter-
rain. The language barrier with foreign workers turned out 
to be an obstacle, as did the fact that contractors selected 
through a tender are not necessarily familiar with the ter-
rain, which means additional preparations are needed. Local 
staff turned out to be insufficient in numbers because local 
experts also had to lead foreign workers. 
While the public response, notably in rural areas, was mostly 
positive and sympathetic, the scope of work achieved would 
not been possible without foreign assistance. 
Figure 32. Emergency restoration structures (ERS)
Source: Elektro Ljubljana
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The availability and condition of work equipment was more 
or less sufficient. It was also used by non-professional staff, 
who usually do not have adequate equipment for fieldwork. 
To guarantee work safety, personal protective equipment 
(PPE) has to be available to all maintenance staff. The fact 
that PPE was widely available and could be supplemented 
wherever additional equipment was needed showed how ef-
fective the functioning and organization of the health and 
safety department actually was.
Transportation was a challenge as many roads were closed 
due to the extreme weather conditions. It is recommended 
that in future all vehicles should be equipped with four-
wheel drive to be able to negotiate roads that are closed to 
regular traffic. 
The availability of material in the first days of the event was 
poor, mainly due to a low level of emergency stocks. Some 
material intended for other investment projects was used. 
Later on, efficient procurement of supply logistics was in 
place. Handling supplies through a centralized warehouse 
with sufficient stock levels improves logistics. 
When some of the GSM base stations ran out of power sup-
ply, FM/GSM based communication were used. At first it was 
only possible to use satellite phone communication. Failure 
of the 110 kV lines meant there was also no longer an FM sig-
nal or optical telecommunication and consequently no FM 
communication and remote control. After a while the batter-
ies at the transformer stations were discharged and there was 
no information on the situation of SCADA. It was necessary 
to manually check the position of switches and work fully in 
manual mode. It was also not possible to use data links for 
exchanging information. As a result, there were some parts 
of the country left without communication with the rest of 
the world for 10 days.
Record-keeping of the works, material consumption, and 
needs for the final remediation of defects (plan) was prob-
lematic in that different companies used different record 
keeping systems (different IT support and strategies). The 
situation improved later after a certain level of regulation 
was implemented. A common problem was a lack of staff to 
collect and record defects. 
Further complication was caused by additional information-
al requirements of ministries, agencies, DSO, and other in-
stitutions. They requested information, but sometimes even 
they did not know what they wanted and why. Each entity 
would request information but often lacking clear definition 
and specification on the level or content of the information 
needed. 
Keeping records of aggregates, fuel consumption and con-
sumers connected on aggregates posed challenges in terms 
of monitoring aggregates and fuel consumption. The most 
problems were in the monitoring of aggregates and fuel con-
sumption. There were some failures on aggregates that had 
to be removed immediately. Here, too, the content and level 
of information to be collected was not clearly defined. In ret-
rospect, obtaining information in general proved to be chal-
lenging. Another problem was due to rental of aggregates 
and migrating them at locations according to the needs. Es-
tablishing a reporting system for installed aggregates took 
several days.  
While involving volunteers and retirees in the works build 
on their support, it raised concerns regarding work safety, 
responsibility, and liability regarding the execution of work 
tasks. Volunteers and retirees were mainly involved in less 
difficult work. 
Due to a lack of staff all workers had to work additional hours 
and were overburdened with the workload. At a certain 
point, workers had to take mandatory resting periods as the 
lack of rest caused fatigue and threatened work safety. 
Contractual relationships with hired workers include regu-
lated contracts and written agreements. Workers were also 
engaged with whom contracts and written agreements had 
not been concluded. In fact, it was not even possible to print 
agreements in some areas because there was neither power 
supply, nor sufficient time for this work. However, these were 
contractors trained to work with electrical equipment that, 
in the past, had worked for electrical distribution companies. 
The issue of written agreements should be resolved before 
the arrival of hired workers on the ground. One option may 
be to create templates of a written agreement for workforce 
providers to collect the data of workers and sort out the legal 
framework beforehand.
Documents for safe work are needed at different phases of 
the project. During the first phase, defect localization, issu-
ing documents for safe work was abandoned. As soon as the 
workers started to work in a organized manner, documents 
were issued on safe working practices. In areas where there 
was a breakdown of the electricity system, the issuing of 
documents for safe work began when the 110 kV power was 
restored. Safety instructions and measures were neverthe-
less carried out in accordance with the instructions. For each 
switch manipulation, voice communication (FM) was used, 
which enabled recording in the Distribution Control Centre.
Compliance with security measures and rules varies depend-
ing on the difficulty of the terrain, how extreme the weather 
conditions, and restrictions of movement in the forest due to 
forest protection concerns.
The safety instructions and measures should be implement-
ed in accordance with the instructions as much as possible. 
The emergency plan should be worked out with a proposal 
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that provides the safety and protection of workers and the 
provision of emergency medical care in the case of injuries. 
In addition, such emergency situations demonstrate the ne-
cessity of special knowledge about territorial organization, 
services, and facilities.
Conclusions
The following measures are recommended to improve re-
sponsiveness and performance in crisis situations:
- Improve the hierarchy of crisis staff and adhere to it
- Prepare local operation control centers for activation in 
crisis situations
- Increase the number of skilled workers during normal 
operations who can guide and lead contracted workers 
in a crisis
- Improve the fleet of vehicles and equipment
- Reorganize and create a central distribution warehouse 
large enough to supply the main material and organize 
logistics for delivery of the necessary material
- Prepare written agreements for leased workers in ad-
vance
- Lay cable networks wherever possible 
- Work in accordance with the safety rules in crisis situa-
tions
- Develop methods and content of record keeping in crisis 
situations
- Identify what work can be carried out by volunteers and 
retirees
- Arrange a way of providing rest for workers facing sub-
stantial overtime and teams that are understaffed
- Develop and maintain an independent communication 
system (FM or similar)
- Regulate the coordination and communication of the 
civil protection organization and distribution compa-
nies at the national level
- Keep press releases in crisis Staff Administration Com-
pany - relief of local emergency headquarters
Natural disasters cannot be prevented. Extreme weather 
conditions will continue to pose a threat to energy security. 
A crisis can be made less painful by being prepared for the 
unexpected and through effective training for a faster resto-
ration of the system.
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2.3. South-Eastern Europe: 
Floods in 2014
Milka Mumovic
Energy Community Secretariat
Introduction
Ice storms, floods, and landslides hit the Balkan region in 
recent years with devastating consequences. Network op-
erators from affected areas had to cope with technical con-
straints to repair and restore their system and with financial 
constraints to recover the costs and stabilize the income 
streams. 
The recovery indicated the need to define and put in place 
policies and procedures for:
- Precautionary measures 
- Quick response 
- Restoration/reenergizing 
- Managing aftermaths. 
All these activities are associated with costs. Under all con-
straints and difficulties, the systems were restored success-
fully. However, the financial viability of network operator 
remains critical.
Recalling that network operators are regulated businesses, 
the network tariffs should reflect adequately all the risks as-
sociated with repair and restoration of the system against 
natural disaster. 
Recent natural disasters in the Balkans
In 2012 heavy snow piled up on overhead lines causing inter-
ruptions in power supply and obstructing access to damaged 
infrastructure. In 2014 ice storms hit the western Balkans 
again, causing poles and lines to fall and and interruption in 
supply. 
In mid-May 2014 continuous, heavy rainfall resulted in ex-
tensive flooding in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia, described as the “epic floods.” 
The floods caused landslides and devastation of overhead 
and underground infrastructure, transformer stations, cus-
tomer connections, and metering equipment. The floods af-
fected millions and resulted in 80 casualties. The severe and 
widespread rains triggered over 3,000 landslides. Power sup-
ply to more than 250,000 customers was interrupted.15
15 Relief web: Balkan floods 2014 http://reliefweb.int/disaster/ff-2014-000059-srb
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The Balkans floods, May 201416
In Serbia, the floods affected some 1.6 million people and 
resulted in 51 casualties, of which 23 were due to drowning. 
Around 32,000 people were evacuated from their homes. 
The majority of evacuees found accommodation with rela-
tives, but some 5,000 required temporary shelters in camps 
established by the Government and the Serbian Red Cross. 
Health facilities, schools, and agricultural lands were dam-
aged. On 15 May the Government declared a state of emer-
gency for its entire territory. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, over a million people were af-
fected by flooding, almost 90,000 were displaced, and 25 
casualties were recorded. The severe and widespread rains 
triggered over 3,000 landslides. Floods and/or landslides hit 
75,000 houses, of which 25,000 were severely damaged or 
destroyed, and also caused extensive damage to livelihoods, 
health, water, and sanitation facilities. (IFRC, 21 Jun 2014)
In Croatia, the floods caused widespread power outages, 
water shortages, damage to infrastructure, livestock and 
livelihoods, and displacement. Three people were killed. 
Of the estimated 15,000 people evacuated, more than 7,000 
were registered and looked after by the Croatian Red Cross. 
(IFRC, 30 May 2014). Flooding was also reported in Romania 
and Bulgaria (ECHO, 24 Apr 2014). 
16 Report UN 23/05/2014 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47879&Kw1=fl
oods&Kw2=&Kw3=#.VriQvjj2bq4
Recovery
After the disastrous floods and landslides in the Balkans and 
breakdown of distribution systems supplying electricity to 
key public services and households, network operators did 
all they could to restore supply as soon as the water subsided. 
The scale of destruction is reflected in tens of thousands of 
meters damaged beyond repair, wrecked transformers and 
respective ancillary equipment, conductors and overhead 
lines, including complete destruction of spare parts and ma-
terial in flooded warehouses.
It took only days after the water receded to restore the emer-
gency power supply and connect priority facilities in affected 
areas. The gravity of the situation forced network operators 
to work day and night  to prevent further devastating conse-
quences for populations and economies. 
Full restoration of network infrastructure, which was de-
pendent on the restoration of other infrastructure and con-
sumer facilities, took months.
Recovery measures - assessment tools
An assessment of recovery needs17 indicates that the top pri-
ority are activities for restoration of the power system and 
measures aimed at mitigating the consequences. This is fol-
lowed by measures to manage the risks and improve the abil-
ity of the network operator to respond to a natural disaster 
of such or similar scale. Short-term measures included quick 
response and restoration. The sequence can be presented in 
the following steps:
Short-term or quick-response measures include: 
- urgent relocation of key facilities away from  
flood-prone areas, 
- provision of emergency equipment and material  
inventory, 
- rapid rehabilitation of damaged and destroyed  
power lines and equipment on a priority basis, 
- installation of meters and safe energizing of  
affected sites.
After these quick response measures aiming to provide elec-
tricity to reinstate basic social and commercial functionali-
ties in affected areas, mid-term measures are designed and 
implemented to allow network operators to reduce losses 
due to lower electricity demand. 
Mid-term measures include:
- replenishing the equipment and spare parts inventory 
used up during the emergency phase, 
- reconstruct/rehabilitate and construct new power  
distribution facilities, 
17 Recovery needs assessments prepared by EU Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2014 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/floods/140714-overview-bih.pdf)
Figure 33: Recent natural disasters in the Balkans
Source: Energy Community Secretariat, Report of the Elektroprivreda 
Republike Srpske of the Damage on Distribution Assets
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- restore all affected facilities to operation with a better 
disaster-resilience capacity, 
- and rehabilitate and rebuild affected infrastructure and 
assets, while taking into account flood and landslide 
protection measures, 
- and reconnect affected business premises to ensure 
continuation of uninterrupted business operation.
As was the case during the recent Balkans flooding, develop-
ing a comprehensive restoration plan which takes full account 
of access to affected areas, priority connections and pace of 
restoration of consumption sites and facilities is vital at this 
stage. In the aftermath, the lack of material, spare parts, tools 
and equipment was evident, partly due to the scale of destruc-
tion, partly because warehouses were damaged or destroyed. 
Regional neighboring DSOs provided assistance in quick 
response measures and later European DSOs in EURELEC-
TRIC were asked to provide support by supplying urgently 
needed material and spare parts, primarily meters. 
Long-term measures include precaution and managing 
aftermaths. In the long run, network operators have to tie 
reconstruction and recovery efforts to development and 
growth strategies. These strategies need to take account of 
the risks of natural disasters and improving resilience to 
them. Based on the risk assessments, the plans may include: 
development of quick response and full restoration plans, re-
view of emergency procedures for the future, relocation of 
key facilities away from known flood areas, new design pa-
rameters and/or practices for energy infrastructure and as-
sets to improve performance and resilience, and strategically 
located emergency equipment and material inventory such 
as mobile substations. 
Massive damages to customer facilities led to substantial de-
crease in demand requiring network operators to revise not 
only their development plans but also the capacity require-
ments from the reconnected facilities. 
Tool to assess financial viability of 
restored networks 
After returning to business as usual, network operators need 
to assess their position before and after the disaster, analyze 
the procedures and measures applied and their effectiveness 
and to adjust policies and procedures accordingly. Immedi-
ate financial consequences include costs of repair of equip-
ment and rehabilitation, writing off and disposal of equip-
ment, costs of procurement and installation of new and 
replacement equipment, and lost revenues. 
Damaged equipment must be urgently examined and re-
paired whenever possible. If repair is not possible or not 
reasonable, the equipment will be disposed of and replaced. 
A network operator should have a transparent procedure in 
place to conduct such an evaluation. In principle, an asset 
should be repaired if the fair value of the repaired asset will 
exceed the book value, whereas the book value equals the 
sum of net book value and costs of repair.
Costs of repair and disposal include used material, engage-
ment of staff and equipment, transport and field work of staff 
and outsourced services of third parties. In the given circum-
stances, the costs are usually higher compared with a similar 
scope of work in regular course of business. Repair and re-
habilitation costs are reflected in the company’s accounts as 
costs for the period. If a company does not have insurance 
coverage or a dedicated contingency fund, the costs of the 
period in question are likely to rise significantly. The assets 
damaged beyond repair have to be written off to zero and 
accounted for at net book value. These are one-time costs, 
eventually adjusted for a salvage value, if any, and costs of 
disposal, which may include dismantling, transport, and res-
toration of the site, in line with company accounting policies. 
Replacement is when new equipment is installed to replace 
destroyed equipment, taking account of updated design pa-
rameters to improve resilience. All expenditures incurred to 
put new assets in place and condition for their intended use 
are capitalized (i.e., registered as fixed assets). This acquisi-
tion will not have an immediate effect on the profit and loss 
account of the current year, as the asset is depreciated over 
its useful life.
In times of disaster, companies receive donations and grants, 
either monetary or in kind. It is important to account for 
everything received – to determine the fair value of received 
assets in kind and to account for all related costs of acquisi-
tion, such as transport, installation, trial run, etc. Grants are 
important because received assets do not give rise to opera-
tional expenses. In the short term, grants and donations of 
equipment alleviate the financial position of a network op-
erator and the pressure on network tariffs, as donated assets 
should be factored out when tariffs are being set. 
Lost revenues are connected with a prolonged outage and 
also have indirect devastating consequences. Electricity is 
not supplied to customers and consumption is not registered 
until metering equipment is installed. Revenues are not in-
curred during the period when services were not supplied 
and the fixed costs of the period are not covered. If the com-
pany does not have insurance or contingency coverage to 
bridge the emergency expenditure and lost revenue, its vi-
ability will be endangered. It is not only the network opera-
tor that loses revenues. All other economic operators in the 
affected area are prevented from operating and earning in-
come. Indirect damages are estimated using different meth-
odologies, but for the electricity network, the key indicator is 
the value of loss load. The value of lost load is the estimated 
value that customers attribute to security of electricity sup-
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ply measured as the amount they would be willing to pay to 
avoid a disruption in their electricity service. This estimate 
may be used to determine the social costs and benefits of 
measures to improve resilience and reduce natural hazard. 
Insurance of distribution equipment and policy is a mat-
ter of internal economics. For a network operator insurance 
should at minimum cover the risks of regular operation. 
Extending the coverage to situations declared as a state of 
emergency and natural disasters is not very common. The 
decision will be based on a well substantiated cost–benefit 
analysis, taking into account overall impact on cost of service 
and value of lost load. 
Network operation is a regulated business and consequently 
decisions related to insurance coverage will depend on a reg-
ulatory assessment. A network operator will not incur costs 
which cannot be recovered from tariffs. On the other hand, 
it is the responsibility of network operators to evaluate costs 
and benefits in different scenarios for insurance coverage.
Summary
A network operator, as a provider of an important public 
service, has to take due care of network security and costs 
of operation. Keeping the two in balance requires a compre-
hensive analysis and assessment of different scenarios, keep-
ing up to date with scientific and technological achievements 
and implementation of best practices. Regulatory oversight 
and approval is part of the process. A network operator must 
strive to substantiate its proposal with sufficient evidence for 
an informed decision. The priorities are: 
- permanently check and upgrade emergency and  
restoration plans; 
- explore lowest cost options to minimize damage to 
existing energy assets in the future; 
- review insurance policy and assets insurance coverage; 
- and analyze cost efficiency of design parameters for 
improved resilience solutions and revised  
development plans.
2.4. France: Storms in 1999
Eric Andreini, 
Réseau de Transport d’Electricité (RTE)
Introduction: Natural Disasters -  
reality and increasing risks
Under climate change, natural disaster events tend to be 
more unpredictable, frequent, and devastating for critical 
energy infrastructure. Since 1999 France has experienced 
several storms that have severely impacted its electricity 
network. The two most important, Lothar and Martin, hap-
pened on 26 and 27 December 1999 with winds of nearly 
200km/h (Figure 34).
Figure 34: consequences of natural disasters
Source: RTE library
Each year between 2009 and 2012 there was a storm with an 
impact on the network: Klaus - January 2009: comparable in 
terms of wind power with Lothar and Martin, it damaged four 
times fewer towers than in 1999, Joachim - December 2011, 
Andrea - January 2012, and Foehn - April 2012, affected the 
grid by winds in excess of 110 km/h, with minor damages.
This is why Transmission System Operators (TSOs) must 
take into account the natural disasters in their development 
and maintenance strategies for the electricity networks.
Consequences of natural disasters on 
electricity networks
Electricity transmission networks consisting mainly of over-
head lines, cables, and pylons are particularly sensitive to 
storms and strong winds and falling trees. This results in in-
terruptions in energy supply which can be very long because 
of the major repair works needed (Figure 36).
France had never experienced such storms previously. As 
shown in the above table, the consequences were serious, but 
the network showed a good level of resilience: only 0.5% of 
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the total number of towers were affected. This does not seem 
much, but around 10% of the circuits and more than 180 sub-
stations were out of order for five days or more. Hence, the 
fundamental importance of power system resilience against 
the consequences of natural disasters to the network. 
Implementation of technical issues to 
strengthen the network: The mechanical 
strength program
Following these events, RTE decided to implement a new 
mechanical upgrading of its network based on i) increas-
ing the hypothetical wind pressure at the design stage; and 
ii) implementing anti-cascading towers every 5 km to limit 
damage. The goals of these measures are: i) continuity of 
the service; even if another 1999 storm occurs, transmission 
lines must keep on supplying “source” substations; ii) resto-
ration of the service if a bigger storm hits; the delay both in 
resupplying “source” substations and ensuring the security 
of the public must be overcome, as infrastructure damages 
have consequences for both energy supply and safety in pub-
lic areas. In order to face recorded wind speeds of around 
200km/h and more in areas where RTE had never before re-
corded more than 160km/h, the technical upgrading is the 
subject of a new technical law.
A new “technical” law (2001) with three “legal” wind 
pressures: 
- Normal wind (inland): 570 Pa on conductors (+20%) 
(previously, 480 Pa) 
- Strong wind (some regions): 640 Pa
- Very strong wind (coastline/river-crossing): 720 Pa 
“Anti-cascading” towers must be erected every 5 km: to 
avoid big cascading failures and to allow quick restoration 
thanks to temporary lines (5 km long). 
Figure 35. Key figures of those storms: wind speed from blue to red
Source: Meteo France
Figure 36. Key statistics of the consequences of 
the 1999 storms: (damage = number of towers)
Source: Data, RTE
VOLTAGE DAMAGE CAUSE
63/90 kV 300 destroyed 50% Wind
421/4900 circuits  
out of order
500 damaged 50% Wind
50% Trees
225 kV 125 destroyed 90% Wind
10% Trees
81/1050 circuits  
out of order
25 damaged 50% Wind
50% Trees
400 kV 120 destroyed
5 damaged
100% Wind
38/450 circuits out of order 5 damaged 100% Trees
december 1999
first storm
Lothar (25 – 26)
Second storm
Martin (27 – 28)
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Results:
All the proposed provisions were completed by the end of 
2010: treatment of 1,395 x 400kV towers, treatment of 842 
tower foundations, and expansion of 8,400 km of forest cor-
ridors 
Based on the feedback, the following goals were achieved:
- Ensure that at each delivery point RTE has a secure 
power supply line, resistant to winds of an intensity 
equivalent to that of the 1999 storm. The item qualified 
“complete security” concerns around 2,500 points of 
secure deliveries, 48,700 km grating (3700 lines) which 
constitute the securing of the target network. At the end 
of 2012, approximately 61% of delivery points and 74% of 
the target network lines were secure. 
- Strengthen the important road crossings and overlook-
ing areas. This item concerns brought about 8000 and is 
made up to 80% at end 2012 and end in 2017.
- Reconnected each delivery substation cut in five days in 
case of exceptional events.
The program should be completed by 2017. The mechani-
cal security program the implementation of which started 
in 2002, was funded to the tune of €100 million/year until 
2007 on RTE’s operating budget. From 2008 this deployment 
has accelerated to reach 185 million €/year (excluding invest-
ment). RTE’s investment program over the network contrib-
utes about 20% to the development of security policy.
 
Emergency restoration training and cooperation:
RTE has made a commitment to the French state to restore 
power to the substation within five days at the most. Emer-
gency restoration organization is then implemented and 
based on crisis management, 400 and 225 kV temporary 
lines, and regular team training exercises. RTE signed the 
GO15 Protocol Agreement for Mutual Assistance in Novem-
ber 2012.
2.5. Resilience of Electricity 
Networks to Natural Disasters 
Wei Liu,  
Human and Environment Linkage Program
Introduction
In modern societies, electricity transmission networks, one 
of the critical components of the lifeline systems, play a vital 
role to supply energy to support national and regional econo-
mies and people’s daily lives. Reliability of these networks, 
often high dimensional, is essential to the security of energy 
supply, or even national security. As the electricity networks 
grow, they face a variety of threats, among which the top is 
natural hazards, such as earthquakes, tsunami, floods, land-
slides, et cetera. Natural disasters may disrupt or damage 
critical lifelines, such as electricity networks, with serious ef-
fects beyond the losses suffered directly by the utility or elec-
tric system operators. Electricity is essential to maintain the 
functionality of emergency services and other lifelines such 
as water supply, fuel supply, and communications, and also 
plays a major role in the economic vitality of the community. 
Failure of electricity networks in a disaster may cause not 
only huge direct/indirect economic losses, but also severally 
impact people’s normal life and social production, or even 
trigger a cascade of economic, social and environmental in 
today’s highly complex and interconnected societies. Rapid 
restoration of electricity network is critical to the recovery of 
a disaster-stricken region. Therefore, discussions about re-
silience of electricity networks become essential in regions 
and countries with significant natural hazards and also in the 
context of climate change. 
Multiple perspectives of resilience 
In this section we briefly review a variety of perspectives on 
resilience from different disciplines and discuss how they 
relate to the protection and resilience of electric power net-
works and other critical infrastructure systems.
Figure 37: Emergency restoration training and cooperation
Source: RTE library
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Engineering and material resilience
Engineering resilience is probably most commonly known 
to general public. Davoudi (2012, pg. 300) defined it as “the 
ability of a system to return to an equilibrium or steady-state 
after a disturbance…such as flooding or earthquakes, or a 
social upheaval, such as banking crises, wars or revolutions”. 
The level of resilience is proportion to the speed of bounc-
ing back. In material science, resilience refers to the ability 
of a material to absorb energy when it is subjected to strain, 
without being permanently distorted. And the more energy 
a material can absorb before reaching the maximal elasticity 
limit, the more resilient it is. Holling (1996, p. 33) points out 
that engineering resilience “focuses on efficiency, constancy, 
and predictability – all attributes at the core of engineers’ de-
sires for fail-safe design.” 
Ecological resilience
Holling coined the term ecological resilience and defined it 
as “a measure of the persistence of systems and their ability 
to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state variables” (Hol-
ling, 1973, p. 14). He stresses the concepts of persistence, 
change, and unpredictability in this definition, in contrast 
to efficiency, constancy, and predictability in engineering re-
silience. A resilience ecosystem has the capacity to absorb 
disturbance (e.g., fire, pest) and reorganize while undergoing 
changes. 
Other disciplines – psychological, social 
and economic Resilience
The concept of psychological resilience in originated from 
both child/youth development and epidemiology. It is about 
the ability of an individual to maintain physiological and psy-
chological health in the face of a traumatic/adverse event and 
recover from it. It has also been expanded to the concept of 
community resilience, which looks at the collective ability of 
community members to cooperate and thrive in an unpre-
dictable environment (Welsh, 2013; Berks and Ross, 2013). 
The latter is also related to the emerging social resilience 
perspective (Adger et al. 2000; Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013), 
which stresses for the coping, adaptive and transformative 
capacities of communities facing changes and shocks. In 
economics, resilience is generally related to how the ability 
of markets to maintain function (e.g., continue producing 
or growth) when shocked by recession, change in consumer 
preferences, damage to capital (e.g, disasters), et cetera. Eco-
nomic resilience necessitates a stable and effective macroe-
conomic and institutional environment and efficient market, 
along with social development (Rose, 2007). 
The emerging social-ecological resilience
Partly building on Holling’s work on ecological resilience, 
the concept of social-ecological system resilience was re-
cently developed together by natural and social scientists. 
Resilience Alliance defined it as “the capacity of a social-
ecological system to absorb or withstand perturbations and 
other stressors such that the system remains within the same 
regime, essentially maintaining its structure and functions. 
It describes the degree to which the system is capable of 
self-organization, learning and adaptation” (RA 2015). The 
social-ecological system perspective sees that human socie-
ties, the physical world, and the biosphere are all intercon-
nected and considers resilience thinking an important part 
of the solution to sustainable development because it strives 
to build flexibility and adaptive capacity in the longer term 
and enable people to anticipate change and influence future 
pathways, instead of focusing on optimizing short-term sys-
tem performance and/or efficiency.
Building on the abovementioned perspectives, we propose 
that a more holistic framework for building the resilience of 
electricity networks to natural disaster should (1) consider 
the electricity networks as both the physical components and 
their human individuals and organizations that operate the 
systems, (2) see electricity networks embedded in a broader 
regional or national social-ecological setting, and (3) identify 
resilience as being able to maintain functionality and recovery 
capacity in face of future disasters and continue improving 
using experience learned from disaster events that occurred.
Four properties of resilience and its 
implication for protecting and building 
resilient electricity networks 
While the resilience of a system is often place-, scale- and 
context-specific, some general properties or principles do 
exist.  In this section we briefly introduce four main prop-
erties that have been identified in various resilient systems 
(Cimellaro et al., 2010), namely the four Rs – robustness, 
redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity. Cimellaro et al 
defined then as following -
  Robustness: strength, or the ability of elements, systems, 
and other measures of analysis to withstand a given level 
of stress or demand, without suffering degradation or 
loss of function. 
  Redundancy: capacity of satisfying functional require-
ments in the event of disruption, degradation or loss of 
functionality.
  Rapidity: the capacity to meet priorities and achieve 
goals in a timely manner in order to contain losses, re-
cover functionality and avoid future disruption. 
  Resourcefulness: the capacity to identify problems, es-
tablish priorities, and mobilize alternative external re-
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sources when conditions exist that threaten to disrupt 
some element, system, or other measure.
These four properties are highly relevant in the context of the 
resilience of electricity networks to natural disasters. Current 
discussions on electricity network resilience mostly pay at-
tention to the robustness of the physical components, such 
as substation equipment and transmission lines and towers, 
and focus on correcting design issues such as poorly detailed, 
improperly restrained, or unanchored equipment that are 
vulnerable to disasters such as earthquakes and landslides. A 
robust electricity network should also include robust human 
resources, which include trained personnel and organization 
with necessary knowledge and experience to operate the sys-
tem during emergency and recovery periods. Redundancy 
refers to the extent to which alternative elements, systems, 
or other measures exist, that are substitutable for the existing 
ones. For electricity networks, this could be either back-up 
physical equipment, and having extra personnel or training 
them to have multiple skillsets to operate the system.  Rapid-
ity refers to how fast related organization and personnel can 
respond to disaster during emergency and also how quickly 
a network’s functionality can be recovered if certain damage 
is unavoidable. Rapidity also takes account of learning, such 
Figure 39. Damaged Gengda Hydropower Plant (left) and nearby substation (right) near the epicenter of 
the Wenchuan Earthquake (Photo credit: Mingchong Liu).
Figure 38. The electricity generating and transmission systems in hazard-prone areas of Wenchuan County, 
Sichuan, China near the epicenter of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake.
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as how soon an electricity network operating organization 
can learn from a disaster event and be better prepared for 
the next event, and may involve a transformation. Resource-
fulness means the ability to mobilize material (i.e., financial, 
physical, technological, and informational) and human re-
sources to the whole process of disaster risk management and 
resilience building. Resourcefulness, often through making 
financial and organizational decisions to engage additional 
and alternative resources, could help improve robustness by 
replacing legacy equipment and supporting structures with 
more modern and disaster-robust equipment and structures 
to prevent and reduce disaster risk; create redundancy by 
providing resources to maintain additional equipment and 
personnel; and enhance rapidity ex post by making relevant 
investment ex ante.
Resilience of electricity networks in 
the Sichuan earthquakes in China
Mountains in the Western China province Sichuan lie at the 
eastern edge of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, where several of 
the largest rivers in Asia originate from and feed tens of mil-
lions people downstream. The province has great potential in 
hydropower, with a gross theoretical capacity of 143 million 
kW (ca. 21% of the national total capacity of China) and a 
technical theoretical capacity of over 100 million kW.  The 
total installed capacity of hydropower in Sichuan has re-
cently reached 63.7 million kW, supplying electricity to both 
within and outside of the province. The mountainous area in 
Sichuan is also a global hotspot of earthquake and landslide 
disasters. Through recent human history dozens of large 
earthquakes have been recorded in this region and landslides 
and flashfloods are common, especially in summer monsoon 
seasons (Xing and Xu 2010). 
The Mw 7.9 (Ms 8.0) Wenchuan Earthquake at 14:28 on 
May 12, 2008 was the most devastating earthquake in main-
land China in the past 60 years, and resulted in the most 
serious losses and damages with the largest stricken area 
of about 500,000 km2. At least 69,227 people were killed, 
374,643 injured and 17,823 missing during the earthquake, 
while about 15.1 million people in over 400 counties (cities 
or districts) in 10 provinces (municipalities or autonomous 
regions) needed to be urgently relocated (Xing and Xu 
2010). The earthquake severely destructed regional infra-
structures, including the electricity system. Besides dam-
ages to dozens of hydro and thermal power plants (such as 
those near the epicenter shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 left), the 
regional high voltage power transmission network and lo-
cal distribution systems were also seriously destructed (see 
pictures in Fig.2 right). A total of 2.46 million users suffered 
power outage. There was widespread failure of the water 
supply in the quake-stricken area due to lack of electric-
ity for pumps and other equipment. Half the wireless com-
munications were lost in Sichuan, partly because of power 
disruption that prevented thousands of base stations from 
functioning (Chen and Booth 2011). 
The Wenchuan Earthquake posed an unprecedented chal-
lenge to electricity network in Sichuan, and to the whole en-
ergy industry in China as well. The lack of resilience in the 
electricity network system apparently was a critical factor 
behind the severe losses and damages and indirect impacts. 
The physical network was not robust enough to sustain the 
impacts of the earthquake and quake-induced landslides. 
In areas near the epicenter, the seismic intensity reached 
XI, much higher than the specified seismic intensity level 
(mostly at VII) in the design of the networks. Three 500kV-
electricity transmission lines and 56 220kV lines tripped af-
ter the earthquake and 122 110kV-lines, and 110 35kV-lines 
and 795 10kV-lines suffered outages, mainly due to fallen 
pylons, broken poles, and damage to transformers, circuit 
breakers and other high voltage equipment (Eidinger 2009). 
The electricity network operators were not prepared to such 
an event either, due to the lack of emergency response plans 
and related knowledge and experience. The level of redun-
dancy in both equipment and personnel was also low, partly 
due to the fact that historically investment and development 
in electricity transmission network significantly lagged be-
hind the construction of power plants. While the level of 
general resourcefulness of the country was high and the gov-
ernment rounded up huge amount of financial and human 
resources into the earthquake relief and recovery processes, 
the electricity network across the vast quake-stricken areas 
did not return back to basic functioning till weeks or even 
months later, a sign of lack of rapidity. The reconstruction of 
the whole electricity network in the region only finished five 
years later. 
Taking the hard lessons from the Wenchuan Earthquake, 
about 26 billion Yuan (~4.2 billion US Dollar) were invested 
in reconstructing a more resilient electricity network sys-
tem in Sichuan by 2013 (SGN 2013). Modern seismic design 
guidelines were taken into account to rebuild the power sys-
tems, such as reducing the fragility of equipment and con-
structing substations outside landslide zones so that these 
equipment can sustain a higher level of seismic intensity. 
More importantly, a new electricity network disaster emer-
gency and risk management system was designed and imple-
mented by the State Grid Sichuan Electric Power Corpora-
tion, covering disaster risk prevention, preparation, response 
and recovery stages (CPNN 2015). This new system was soon 
tested in the Ms. 7.0 Lushan Earthquake on April 20th, 2013. 
The epicenter of this Mw 6.6 (Ms 7.0) earthquake was just 
85 km southwest to the Wenchuan Earthquake epicenter, 
with a highest seismic intensity measured at IX. Although 
less devastating than the Wenchuan Earthquake, the Lushan 
Earthquake still affected around 2 million people in over 100 
counties and caused substantial damages to lifeline systems. 
Some similar damages to electricity network equipment was 
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still observed, mainly in high landslide risk locations; but 
the overall emergency response was much improved (Chen 
2013). Electricity supply to the centers of the three counties 
closest to the epicenter were all recovered only one day later, 
and it took only 20 days to recover electricity supply to all af-
fected villages. The success shown in the Lushan Earthquake 
response and recovery was largely due to the resourcefulness 
of the central and provincial governments, which have the 
capacity to mobilize large amount of human and financial re-
sources, and also the rapidity of learning by all sectors from 
the Wenchuan Earthquake. 
The Wenchuan Earthquake and its reconstruction is a mile-
stone in China’s disaster emergency and risk management 
history and also a critical event that changed the trajectory 
of China’s power network system development toward re-
silience building. While significant improvement has been 
achieved in mountainous Sichuan, as evidenced by the Lush-
an Earthquake, the nature of mountainous Western China 
being hotspot of various disasters make it a long-term chal-
lenge to build resilience electricity network and other lifeline 
systems for millions of households in this least developed 
region of the China. 
Conclusions
In summary, we reviewed key perspectives on the concept 
of resilience in various disciplines, including engineer, ecol-
ogy, psychology, economics and social-ecological systems, 
building on which we propose that the resilience of critical 
infrastructure systems, such as electric power network, to 
natural disasters should include both the physical capacity 
of the power systems (transformation substations, transmis-
sion lines, etc.) and the organizational capacity of the oper-
ating groups. We further elaborated four necessary proper-
ties, robustness (ability to withstand a shock), redundancy 
(functional diversity), resourcefulness (ability to mobilize 
when threatened), and rapidity (ability to contain losses 
and recover in a timely manner), of a resilient system, and 
demonstrate how each of them can be operationalized in the 
context of maintaining reliability of electricity networks and 
other critical infrastructure systems in a more and more in-
terconnected world facing increasing frequency and inten-
sity of natural hazards. We demonstrated how the concept 
and properties related to disaster resilience of electricity net-
work system can be operationalized using the case of 2008 
and 2013 earthquakes in Sichuan, China. 
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Chapter 3 provides examples of good practices on preven-
tion of power blackouts caused by natural disasters, which 
are available at the German Federal Office of Civil Protec-
tion and Disaster Assistance, to prevent long-term security 
of supply and to increase short-term reliability of the power 
system, available at GO15, the organisation bringing togeth-
er several transmission systems operators. The chapter also 
contains perspectives of the insurance industry, provided 
by the Willis Towers and Willis Re, which is followed by the 
discussion of the early warning mechanism, provided by the 
Energy Charter Secretariat.
3.1. National Civil Protection
Christine Eismann, 
German Federal Office of Civil Protection 
and Disaster Assistance
1. Introduction –  
Electricity networks are in focus
This article highlights some of the successful measures that 
were implemented in Germany in order to prevent power 
blackouts caused by natural disasters, as well as examples of 
how power disruptions can be handled. Within Critical In-
frastructure Protection, the German Federal Office of Civil 
Protection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bev-
ölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe, BBK) focuses on 
electricity networks as part of the Critical Infrastructure of 
“Energy Supply.” As almost all other infrastructures depend 
on it, failure can have dramatic consequences for the citizens 
(Petermann et al. 2010).
The most important conclusion from the examples is that 
successful risk and crisis management cannot be realized 
by one organization alone. Cooperation is key. Every stake-
holder has a part to play. While public authorities are in the 
position of defining protection goals, infrastructure opera-
tors have the lead in risk prevention within the organiza-
tion; thus, each stakeholder has a different perspective and 
responsibility.
The examples will be presented according to the four phases 
of the integrated risk and crisis management cycle (see Fig-
ure 40). However, the reader should keep in mind that some 
of the examples touch on several phases. To deal with the risk 
of power failure successfully, action needs to be taken during 
all four phases:
  Prevention to lessen the probability and intensity of a 
blackout happening, decision on which risks to take and 
which to avoid 
  Preparedness to establish structures that are able to deal 
with a blackout in case it occurs despite the prevention 
measures 
  Response to keeping blackouts small and short and the 
degree of damage low 
  Recovery to get back to normal life by building on experi-
ences from the event.
2. Prevention 
Systematic prevention of the risk of power failure is achieved 
by performing risk management. Risks need to be analyzed, 
evaluated, and treated at all different levels of government 
as well as in companies. Some examples are now listed. The 
examples are chosen from the perspective of Civil Protec-
tion. Of course, the design of the legislative framework also 
plays an important part in risk prevention. It is, however, not 
in focus here.
In Germany, regular reports on Risk Analysis in Civil Pro-
tection at the National Level are presented to parliament. 
In the scenarios “winter storm” and “storm surge,” power 
blackouts are given special consideration. To catch the de-
pendencies, power failures are treated as part of the sce-
nario in the report. The cascading effects on other criti-
Chapter 3
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cal infrastructures (CI) are described on a generic level 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2013).
For private and governmental organizations, the German 
Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Innern, 
BMI) published a Guideline for Risk and Crisis Manage-
ment in Critical Infrastructures (BMI 2011). It provides for 
all operators a methodology to perform a well-structured 
analysis of their own operability/operational capability, con-
sidering not only everyday hazards, but also extreme events. 
The analysis also looks at the vulnerability and criticality of 
infrastructures and their processes and elements. Electricity 
network operators who perform risk and crisis management 
according to the guideline add to the security of the electric-
ity infrastructure. Other methods for risk management are 
also available, for example as described in ISO 31010 (ISO.
IEC 31010:2009).
Operators of CI and governmental authorities – ideally – 
exchange information on the relevant findings of their risk 
analyses in order to strengthen the protection of Critical In-
frastructures and therefore of the population from hazards. 
This cooperative approach is manifested in the German Crit-
ical Infrastructure Strategy (BMI 2009). A successful exam-
ple is the Working Group on Electricity, in which the roles of 
the public authorities (from the interior and economy port-
folios) and of the operators are defined as shown in Figure 
39: The authorities supply the scenarios and the protection 
goals. The operators identify the processes and assets that 
are critical, meaning that their failure would result in large 
supply disturbances. They perform an analysis of the vulner-
able parts in their system and define and implement protec-
tion measures. Both operators and authorities are responsi-
ble for validating the effects of those measures.
Figure 40. Risk and Crisis Management Cycle
Source: BBK
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Voluntary cooperation also takes place in the UP KRITIS, 
a platform on which representatives of private companies 
and authorities meet to discuss different aspects of critical 
infrastructure security (BSI 2014). It is hosted by the Federal 
Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit 
in der Informationstechnik, BSI). In the Sectoral Working 
Group for Electricity, threats, criticalities, and vulnerabilities 
are discussed. 
Complementing the cooperative approach, in cases where 
equal standards and procedures are necessary, legislative so-
lutions are needed. An example for this is the new IT Security 
Act (IT-Sicherheitsgesetz, ITSiG), which defines procedures 
for operators of critical infrastructures to report incidents to 
the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für 
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI). 
Critical infrastructures are also, protected according to the 
European Program on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP). For the energy sector, the 2008 Directive on Eu-
ropean Critical Infrastructures has been implemented into 
national legislation. This means that the operators of Euro-
pean critical energy infrastructures in Germany have to pre-
pare Operator Security Plans (advanced business continuity 
plans) and nominate Security Liaison Officers (linking the 
owner/operator with the national authority responsible for 
critical infrastructure protection).
The operators of the critical energy infrastructures are the 
stakeholders that have to implement the protection meas-
ures and that can give detailed information on viable ways 
to improve protection measures – both physical and by 
deliberate planning. The (legislative) authorities have to 
provide the framework for this. A good practice example 
is that in the German Federal Regional Planning Act, it is 
obligatory to consider critical infrastructures in the stake-
holder process (Raumordnungsgesetz). This serves to give 
critical infrastructure protection an adequate role in wider 
planning processes: Is centralization of power lines, which 
might be useful from an economic perspective, also a good 
idea when considering questions of vulnerability? Might 
transformer stations be exposed to threats due to their geo-
graphical position?
Research projects can generate input for the risk manage-
ment regarding power failures. In a project funded by the 
German Ministry of Education and Research, the partici-
pants developed a methodology to generate threat scenarios 
by combining hazards with different effects. An example was 
the combination of flooding and a cold spell, with the low 
temperatures resulting in frozen water that might hit roads 
and houses as well as transformer stations (BBK 2014). In the 
same project, a simulation of an earthquake was run as an ex-
ample for an extreme single risk. The simulators were able to 
get much more detailed information on the vulnerability of a 
transformer station than was previously known. The opera-
tor could therefore take well-adjusted measures (BBK 2014).
For local authorities, the BBK and the United Nations Uni-
versity (UNU) provide guidelines for specific scenarios that 
might be more frequent in the future due to climate change. 
The guidelines “Assessing Vulnerability to Flood Events at 
a Community Level” and “Assessing Vulnerability to Heat 
Waves and Heavy Rainfall at a Community Level” contain ex-
pedient checklists for the users. These are also on the topic of 
blackouts: such as the checklist on “Emergency power supply 
Figure 41. Assignment of tasks within the cooperative approach
Source: BBK 2012
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in a flooding event” (BBK and UNU 2014). Another guideline 
provides checklists on “Vulnerability assessment of the mu-
nicipality to power failures” (BBK and UNU, 2014). They are 
directed at officials, the population, emergency services, and 
critical infrastructure operators.
3. Preparedness
Risk preparedness builds closely on prevention. The focus 
shifts from technical and physical protection measures to 
planning the necessary capacities for the event that a risk 
materializes despite all preventive measures or because it has 
been explicitly taken. This is necessary because not all risks 
can be diminished. Preparation is, just as prevention, a part 
of risk management.
To be prepared, the BBK is working on emergency planning 
for widespread and long-lasting electricity blackouts, taking 
into account the preparations of all relevant stakeholders.18 
The goal is to bring all efforts together in a harmonized con-
cept. This, for example, guarantees that a minimum level of 
supplies is available for every citizen. To get an overview of 
the multitude of projects  being worked on in Germany’s fed-
eral system of civil protection, a series of workshops has been 
started by BBK. 
Research projects help generate good practice solutions to 
keep necessary goods and services available in blackout sce-
narios. Examples of this are a logistics system to bring fuel 
supplies to emergency power units and solutions for passing 
on information to crisis managers as well as to the population. 
These topics are worked on in the projects TankNotStrom 
(engl.: TankEmergencyPower)19 and Katastrophenschutz-
Leuchttürme (engl.: Disaster Protection Lighthouses),20, 
funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research.
Solutions for a limited power supply on a household level are 
also being worked on.21  Powered by small devices, mostly 
using regenerative energies, individuals can build up their 
own emergency supply and take precautions (BBK 2015a). 
Guidelines for emergency power supplies for authorities and 
companies are also available (BBK 2015b). 
18 Some of the German states (Länder) as well as some counties or other administrative 
bodies have already done detailed work on the topic and published guidelines or analyses 
on the topic. Just two examples are:
 Hessisches Ministerium des Innern und für Sport (HMdIS) (2013): Rahmenempfehlungen 
zur Einsatzplanung des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes bei flächendeckendem, lang-
andauerndem Stromausfall. Online available at https://innen.hessen.de/sicherheit/
katastrophenschutz/infothek/rahmenempfehlung-stromausfall-0. (German only)
 Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe (2014): Musternotfallplan Stromausfall. Handlungs-
empfehlungen zur Vorbereitung auf einen flächendeckenden und langanhaltenden Strom-
ausfall. Online available at http://www.lfs-bw.de/meldungen/aktuelles/archiv/archiv2014/
Documents/2014011_MNP_Stromausfall.pdf. (German only)
19 http://www.tanknotstrom.de/
20 http://www.kat-leuchtturm.de/
21 http://www.kat-leuchtturm.de/
 x_k2db4zhweo70Dzwo.html
4. Response
The ability to respond in case of a major power outage de-
pends strongly on the level of preparedness. Only structures 
and procedures that were established beforehand can be 
quickly used in a crisis. The effectiveness is validated by exer-
cises and real-life events. 
In 2004 the exercise scenario for the German cross-state 
(Laender) exercise in national crisis management (LÜKEX) 
was a power blackout in one of the German states.22 The 
experiences from the exercise were compiled in the Crisis 
Handbook Electricity Blackout (Krisenhandbuch Stromaus-
fall) (BBK, IM BW and KIT, 2010). This contains extensive 
information and detailed checklists on crisis management in 
cases of blackouts.
Actual power blackouts are rare events in Germany, where 
the annual power interruption per person ranks at approx-
imately 15 to 20 minutes. However, there have been a few 
long-lasting blackouts caused by the snow storms in north-
ern Germany in the winter of 1978/1979 and the snow storm 
in the Münster area in November 2005. The latter is a refer-
ence for much of the current emergency planning. Around 
250,000 people (at first more, then less) were without power 
for several days. The situation was handled without much 
more than economic damage, due to the good cooperation of 
the involved emergency response teams and the close collab-
oration of different power companies. The situation was also 
less destructive than it might have been in a more densely 
populated area, since personal preparedness (food supplies, 
ovens) was comparatively high (BNetzA 2006).
5. Recovery
When a harmful event has taken place, people tend to learn 
from it. It is no coincidence that people are better-prepared 
for events that they have experienced before. This is valid 
also for electricity blackouts.
Smaller blackouts with several thousand affected citizens 
within one county or city take place more frequently than 
large events. The electricity supply is mainly restored within 
a few hours, but sometimes the disruption lasts for a day or 
longer. Although these events are only small, they challenge 
the local authorities, infrastructure operators, and disaster 
response teams. In cities that have experienced such black-
outs, emergency power supplies are often strengthened in 
the aftermath.
The risk recovery phase is usually a window of opportu-
nity for implementing additional protection measures. The 
stakeholders wish to avoid the same kind of damage in the 
22 http://www.bbk.bund.de/DE/AufgabenundAusstattung/Krisenmanagement/Luekex/
Vergangene_Uebungen/vergangene_uebungen_node.html
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future, so that destroyed infrastructure components are re-
built in a less vulnerable way. Following the winter storm in 
the Münster area 2005 and the highly destructive storm Ky-
rill in January 2007, the electricity network operators have 
worked together in an association and adjusted their criteria 
for building electrical towers. With their new Technical Rule 
they went beyond setting stricter standards for new towers 
to better resist storms and ice load. Under certain conditions 
even the existing towers need to be retrofitted to fulfill the 
criteria of the  technical rule VDE-AR-N 4210-4, 2014.
6. Conclusion
The various examples provided, which are by no means com-
plete, show that the issue of power blackout due to natural 
disasters is acknowledged as a serious issue to be addressed 
in Germany. Germany has a strictly federal system, which 
means that civil protection is largely composed of different 
volunteer organizations. Even without this special setting, 
however, the protection from electrical failures is a task that 
has to be performed by a multitude of different stakehold-
ers. Authorities, private operators, and the public all have to 
work together to protect citizens effectively. 
The examples also illustrate the wide variety of possible 
measures when it comes to protecting electricity networks 
and protecting citizens from blackouts. The different phases 
of risk and crisis management – prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery – pose different challenges. They also 
provide different opportunities for protection. If these are 
utilized well, then a good protection level can be reached.
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Introduction
With the continued population growth, economic develop-
ment, and the shift towards a higher share of electric power 
in energy consumption, energy demand is expected to dou-
ble in the next 15 years. Due to new technologies, the costs 
associated with energy interruptions will rise. In addition, 
blackouts have been seen not only as technical issues, but 
also as subject to strong political influence.
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In the last decades, the most frequent causes of system dis-
turbances have been: natural phenomena, communication 
and control system failure, design and application error, op-
erator error, and primary equipment failure.
New environmental constraints affecting or delaying the 
building of traditional power plants and new transmission 
corridors have aggravated power system performance.
More recently, electricity in common with other physical 
and logistic networks has been subject to natural disasters 
and to threats from aggressors; all networks have vulnerabili-
ties that are difficult to defend. See the report published by 
the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress, 
“Physical Vulnerability of the Electric System to Natural Dis-
asters and Sabotage.” This report also documents the inter-
ruption costs, estimating them to be in the range from $1 
- $5 /Kwh of disrupted service, depending on the length of 
outage, the types of customers affected, and the time of day.
Power system vulnerability has significantly increased in 
recent years for several reasons: dramatic increase in in-
terregional bulk power transfers, leading power systems to 
operate closer to their limits; increase in transmission trunk 
bottlenecks; new environmental constraints leading to dif-
ficulties in building new transmission facilities and hydro 
plants (mainly with reservoirs); integration of renewable 
generation sources (RES) replacing traditional thermal gen-
eration. Europe today is facing the fundamental challenge of 
shifting from large-scale, centralized predictable power gen-
eration to a system in which generation capacity is becoming 
decentralized and intermittent.
Without a doubt, the electricity industry is being impacted 
immensely by the fundamental shift in the base load genera-
tion mix. For example, low gas prices and an abundant gas 
supply, combined with stringent environmental policies in 
the USA are driving the change from coal- to gas-based. The 
consequences are electricity generation far from load cent-
ers, increase in transmission trunk power flow, and new gen-
erating units with poor controls, all of which affect power 
system reliability and security. 
In the last years, new issues have been affecting power system 
performance in a negative way. These has been an increase 
in natural disasters, cyber/internet attacks, and vandalism. 
It is important to note that all threats to security travel either 
through the power network itself or via communication and 
information systems. In terms of natural disasters: heat waves 
are hotter, heavy rain events are more frequent, and winter 
storms have increased in both frequency and intensity. These 
kinds of events are among the leading causes of large-scale 
power outages. The increasing occurrence of severe weather 
could lead to infrastructure breakdown with far-reaching 
consequences. In some countries, acts of vandalism moti-
vated by theft are quite common, as when transmission line 
cables are stolen or guyed cables cut off, thus occasioning 
faults on the transmission lines. A sharp increase in cyber 
attacks targeting the power industry, along with the prolif-
eration of computing devices in the field to support smart 
grid initiatives, will require utilities to rethink cyber security.
System operators are facing unprecedented challenges in 
the threat levels confronting their enterprises: terrorists, 
hostile states, criminality, and extreme weather conditions. 
Although, to date physical and/or cyber attacks have not led 
to severe blackouts, several measures must to be adopted in 
the face of increasingly sophisticated and frequent attacks. 
We need to understand and accept this reality and to adopt 
countermeasures to ensure power system security.
This report will focus on the problems caused by adverse 
weather conditions and will propose actions to minimize 
their impact. Of course, the proposed remedial actions can 
also help power systems to face multiple contingencies from 
different causes or origins. Power system restoration can take 
from hours to days and even weeks for distribution grids, 
depending on the severity of the blackout and the physical 
damage to power system infrastructure. The societal reac-
tion increases the longer the total restoration time takes.
Understanding challenges
It is difficult to imagine modern society without a power grid 
that provides electricity in a reliable, cost-effective, efficient, 
and timely manner. The trends are towards increasing needs 
for more and more energy. This infrastructure will thus face a 
number of new challenges.
The challenges we are addressing are familiar to everyone in-
volved in grid modernization: cyber security, the integration 
of renewable energy sources, gaps in standards, harmoniza-
tion of global standards, consumer engagement and transac-
tive energy, to name a few.
More recently and assuming that threats continue increasing 
in the short run, power system security is likely to degrade. 
Possible impacts to nuclear generation also cause some un-
certainty regarding the future of the industry. 
Clearly, society expects increased reliability and reduced res-
toration time. Thus, pressures have increased considerably 
for utilities. Under the critical eye of both regulators and 
consumers, we must ask: are utilities currently better pre-
pared to face extreme weather than they were before?
For example, Superstorm Sandy interrupted power to close 
to two million customers of the PSE&G (Public Service En-
terprise Group of New Jersey), who went a combined 164 
million hours without electricity. Waters from Hurricane 
Irene and Sandy damaged 29 substations.
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Local US leaders clearly remember what occurred after Hur-
ricane Irene and Superstorm Sandy. They understand the 
costs imposed by extended outages and expect to see meas-
ures to protect against the next storm.
The number of record-breaking storms since 2011 especially 
in the northeast of the USA has increased attention on utili-
ties and their ability to handle emergency response. As bil-
lions of US dollars have been used to battle power outages 
and energy supply shortages because of the 2015-16 low tem-
peratures, consumers are wondering what the weather might 
bring next and if their local power company will be prepared.
In Europe, Maros Sefcovic, Vice President of the European 
Commission and in charge of energy union in the 28-nation 
EU bloc, announced on 1 April 2015 that the European Com-
mission plans to introduce stress tests for the power sector 
in 2016 along the lines of those carried out for the EU gas 
sector. It is, therefore key to understand and accept this new 
reality if cost-effective countermeasures are to be adopted to 
ensure power system security.
Long-term security of supply
In general, and at the level of an entire power system, long-
term security of supply depends on: secure access to fuels; 
generation adequacy on a regional basis, taking into account 
reserves for maintenance and unplanned outages; transmis-
sion adequacy; and the transmission capacity available with-
in a given region to accommodate power transfers. Resist-
ance to the physical threats and redundancy of infrastructure 
are key elements for resilience. Security of supply also de-
pends on real time observability and controllability resources 
(ENTSO-E 2012).
While generation investments are made at the initiative of 
market players and mainly driven by economic objectives, 
transmission investments are planned and realized under a 
regulated regime and are subject to reliability criteria (EN-
TSO-E Ten Year Network Development Plan). Therefore, 
the transmission grid is planned with redundancy (N-1 cri-
terion); however, common mode failures are in general not 
covered. The (N-2) criterion is adopted in specific cases only.
Short-term reliability of the power system 
When we think about short-term reliability of the power sys-
tem, we have to consider different threats:
  Failures in the distribution grids which in general are not 
redundant by design, meaning that a single failure will 
be experienced by the consumer as a power interruption
  “Excursions” from planning criteria: events that for eco-
nomic reasons cannot be taken into account in grid plan-
ning criteria. Examples are multiple simultaneous failures
  Delay in transmission corridor chronograms.
  Asset aging: the actual performance of an asset, com-
pared to its original design requirements.
  Human errors caused, for example, by unreliable infor-
mation, flawed reasoning and decision making, or faulty 
execution of an intervention in the power system.
Figure 42: Basic structure of the electric system
Source: US DOE, complemented by the authors
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  Forecast errors for renewable energy resources
  Combination of the above-mentioned risks
On top of these mostly internal threats, some additional ex-
ternal threats are emerging: severe weather events, and cy-
ber attacks and terrorist attacks against grid infrastructure. 
These are nowadays considered as the most serious and dif-
ficult in terms of managing risks to a secure power supply.
Metrics
To measure the quality of power supply, several critical per-
formance indicators (CPIs) have been identified. Some of the 
most commonly used are listed here:
  Number of affected consumers 
  Affected area
  Average load restoration time 
  Average Interruption Time (AIT): the time a customer 
would not be supplied if all power not been delivered due 
to power failures during a year were to be equally spread 
among all consumers
  System average interruption duration index (SAIDI): the 
time a customer would not be supplied in a given year if 
interruptions were equally spread among all consumers
SAIDI is a measure for the frequency and duration of the in-
terruptions, while AIT places the emphasis on the impact of 
the power failures.
Improving resilience
Figure 43 is used to describe members’ response to severe 
events and GO15 support to its members in improving grid 
resilience. It includes several blocks, such as prior to an 
event, during an event, and after an event.
Prior to an event: the cost versus security dilemma or cost/
benefit trade-off appear. There is a need to increase the re-
silience of transmission equipment so it can remain reliable 
under a wider range of ambient conditions. The capital cost 
of such a move is likely to be very high. In addition, as we are 
dealing here with relatively rare conditions, it would be very 
difficult to justify large-scale projects on this basis. However, 
limited-scale projects for critical corridors could well be jus-
tified. A generic model was developed by GO15 members to 
enable experience exchange and benchmarking at the level 
of design criteria. However, no common standards could be 
proposed due to the great differences in boundary conditions 
of the different power systems.
During an event: operation of the power system in a more 
secure mode than normal when such severe natural phenom-
ena are forecast. If the risk is high, then such measures can 
usually be justified. If the system becomes unstable, power 
system operators trigger “Defense Plan” to return to stable 
state; the main measures are load shedding, generation drop-
ping, and islanding.
After an event: after stabilization (could be during blackout): 
activation of “Restoration plan”: this is a systematic ap-
proach for repowering lost load and reducing duration of im-
pact. In the case of severe infrastructure damage, restoration 
can take days to weeks –deployment of the disaster recovery 
plan, coordination of operational teams, external contrac-
tors, consultation with public authorities, priority setting, 
communication. GO15 provides two supporting tools: a 
crisis communication network and communication pro-
tocol, helping members to understand what is happening 
in another member’s system and a framework for mutual 
assistance, which enables members to provide each other 
with emergency help and relief in case serious infrastructure 
damage has occurred.
Post-incident learning: a database with case studies on se-
vere power system failure is available for members to enable 
them to learn from other incidents.
Framework for mutual assistance 
By sharing operational experiences and best practices, the 
capability of Power Grid Operators around the world to re-
Figure 43: Resilience concept
Source: PJM
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spond quickly to exceptional situations is greatly enhanced. 
In cases of extensive damage to the power grid assets, resto-
ration of the service is accelerated by obtaining spare equip-
ment and resources from neighboring operators. In this con-
text, the GO15 members have developed a framework for 
Mutual Assistance. The aim of the framework is to speed up 
restoration after a major power disturbance, on the one hand 
by sharing experiences, and on the other hand by facilitating 
arrangements among the members for access to spare parts 
and workforces.
The framework includes a signed protocol which defines pre-
agreed terms for such assistance, a library of relevant reports 
documenting how previous incidents were handled, and a 
mapping guide that helps members in need of assistance to 
quickly access subject matter experts who can be consulted 
to address specific types of incidents.
The protocol of mutual assistance expresses the will of GO15 
members to collaborate, and encompasses a template for con-
tractual agreement. This template can avoid lengthy negotia-
tions about terms and conditions when there is a request for 
assistance. The library is composed of contributions from the 
members featuring reports from past incidents in the GO15 
members’ networks and the way they were handled, includ-
ing root cause analysis and recommendations. Additionally, 
general interest publications about threats to secure opera-
tion of the electricity networks are shared.
The mapping guide is a practical tool that allows experts 
from the members and a list of available spare parts to be 
indexed to any to subject matters. It thus helps members in 
their search for help to identify the right companies and the 
right persons within the companies, member of GO15.
It is well known that in case of severe crisis, communication 
is of utmost importance. Therefore, the framework consti-
tutes a Crisis Communication Network. The members of 
GO15 have agreed on guidelines for information exchange 
with the aim of facilitating support actions and promoting 
efficient communication among members if a major event 
occurs.
3.3. Insurance industry
Brigitte Balthasar,  
Torolf Hamm and Marc Lehmann  
Willis Towers Watson and Willis Re
Energy infrastructure, particularly the electric power grid, 
is one of the critical lifeline infrastructures on which many 
other types of critical infrastructure depend. As we have 
seen over the years, low frequency, high impact events such 
as natural hazards can cause significant property damage 
and business interruption to critical infrastructure. A major 
event like an earthquake, windstorm, or flood ultimately im-
pact the ability to provide and maintain vital lifeline supplies 
to the wider population. The destruction of this infrastruc-
ture can cause a significant impact to national security and 
economy. Such events do not occur just in highly exposed 
regions around the world. We have witnessed the damage 
and disruption that recent storm events such as Desmond 
(December 2015) and Imogen/Ruzica (February 2016) have 
caused to various parts of the UK and EU knocking out pow-
er lines and flooding entire substations and resulting in the 
prolonged loss of power to many households and businesses.
Transferring risk to insurance is part of financial risk man-
agement. Insurance is a mechanism for sharing risks over 
time, a large group, and geographical areas; however, it does 
not mitigate or reduce potential disaster consequences or 
occurrence probability. Yet, within the insurance and rein-
surance industry there is enormous knowledge and exper-
tise in identifying, analyzing, and modeling risks that can 
be accessed through insurance transactions. This enables 
and empowers the insured to better understand the prob-
able risks and help develop further risk mitigation strategies 
and integrative risk management approaches. With respect 
to electricity networks one needs to keep in mind that in-
frastructure owners are not directly exposed to the full costs 
borne by society due to infrastructure failure in the event of 
a natural catastrophe. Thus, the losses incurred by individu-
als and companies due to power outage can be much larger 
than the cost to the electrical utility of repairing the damage.
This article offers some possible pre-event risk management 
concepts and methodologies to help electricity networks 
identify exposures, quantify expected losses or likely down-
times, and consider good practice risk mitigation solutions. 
It will briefly discuss some typically observed vulnerabilities 
of electrical power network systems to different perils, com-
ment on our experience in the assessment of these types of 
assets regarding natural hazards, and present tools and risk 
assessment techniques employed to assess the general resil-
ience of power distribution and transmission systems. This 
section is rounded up by some insights on Superstorm Sandy. 
Given the evolution of risk, an outlook on emerging risks will 
be provided followed by some concluding comments.
Electricity is an essential resource for many critical services 
(e.g., water, gas, communications, internet etc.), and other 
infrastructure systems depend on its continuity for their 
smooth functioning. At the same time electricity power net-
works have continued to develop into large and highly com-
plex technical systems with a greater geographical spread, 
which means that exposure to natural hazards is increasing. 
The very occurrence of natural disasters and their impact 
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on electricity power networks has been the focus of many 
countries around the world, as has been the need to enhance 
the resilience of these infrastructure systems, particularly in 
light of evolving trends such as climate change. Resilience 
depends on equipment, building codes, and technology, but 
even more so on the organization, mitigation, and standard-
ized emergency preparedness of well-structured electricity 
companies.
According to a report (Cabinet Office 2011), the UK energy 
sector under the direction of the Energy Networks Associa-
tion (ENA) produced an Engineering Technical Report on 
Resilience of Flooding of Grid and Primary Substations (ETR 
138). The report provides a risk-based approach to flood-
ing as well as methods to improve the resilience of services 
where this was technically feasible and economically viable. 
The electricity transmission and distribution industry has set 
out target levels (standards) of resilience for different assets 
within their sector, which includes a risk-based target of a 1 
in 1000 (0.1%) annual probability flood for the highest prior-
ity assets within their critical national infrastructure. Other 
measures to improve resilience include the capacity to re-
connect or provide an alternative energy supply to consum-
ers. This model of cooperation in the development of stand-
ards is being rolled out further to evaluate other hazards in 
the energy sector.
Asset and operational vulnerabilities of 
electricity networks
Natural hazards that have the potential to cause extended 
blackouts include earthquakes, (extra) tropical storms, tor-
nados, flooding, and severe thunderstorms. Each type of per-
il can affect power systems in a different way. Earthquakes, 
for example, can damage all types of power system equip-
ment, and are the most likely to cause power interruptions 
lasting more than a few days. Other perils such as wind-
storms mostly affect the overhead transmission and local 
distribution (T&D) lines, whereas widespread flooding can 
impact lower level electrical generating equipment, result-
ing in extended business interruption losses. Tornados and 
severe thunderstorms can also affect transmission and distri-
bution lines through lightning strikes and wind damage, cou-
pled with falling trees and other wind-borne debris capable 
of pulling down complete lines. Winter storms can create ice 
buildup on power lines resulting in increased wind exposure 
and weight on the high voltage cables. 
From an earthquake perspective it is worth noting that the 
increase in transmission voltage over the years has resulted 
in larger substation equipment, the size and weight of which 
makes it more vulnerable to lateral seismic loading. The in-
creased exposure to damage is caused by two principal fac-
tors: i) a drop in the frequencies of vibration into a lower and 
more severe region of the characteristic seismic frequency 
range, which produces an amplification of the seismic 
forces in the equipment (resonance effect); and ii) inherent 
structural deficiencies, notably the brittle nature and low-
energy dissipation properties of electrical insulating mate-
rial such as porcelain equipment used, for example, at 230 
and 500kV substations. Heavy, unanchored circuit break-
ers and transformers can also be susceptible to sliding and 
overturning damage as a result of strong ground motions. 
While the transmission lines, towers, and poles are gener-
ally less susceptible to ground shaking due to their flexibility, 
earthquakes can still cause transmission outages when tower 
foundations are subject to earth slippage. Detailed soil analy-
ses, adequate foundation design, and periodic inspection of 
existing foundations are therefore essential at the outset and 
during the lifespan of the electrical network systems. 
The variety of impacts can be attributed to the fact that gen-
eration and transmission systems consist of large, clustered 
assets in generation facilities and in substations, whereas 
distribution assets are spread over wide geographical areas. 
Overall, it heavily depends on the peril as well as risk loca-
tion, which risk mitigation measures and risk management 
structures need to be put in place to protect the electricity 
network according to asset and operational vulnerabilities. 
Managing natural hazards 
As part of one of the world’s leading risk management and 
insurance intermediaries the Strategic Risk Consulting 
(SRC) team at Willis Towers Watson adopts a wide range of 
catastrophe risk consulting services to help utility companies 
better identify and quantify their exposure to natural hazard 
risks for a range of return periods and to assist in making 
more informed decisions to support their operational risk 
management, insurance purchasing, and mitigation require-
ments. 
The methodology has been set out to address the questions 
we are hearing from our clients. For Electricity Networks, for 
example, these can include:
What hazards are our operations exposed to on a local, re-
gional, or global basis?
What are the potential material damages and disruptions we 
may face due to a major natural hazard?
How do these compare with our current risk management 
strategies, resilience, and recovery plans?
Can more than one key facility or multiple parts of the net-
work be affected by the same event?
What risk mitigation options can we consider to reduce our 
risk exposure?
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Through this we adopt a comprehensive Natural Catastrophe 
Risk Management framework using the following top-down 
approach to help identify, evaluate and manage company-
wide risks from natural perils:
Detailed review of a network’s natural hazard exposures on a 
global, regional, and single- site basis to help shape their strat-
egy for managing natural catastrophe risks to their business.
Natural catastrophe modeling to quantify the expected loss-
es and likely downtimes of the power network assets and as-
sess which specific components are driving the risks by peril 
and region. 
CAT Risk Engineering Assessments and Site Surveys for 
individual facilities of high value and strategic importance. 
Detailed estimates of the expected material damages and 
downtime as a result of a major natural event. Provision of 
recommendations to help reduce the risk exposure and im-
prove business continuity at the facility.
The exposure and reliability of electricity networks under the 
action of natural hazard events can be assessed using a com-
bination of geospatial mapping and probabilistic modeling 
techniques to help evaluate and quantify the risks within 
the system. Geospatial mapping based on accurate location 
data can pinpoint assets and represent them in a clear visual 
manner to identify the components of the network that are 
at higher risk than others. In turn, this can help organizations 
to shape an appropriate strategy to manage these risks.
Below are some sample exhibits from this type of analysis. 
The image on the left side shows a “heatmap” or hazard ma-
trix where we can evaluate which sites are exposed to which 
type of hazards and to what degree (red representing “Very 
High” hazard, green “Very Low”). To the right tools, such as 
Google Earth can be used to geospatially visualize the loca-
tions, their relative values (height of the bars) and identify 
possible clusters. At the bottom we show a sample catas-
trophe modeling graphic that represents a loss exceedance 
curve mapped against a sample insurance program, often 
used to assess if suitable insurance cover is in place to protect 
the assets against natural perils.
Quantitative catastrophe modeling can then capture the im-
pact of a wide range of possible natural hazard scenarios such 
as earthquakes or windstorms on a system, and in particular 
those lower frequency higher impact (or extreme) events that 
Figure 44. Sample Analysis Outputs
Source: Authors
88
would have the greatest impact on a power network. These 
models can also take into account the type of construction, 
age, and height of key assets to simulate the vulnerabilities 
to a given hazard. The outputs would typically comprise loss 
estimations for material damages and operational disruption 
or downtime, helping network operators focus their attention 
on where potential upgrades or additional redundancy may 
be required. Moreover, the modeling outputs support the de-
cision making with respect to risk transfer and mitigation.
To assist clients, Willis Re has developed its own view of 
catastrophe risk for all major perils and territories globally. 
These models are complex risk quantification tools that are 
based on extensive scientific analysis. Despite this, there 
have been unexpected shocks when major loss events have 
occurred. Willis Re seeks a full understanding of what is 
and is not captured in these models and how to consider the 
complexities and uncertainties in catastrophe risk modeling. 
This enables our clients to more accurately understand, com-
municate, and efficiently mitigate their own risk.
To maintain and continuously enhance this view, the special-
ist teams work in close conjunction with the extensive re-
sources of the Willis Research Network.23 Given the specific 
23  The Willis Research Network is the world’s largest insurance related network of academic 
institutions. It operates across the full spectrum of risk from natural catastrophe, to legal 
liability, financial and security issues linked across driving themes: Resilience, Security & 
Sustainable Growth; Managing Extremes; Insurance & Risk Management and Mastering 
the Modelled World.
locations and exposure of electricity networks and power 
suppliers, one needs to work through the range of models 
and complex scientific views to establish if their view of risk 
is adequate. The geospatial visualization combined with ca-
tastrophe modeling within tools such as SpatialKey opens 
the world of effectively managing exposure accumulation 
and profitability, running location-based scenario analyses, 
as well as real-time monitoring and post-event reporting.
CAT Risk Engineering Assessments
For individual, high value, and strategic level facilities such 
as a major substation or hydro power facility a detailed be-
spoke approach may prove to be more beneficial. This assess-
ment would typically involve a detailed single site assessment 
Figure 45. Accumulation analysis for regulatory modeling or conflagration analysis for terrorism risk
Source: Authors
Figure 46. Identifying areas of peak exposure
Source: Authors
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and/or physical site inspection by a specialist natural hazard 
engineer to assess in situ vulnerabilities and gain an under-
standing of likely failure modes, the associated loss potential 
(PML), and methods to reduce the risk exposures. From an 
earthquake perspective, the focus may be more on checking 
whether suitable anchorage and lateral restraint methods are 
in place for critical equipment such as transformers and gen-
erators, whereas for flood it can focus on the ingress routes 
of water into a facility and the elevation of susceptible assets 
such as electrical switchgear and control cabinets. 
Case study, Superstorm Sandy
In addition to the natural catastrophe risk assessment and 
modeling, academic research is another key to quantifying 
and understanding risk. Hence, close cooperation between 
the insurance industry and research ensures that the view of 
risk is maintained and at the highest standard. Below, a sum-
mary of post-event report and findings on Superstorm Sandy 
as at 6 November 2012 are described where members of 
Willis Re’s Catastrophe Management Services conducted 
post-event field assessments and Willis Research Network 
scientist Dr. Michael Kunz and his colleagues at the Center 
for Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Technology, 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany, studied the di-
rect and indirect impact of Sandy on business. This publicly 
available study helps to better understand electric utility be-
havior in the case of a catastrophic event and to draw conclu-
sions on societal and economic implications.
Hurricane Sandy was a storm system with special meteoro-
logical characteristics and caused widespread damage from 
the Caribbean to the U.S. East Coast. At the U.S. coast, es-
pecially in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, Sandy 
resulted in a relatively high death toll compared to historic 
events. Critical infrastructure failures (electricity, transpor-
tation) are expected to lead to a high amount of indirect 
damages. The impact of Sandy on the longer term and the 
indirect losses are difficult to estimate due to the complex in-
terrelations between socioeconomic and technical systems. 
Figure 47. Developing a bespoke realistic disaster scenarios or post event calculations
Source: Authors
Figure 48. CAT risk engineering survey and PML assessment
Source: Authors
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In most of the regions affected by Hurricane Sandy where the 
electricity broke down, the power supply was successfully re-
stored after multiple blackouts. Power outages were reported 
on Monday 29 October and Tuesday 30 October in 14 north-
eastern states, leaving an estimated 8.7million customers (ap-
prox. 2.51 people per residential customer) without power. 
A week after the storm, on Monday 5 November, around 1.3 
million people were still affected by the outage. The storm 
stressed both the power utilities in their restoration schedules 
and the people living in the regions without power.
The (direct and indirect) costs of the blackout caused by 
Sandy can be roughly estimated by comparison with similar 
past events (e.g., 2003 northeast blackout of about $6.3 bil-
lion, 2005 one-day blackout estimates of $5.6 billion – calcu-
lation based on GDP per person and the number of people 
affected). Using a similar approach, the costs for the power 
outage following Sandy would be approximately $2.6 billion 
for the first day, and $14.4 billion for ten days of blackout (us-
ing a GDP24 per capita per day of $132.72 and a linear recov-
ery function from 20 million people affected on Monday, 29 
October to 2 million on Wednesday 7 November). This lin-
ear function correlates well to the number of people reported 
without power. However, it overestimates towards the end of 
the ten-day estimate. 
Overall, it was observed that Sandy caused extensive struc-
tural damage to buildings and structures from storm surge 
and related flooding in the surveyed areas. Building damage 
due to storm surge ranged from moderate to complete col-
lapse. In general, the direct damage to buildings due to the 
wind component of the storm was none to minor. However, 
significant and widespread damage to structures was ob-
served due to tree fall and other flying debris. 
24  It should be noted that this value of GDP is a U.S. country average, with the GDP per capita 
being around 1.3 times greater on the East Coast on average than the U.S. average.
Figure 49. Very soft casual map/flow chart to capture main effects of extended power outages for human basic 
needs and possible emergency measures to avoid further risks.
Source: CEDIM
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Contingency and emergency 
response planning
In addition to identifying and quantifying potential risks 
from natural hazards, the other requirement to ensure the 
resilience of a network is to put in place robust plans for 
both contingency and emergency response following a ma-
jor event. Depending on the expected peril the requirements 
and procedures will be different for handling power flow in-
stability after major disasters and ensuring that operators are 
trained to implement these contingency plans. Willis Towers 
Watson advises their clients regularly on good practice plan-
ning procedures aimed at complementing existing measures 
already put in place by the network operators.
Outlook on emerging risks in 
the energy sector
The list of emerging risks covers the kind of perils that keep 
risk managers up at night: cyber risk, oil price volatility, the 
changing demands of today’s workforce, corruption, terror-
ism, the over-confidence corporations have in the ability of 
their entity to withstand a negative event, and more. While 
the energy sector has been affected by natural disaster risk 
over centuries, there are new, emerging risks that threaten 
the operation and resilience of critical infrastructure. Given 
the uncertain and unknown forms, there is a challenge in un-
derstanding, analyzing, and quantifying such emerging risks; 
consequently, it is difficult to find appropriate management 
tools such as insurance products for those risks. However, 
as the market evolves, different types of insurance solutions 
are developed to account for the high degree of uncertainty 
and to open the option to share such risk. Moreover, within 
the world of catastrophe models new platforms and models 
are also being developed, for example, to quantify and assess 
terrorism and cyber risk. 
In addition to the mentioned risk, space weather events are 
another threat to the electricity networks. When the sun’s 
surface ties itself in a knot, the results can be unimaginably 
powerful and blindingly beautiful. At the end of February 
2014 space weather enthusiasts were spoiled by the biggest 
solar flare, and associated coronal mass ejection (CME), of 
the year – classified as an X4.9. X-class denotes the most 
intense flares, and these are often followed by long-lasting 
solar radiation storms. The scale is based on a multiplication 
scheme: X2 is twice as intense as X1; X3 is three times the 
intensity, and so forth. The main impact of this event was a 
mesmerizing display of Aurora Borealis. But solar flares can 
have a much more damaging impact on earth by disrupt-
ing communications technology, like satellites, and trashing 
electrical infrastructure. When solar storms strike the earth, 
electrical surges can damage power grids by blowing trans-
formers and can also create interference with high-frequency 
radio communications and GPS systems. The wide regional 
or even global impacts solar storms can have on infrastruc-
ture and the consequent cost for repair and recovery, not to 
mention loss due to business interruption, require attention 
and forewarning. 
To this end, space weather desks around the world are moni-
toring the sun and are able to give alerts for when an event 
is on the way, hopefully helping to mitigate damages or loss. 
Even though we are more vulnerable than ever due to in-
creased exposure and reliance on susceptible infrastructure, 
we are also more prepared than ever to mitigate geomag-
netic disaster. Data and models are available through NASA’s 
Heliophysics Division (among other sources) for academic, 
civil, and industrial use, allowing us to learn more about this 
beautiful yet potentially disruptive risk.
Insurance mechanisms:  
A useful tool to mitigate risk and  
absorb losses from disaster
The key tasks and core of the insurance industry is under-
standing and identifying risk – the threefold of hazard, vul-
nerability, and exposure. To manage insurance products and 
financial risks, it is necessary to estimate occurrence rates 
of events and associated economic damages with a certain 
level of reliability. Within the insurance business, certain 
technical and actuarial expertise has been developed with 
respect to the abundance of historic data in order to provide 
risk assessment and risk allocation mechanisms that are not 
only used by households and business to absorb losses from 
disasters, but equally valid for governments. This knowledge 
can also help to adapt and become more resilient to catas-
trophes through better understanding of the risk, providing 
economic incentives to certain behaviors that can reduce 
risk, contributing to data collection to assess risk, promot-
ing risk awareness and possibly improving (re-)construction 
methods (or codes) and regulation.
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Introduction
Energy is a backbone of the economy. The energy sector is 
critical to other sectors such as transportation, health, busi-
nesses, and households. The risk of natural disasters such 
as floods, droughts, earthquakes, tsunami, as well as inten-
tional and unintentional human actions, make the “critical 
infrastructure” of energy extremely vulnerable. Disruption 
or damage to energy networks, especially in the complex and 
interconnected modern world, can affect millions of people, 
causing loss of life, multiple environmental impacts, and a 
cascade of interlinked economic losses.
The importance of protecting energy infrastructure cannot 
be underestimated. Recent examples of accidents caused 
by natural disasters and human actions in the energy sector 
clearly indicate that their scale and long-term consequences 
go far beyond national borders. Earthquakes and related 
tsunami, as well as climate-related disasters such as hurri-
canes, floods, landslides, or hail storms, mainly result in seri-
ous physical damage to the critical infrastructure, making it 
almost impossible for a single country to cope. The failure 
of energy networks often becomes a transboundary issue; 
therefore, any effort in this area needs to be of an interna-
tional nature. Taking into account the current state of energy 
interdependence and interconnection, the biggest challenge 
to recover and restore requires coordinated efforts by the in-
ternational community.
Today, maintaining the operation of the interconnected en-
ergy system is a challenge in itself, even if a major disaster 
does not place. As an example, the extreme weather condi-
tions of February 2012 in continental Europe revealed other 
threats to energy networks. The growing share of intermit-
tent energy sources throughout the European Union creates 
significant challenges for the transmission system operators 
of the interconnected systems. These risks, associated with 
the large-scale integration of renewables along with physi-
cal risks from natural and man-made disasters, impose major 
threats to the security of the energy supply, which has be-
come a concern worldwide. 
The Energy Charter, a multilateral organization promoting 
energy security and international cooperation, is unique in 
terms of its membership, which includes energy- producing, 
transit, and energy-consuming countries. The Energy Char-
ter promotes international cooperation in the energy field. 
The Charter framework covers the EU and its member states, 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Central Asia and 
the Caucasus, as well as Japan, Australia, Mongolia, and ob-
server countries in African and American continents. 
The legal framework of the Energy Charter provides for vari-
ous instruments to sustain energy supply, including, inter 
alia, preventive diplomacy measures and mitigation of ener-
gy-related risks by means of the Model Energy Charter Early 
Warning Mechanism (the EWM). 
Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism25
The Model Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism was 
developed during the Russia- Ukraine gas dispute in 2014, 
but is designed to address emergency situations in any type of 
energy sector, including electricity. Hence, according to the 
Model Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism, “Emer-
gency situation” is a situation with a significant disruption or 
physical interruption of supply of electricity, natural gas, and 
oil within the Energy Charter constituency with cross border 
significance.26
According to Art. 2.1 of the Model Energy Charter Early 
Warning Mechanism, its objective “is to provide for a non-
binding framework aimed at preventing and overcoming 
emergency situations in the energy sector related to the tran-
sit and supply of electricity, natural gas, oil and oil products 
through cross-border grids and pipelines.”
The methodology of the Model Energy Charter EWM in-
cludes “exchange of information and response to requests for 
information, consultations, confirmation of information and 
monitoring, risk evaluation and recommendations for action 
in view of an emergency situation or the threat of an emer-
gency situation” (Art.2.2).
The mechanism presents three levels. The mechanism may 
be initiated by any signatory of the 1991 Energy Charter or 
the 2015 International Energy Charter in case of an emer-
gency situation or the threat of an emergency situation by 
notification to the Secretary General (Art. 4.1). The notifi-
cation should include relevant information, for example, 
a description of the situation, names of other parties that 
may be involved or affected, and any information requested 
from those. The notifying party and other Parties Involved 
or affected by an emergency situation are called the “Par-
ties Involved” (Art. 4.3). Parties involved can assign their 
25 See U. Rusnák; I. De Meyer “The Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism: 2014 Russia-
Ukraine-EU Transit Issues” OGEL 6 (2015), www.ogel.org, URL: www.ogel.org/article.
asp?key=3598. 
26  The text of the Model Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism is available at http://
www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/CCDEC201414.pdf. 
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representatives from any level: a country representative, an 
authorized person, an official from a diplomatic mission, or 
administrative officer. Representatives are not required to 
have an expertise in the energy field. 
The Energy Security Contact Group is the core of the Model 
EWM. The Contact Group can be established either by re-
quest of any of the Parties Involved or by the Secretary Gen-
eral upon his own initiative. The Contact Group is a primary 
working body chaired by the Secretary General and includes 
representatives of the parties involved, the Chairmanship of 
the Energy Charter Conference (Vice-Chair of the Contact 
Group), and other invited parties (Art. 5.3). 
The Contact Group encourages cooperation, and the exchange 
and analyses of information among the parties involved on is-
sues they consider relevant. The Parties Involved may request 
the Chair to invite experts to provide additional information. 
The Contact Group has two objectives. Firstly, it proposes an 
agreed assessment of the situation and, secondly, it develops 
recommendations to eliminate the threat of an emergency 
situation, or to overcome an emergency situation (Art. 5.7). 
Recommendations refer to provisions agreed on by all parties 
involved and are in the nature of a “code of conduct,” without 
any legal obligation and enforcement.
At this level it is important that parties should share mutual 
confidence and provide the counterparty with the necessary 
information about the situation.
To establish the facts concerning the energy flows between 
countries involved, the Energy Charter EWM envisages the 
creation of a Monitoring Group. The composition of this 
Group as well as its terms of references is decided upon by 
the Energy Security Contact Group (Art. 6.2). The Monitor-
ing Group can potentially include experts and monitors in a 
certain energy field (gas, oil, electricity). In practical terms, 
the monitors from the Group should be allowed access to 
the national dispatch centers in order to carry out necessary 
verification and control. 
A Monitoring Group can be established, for example, be-
cause of the inability of the Contact Group participants to 
travel to places that require monitoring or when it is impera-
tive to have independent members with monitoring expertise 
to ensure accuracy of data provided by the parties involved. 
The establishment of the Monitoring Group is optional. This 
working group can be established in case of a need to con-
firm information gathered within the Energy Security Con-
tact Group (Figure 50).
Figure 50. Functioning of the Model Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism
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The Energy Charter EWM is of a multilateral nature. The 
Energy Charter policy would be used as a forum, a neutral 
place for information exchange on developments, which may 
result in an energy security threat to a country or region. 
The EWM is an instrument for preventive diplomacy and 
confidence building. It provides a platform for cooperation 
and suggests solutions to overcome emergencies. The Model 
Energy Charter EWM is of a non- legally binding nature. It is 
based on full transparency and neutrality. 
The EWM is complementary to existing mechanisms and 
does not duplicate them (Art. 4.2). Parties can refer to it vol-
untarily on a case by case basis. It will be complementary to 
other mechanisms for early warning and dispute resolution 
agreed bilaterally between individual parties.
The mechanism is not a dispute settlement mechanism, but 
an Early Warning Mechanism, meaning that it does not aim 
to replace any dispute resolution mechanisms provided by 
the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Its main objective is to 
prevent a real or potential crisis and to set up a neutral plat-
form with voluntary participation of the countries involved 
to collect and share the relevant information before taking 
any further steps. The Secretary General facilitates the dia-
logue between the parties involved and ensures that possible 
misunderstandings, manipulations, and misuse of the data 
are avoided between them. 
The implementation of the Model Energy 
Charter EWM: 2014 Ukraine case
Although the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes are perceived 
by the international community as political rather than com-
mercial, the Energy Charter has made efforts to settle the 
situation from the energy perspective and within the Energy 
Charter legal framework. 
The Energy Charter was prepared for possible energy security 
threats and on 3 March 2014 the Secretary General made a 
statement regarding the situation in Ukraine and initiated the 
Energy Security Contact Group on the Ukraine Crisis upon 
his own initiative to act in the spirit of partnership relations 
and international commitments (Art. 4.2). Only the Secretary 
General and parties involved can initiate a Contact Group 
meeting which is explained by the need to facilitate the deci-
sion-making process in a situation of high emergency. 
On 5 March 2014, the first Energy Security Contact Group 
meeting with voluntary participation of the parties involved 
took place.27 It was chaired by the Secretary General and 
consisted of the Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian representa-
27  For more information about all the Energy Charter Security Contact Group meetings see 
Energy Charter news items, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=660&L=0 (accessed 
15 November 2014).
tives from their respective diplomatic missions to the EU; 
and the EU’s DG Energy and European External Action Ser-
vice representatives. 
During this meeting the parties exchanged views on the situ-
ation and possible implications for the flow of gas within the 
Energy Charter constituency. The Russian and Ukrainian 
representatives both reiterated their country’s commitment 
to fulfil respective contractual obligations to avoid any inter-
ruption to energy flows. The Parties agreed to meet again one 
week later and thereby demonstrated their good faith and 
readiness to discuss the problem. 
The second Contact Group meeting took place on 13 March 
2014. Recognizing that transparency is the key for confidence 
building, the Secretary General proposed that a system for 
collecting relevant information on the physical gas flow 
should be put in place for the benefit of the Contact Group 
discussions. In other words, the Secretary General proposed 
that the Russian, Ukrainian, and EU parties should provide 
the Group with “daily actual flows … daily nominations for 
flows of gas … across borders from, through or to the areas 
of the parties involved; volumes transited as documented by 
the operators” (Art. 5.6). 
After the events of the Crimea in March 2014, there was a 
need to de-escalate the tensions between Russia and Ukraine 
and to strike a line between political and energy confronta-
tion. In his public statement from 17 March  2014, the Secre-
tary General reminded the Russia and Ukraine of their inter-
national commitments with regard to energy security in the 
region and existing investors.28 He reiterated that the Energy 
Security Contact Group was a neutral channel of communi-
cation and common evaluation, and encouraged the parties 
to continue participation.
At the third Energy Security Contact Group meeting at the 
end of March, the Secretary General repeated that the En-
ergy Charter was a technical political body with a mandate 
to ensure the energy security of the constituency. For this 
reason, the parties were invited to discuss the outline of the 
Model Energy Charter EWM.
The last Energy Security Contact Group meeting was held 
on 4 April 2014. To advance and benefit the Contact Group 
discussions and build confidence among the parties involved, 
the Secretary General reiterated the need for the Energy 
Charter Secretariat to set up a system for collecting relevant 
data on physical gas flows. The Group was to reconvene 
again when the Russian and Ukrainian representatives had 
received instructions from the capitals concerning provi-
28  “Development of the Situation in Ukraine,” Statement by the Secretary General, Brussels, 
17 March 2014, www.encharter.org (accessed 28 November 2014).
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sions of the necessary information, or concerning alternative 
suggestions to resolve the situation in the Contact Group.
Since April 2014, the Energy Charter Secretariat made efforts 
to reconvene the Security Contact Group. Another meeting 
was scheduled for the end of May and then rescheduled for 
June. The Secretary General suggested that at that meeting 
the Contact Group might assess the possibility of develop-
ing the proposal for the Ukrainian Government to imple-
ment the essential terms of the Early Warning Mechanism 
of the Energy Charter. However, the European Commission 
requested cancellation of the meeting due to the ongoing tri-
lateral discussions between the Ukrainian, Russian, and EU 
representatives through its own intermediary. Since no pro-
gress was achieved, and due to the escalation of the conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine, further meetings of the Energy 
Charter Security Contact group were suspended. Despite 
this, the Secretariat, continues to maintain contact with the 
country representatives. 
The March discussions in the framework of the Energy Char-
ter did not give sufficient impetus to the rapid initiation of 
transparency regime. However, following the efforts of the 
Secretary General, some months later Ukraine introduced 
unprecedented transparency initiatives regarding gas flows 
on its territory. 
As from 6 May 2014, NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine, the leading 
gas transmission and storage company, joined Aggregate Gas 
Storage Inventory (AGSI+) transparency platform of Gas In-
frastructure Europe (GIE). The information on the volume of 
gas available in Ukrainian underground storage facilities are 
reported, disaggregated by each storage facility, every Friday 
on the GIE website.29 
Moreover, from 15 May 2014, PJSC “Ukrtransgaz,” a subsidi-
ary of Naftogaz, started daily reporting on the volumes of 
natural gas transit through Ukraine’s gas transport system on 
their website and on the ENTSOG website.30 These transpar-
ency initiatives are expected to provide improved interaction 
between Ukraine and international partners in the energy 
sector. 
Another step by Ukraine towards transparency was its invi-
tation to international observers to monitor gas transit via 
Ukrainian GTS. Thus, Ukrtransgaz was ready to provide of-
ficial observers from the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG, Belgium) and the En-
ergy Community (Austria) with access to the Ukrainian gas 
measuring stations to monitor gas transit via Ukraine in June 
29  Gas Storage Europe, http://transparency.gie.eu/ (accessed 28 November 2014).
30  Ukrtransgaz, Operational Information, http://utg.ua/utg/business-info/live.html and 
Entsog Transparency Platform https://transparency.entsog.eu (accessed 28 November 
2014).
2014.31 The company has sent respective proposals to Brus-
sels and Vienna, but no information on follow up has been 
made available. In November, Naftogaz again called on the 
EU to send observers to Ukraine to monitor gas flows.32 It 
is worth mentioning that back in 2009 monitors were pre-
vented from entering the dispatch centers in Ukraine. The 
invitation to international monitors by Ukraine reflects the 
third level of the Energy Charter EWM – establishment of a 
Monitoring Group. An acceptance by the party of different 
transparency procedures, including granting access to moni-
tors to its national dispatch center on the voluntary basis, is 
at the core of the Energy Charter EWM. It is worth mention-
ing, that such a level of transparency and readiness to receive 
the monitoring mission on its territory was not expressed by 
Russia. There is thus no publicly available set of data for com-
parison between the Russia and Ukraine.
All the initiatives of the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz 
and its subsidiary Ukrtransgaz with regard to joining various 
European data platforms will increase confidence in their in-
ternational partners. Ukraine is willing to demonstrate that 
its gas transportation system is reliable and that its State-
owned gas company with its shady reputation commits to 
international best quality business practices. Providing data 
on gas flows via Ukraine was a key recommendation by the 
Energy Charter Contact Group. Ukraine fulfilled it after the 
Contact Group ceased to meet. It should be noted however, 
that although not directly referred in the abovementioned 
initiatives, the Energy Charter EWM provided useful input 
and indirect influence in this matter.33
Implications of EWM for electricity sector
The electricity supply, like the gas supply, is dependent on 
fixed infrastructure, which is characterized by a high degree 
of interconnectivity and complexity. If such infrastructure 
is vulnerable, especially when it comes to cross-border pro-
jects, a risk of disruptions and significant economic losses 
is posed. Regional cooperation in the electricity sector is a 
common phenomenon today to benefit from economies of 
scale and optimize the use of generation units. Therefore, in-
ternational cooperation on the political and technical level is 
key to ensuring sustainable power supply and mitigating any 
risks of disruption. 
31  “Ukrtransgaz Ready To Allow European Observers To Control Implementation Of Transit 
Obligations”, 25 June 2014, Naftogaz news, http://www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweben.
nsf/0/6568DB532E812325C2257D080039D624?OpenDocument&year=2014&month=06
&nt=News& (accessed 10 April 2015).
32  “Naftogaz increases transparency on gas transit, calls on EU to send observers to Ukraine 
to monitor gas flows”, 25 November 2014, Naftogaz news, http://www.naftogaz.com/ 
(accessed 28 November 2014).
33  Such as the Energy Charter Intergovernmental and Host Government Model Agreements 
in electricity and gas which furnish guidelines and a balanced starting point for new cross-
border project agreements for new cross-border and transit infrastructure (i.e., Baku-
Supsa Pipeline Project).
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The operation of interconnected energy systems, indepen-
dently of whether it is gas/oil pipeline or power grid, requires 
a certain degree of coordination. In the case of emergency, 
issues of transparency and coordination are even more im-
portant. Severe weather conditions and low temperatures 
caused emergency situation in Balkans in winter of 2012. Un-
favorable hydro-meteorological conditions led to increased 
electricity consumption and limitation of exports, creating 
severe difficulties for EU common energy market. 
Given the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty prohib-
iting unjustified export restrictions, the possible effects of 
measures on transit within the region, and security of sup-
ply, the Secretariat called for maximum transparency with 
respect to any measures limiting the electricity export in the 
constituency and also reiterated that the measures applied to 
prevent or relieve critical shortage of electricity on domes-
tic markets should not be employed for periods longer than 
necessary to achieve that objective. Now in a similar situa-
tion, each Contracting Party of the ECT or Signatory of the 
International Energy Charter can utilize the Early Warning 
Mechanism as a tool for transparency, coordination, and 
monitoring. 
Under the ECT, the Contracting Parties are obliged to secure 
established flows of energy materials and products to, from, 
or between the areas of other Contracting Parties and shall 
not, in the event of a dispute over any matter arising from 
transit, interrupt or reduce or permit any entity to interrupt 
or reduce existing flows of energy materials and products 
prior to the dispute resolution procedures set out in Article 
7(7) of the ECT, except where this is specifically provided for 
in a contract or permitted in accordance with the concilia-
tor’s decision (Article 7(6) of the ECT).
The Treaty highlights the significant principle of “freedom of 
transit” and obliges the Contracting Parties to facilitate en-
ergy transit on a “non-discriminatory” basis. In other words, 
the ECT acts as a safeguard of energy security of the ECT 
constituency, as the rationale behind freedom of transit is the 
non-interruption of transit and prevention of any obstruc-
tion to existing flows of energy.
Furthermore, the ECT imposes a soft law obligation on Con-
tracting Parties to encourage Transmission System Opera-
tors (TSOs) to cooperate in measures to mitigate the effects 
of interruptions to energy supply (Article 7(2)(c) of the ECT). 
  
Central Asia and the southern Caucasus are two important 
regions within Energy Charter constituency where electricity 
trade and transport are critical elements of energy security. 
Both regions are characterized by a high degree of vulner-
ability to geophysical (earthquakes) and climate-related dis-
asters (floods, droughts, landslides).
According to the Central Asia and Caucasus Disaster Risk 
Management Initiative, UNISDR: “The countries of Central 
Asia and the Caucasus (CAC) have a history of devastating 
disasters that have caused economic and human losses across 
the region. Almost all types of natural and technological haz-
ards are present, including earthquakes, floods, landslides, 
mudslides, debris flows, avalanches, droughts, and extreme 
temperatures. Earthquakes are the most dangerous haz-
ard, causing destruction to human life, buildings and infra-
structure alike, while also triggering secondary events such 
as landslides, mudslides and avalanches. This mountain-
ous region provides compelling evidence of the destructive 
power of such secondary events: landslides, mudslides and 
debris flows caused most casualties during the earthquakes 
in Armenia (1988 Spitak), Azerbaijan (2000 Baku), Kazakh-
stan (1887, 1889, and 1911 Almaty), Kyrgyzstan (1992 Jalal-
Abad), Tajikistan (1949 Khait, 1989 Gissar), Turkmenistan 
(1948 Ashgabat) and Uzbekistan (1966 Tashkent). Climate 
change is expected to exacerbate disasters associated with 
hydro-meteorological hazards.”
The power systems of Central Asia and the South Caucasus 
inherited highly meshed and radial transmission lines as a 
legacy of the former Soviet Union. Both of these regional 
power systems used to be part of the unified power system 
of the Soviet Union which was designed and built under the 
command economy without taking into account nation-
al borders. This is still the case when part of the networks 
owned by one country crosses the border of the other one, 
making it difficult to react in case of emergency.
The growing need to address security risks is exemplified a 
number of large infrastructure projects in Eurasia which aim 
to facilitate cross-border electricity trade and transport. The 
CASA-1000 project developed by the World Bank stands for 
exports of hydropower surpluses from Central Asia to ener-
gy deficient countries of South Asia – Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. The initial concept of Gobitec and the Asian Supergrid 
projects is elaborated by the Asian Development Bank with 
the involvement of countries of northeast Asia. In large-scale 
projects like this, protection of infrastructure both from 
man-made and environmental risks is a top priority in order 
to generate the anticipated benefits. 
The Model Energy Charter Early Warning Mechanism may 
be seen as a multilateral instrument of preventive energy 
diplomacy, confidence building, and emergency response 
based on voluntary cooperation. This instrument is especial-
ly relevant in light of the growing inter-regional infrastruc-
ture projects currently promoted throughout the Eurasian 
continent. Capital-intensive projects involving several coun-
tries would benefit from a framework which could address 
potential risks associated with critical energy infrastructure. 
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lated	incidents	in	different	continents,	GO15	members	decided	to	put	Grid	resilience	on	their	joint	
agenda.	It	goes	without	saying	that	for	low	probability/high	impact	events	experience	exchange	
is	extremely	 important.	Preventive	and	corrective	measures	are	benchmarked,	 including	costs	
assessments	for	improving	grid	reliability.	Eventually,	members	agreed	on	a	framework	for	mutual	
assistance.	 Improving	electric	power	grid	 resilience	will	 engage	 important	 amounts	of	 invest-
ments.	Therefore,	it	is	a	shared	responsibility	among	federal	agencies,	state	and	local	regulatory	
entities	and	industry	partners.	GO15	promotes	a	better	mutual	understanding	for	the	develop-
ment	of	the	worldwide	power	grids.	G015	brings	together	an	international	network	of	experts	who	
share	best	practices	and	experiences	to	address	the	challenges	of	the	increased	complexity	of	
very	large	power	grids	by	ensuring	that	consumer	needs	are	met	by	means	of	providing	safe	and	
reliable	power	supply	at	reasonable	costs.	The	common	vision	and	recommendations	of	the	17	
members	are	shared	with	relevant	shareholders	like	regulators,	decision	makers,	manufacturers	
and	research	centers.	GO15	joint	activities	are	organized	into	five	Committees	that	address	the	
operational,	technological,	financial	and	communication	aspects.
Hubert Lemmens 
Hubert Lemmens obtained a Master in Engineering from the Katholieke 
Universiteit Leuven (1977). He also holds a degree from the Vlerick 
Business School and the “General Management Program” from CEDEP 
in Fontainebleau (2000). After several positions in the Electricity sector, 
he joined in 2003 the Elia Management Board, where he was successively 
Director of System Operation, Maintenance and Research and Innovation. He 
was deeply involved in the unbundling process and the start up of the Belgian 
System operator Elia from 1999 on. Hubert chaired the ENTSO-E R&D 
committee for 3 years and lead the development of the first R&D Roadmap 
of ENTSO-E. In the course of his career Hubert build a broad experience 
in Power economics. Trough his international contacts with European and 
global power companies, he had the opportunity to get familiarized with 
different business models and organisations in the power sector. 
Terry Boston
After serving as president and CEO of PJM since 2008, Mr. Boston retired 
at the end of 2015. Mr. Boston is past president of GO 15, the association 
of the world’s largest power grid operators.  In 2014 Mr. Boston was elected 
to the National Academy of Engineering, one of the highest professional 
honors accorded an engineer.  Mr. Boston was honored with several other 
professional awards in the US. He is chair of the Electric Infrastructure 
Security Council E-PRO executive committee. He served on the board of 
Electric Power Research Institute, is currently on the Boards of GridLiance 
GP LLC, Grid Protection Alliance and the National Academy’s Board on 
Energy and Environmental Systems. Mr. Boston holds a Bachelor of Science 
in engineering from Tennessee Technological University and a Master of 
Science in engineering administration from the University of Tennessee.
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Alain Steven
Alain Steven has over 47 years of experience in the electric power industry, 
including 30 years as a senior executive, with focus on real-time mission critical 
systems for demand side management, energy markets, grid management, 
nuclear and fossil power plants. Alain Steven is Secretary General for GO15, 
an international association of the largest Power Grid and Market Operators 
in the world. He is also the CTO of Advanced Microgrid Solutions, a San 
Francisco based company using advanced storage technologies to provide grid 
operators with load relief while helping consumers reduce their electricity 
bills. He was CTO and co-founder of Viridity Energy, a company specialized 
in advanced Demand Response services, and is the author of seven patents. 
Prior to Viridity, Alain held senior executive positions as CTO of the PJM 
Interconnection, President of PJM Technologies, CEO of Alstom ESCA 
Corporation and Vice President Simulator Business at ABB Combustion 
Engineering. He graduated from the University of Liège (Belgium) in 1968, 
where he earned a degree of Engineer in Physics and Aerospace.
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Human and Environment Linkage Program
Human	 and	 Environment	 Linkage	 Programme	 (HELP)	 is	 a	 510(c)3	 not-for-profit	 organization	
based	 in	the	California,	USA	and	Beijing,	China.	HELP	focuses	on	the	 intersection	of	disaster	
risk	management,	community	development	and	environment	conservation	in	ecologically	fragile	
regions	in	the	developing	world,	with	a	current	geographical	emphasis	in	Southwest	China.	HELP	
works	with	a	variety	of	stakeholders	across	public,	private,	academic	and	civil	society	sectors	to	
jointly	support	communities	facing	multiple	challenges	to	pilot	and	practice	integrated	and	adap-
tive	management	strategies	to	build	resilience	and	pursue	sustainability	transitions.	Since	2012,	
HELP	works	in	China	as	a	subsidiary	of	Cheung	Kong	Philanthropy	Fund	under	the	Chinese	Red	
Cross	Foundation.	A	priority	in	HELP’s	mission	is	to	promote	resilience	thinking	and	practices,	
through	on-the-ground	implementation,	rigorous	science,	and	innovative	communication,	in	the	
public	and	civil	society	sectors	in	China.
Wei Liu
Dr. Wei Liu was trained in Biology and Economics at Peking University in 
China and later received his MS in Ecology at Iowa State University and 
PhD in Conservation Development at Michigan State University in the 
USA. His research encompasses disaster risk management, socioeconomic 
development and ecosystem management. He has authored and co-authored 
~30 peer reviewed articles in top international journals, such as Ambio, 
Biological Conservation, Journal of Environmental Management, and PNAS, 
and provided consultancy services to a number of governmental agencies 
and international non-governmental organizations, such as UNESCO and 
IUCN, often on the topics of social-ecological, climate and/or disaster risk 
and resilience. He is the co-founder and executive director of Human and 
Environment Linkage Programme, a US and China based NGO focusing on 
community-based DRM, conservation and poverty reduction. As a Research 
Scholar in the Risk and Resilience program of International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), he works with scientist and practitioner 
collaborators to combine scientific research methodology with stakeholder 
participatory processes and citizen science approaches to explore innovative 
solutions for enhancing disaster resilience of communities in Nepal, Indonesia 
and other countries. His currently research at IIASA, including the writing of 
this chapter, is supported by the Zurich Flood Resilience Alliance. 
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International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) and ETH Zurich
IIASA	is	a	scientific	institute	located	in	Laxenburg,	nearby	Vienna.	The	Risk	and	Resilience	(RISK)	
Program	at	IIASA	aims	to	better	understand	the	risks	to	economic,	ecological,	and	social	systems	
arising	from	global	change	and	to	help	transform	the	ways	in	which	societies	manage	them.	The	
Governance	in	Transition	research	theme	analyzes	how	governance	structures	shape	decisions	
and	subsequent	outcomes	by	building	on	and	contributing	to	research	on	decision-making	pro-
cesses,	public	acceptance,	risk	perception,	cognitive	biases,	and	cultural	perspectives,	as	well	
as	participatory	governance	design.	
Climate	Policy	Group	at	the	ETH	Zurich	conducts	problem-driven	research	on	the	strategies	to	
address	climate	change	and	related	environmental	problems.	Currently	the	group	focuses	on	an-
alyzing	pathways	for	creating	a	sustainable	electricity	system	for	Europe	and	beyond,	the	means	
to	mitigate	human	vulnerability	to	climate	and	other	natural	hazards,	and	the	effects	of	policies	on	
the	use	and	protection	of	natural	resources.
Nadejda Komendantova
Dr. Nadejda Komendantova is senior research scholar at the Climate Policy 
Group at ETH Zurich, Switzerland and a coordinator of the research theme 
'Governance in transition' within the RISK Program at IIASA, Austria. Her 
research interests include participatory and multi-risk governance of climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, based on the understanding of views 
and risk perceptions of involved stakeholders, of governance structures, 
market and civil society as well as social institutions and political processes 
towards more adaptive and inclusive governance approach, which is central 
to the science-policy interface. Dr. Komendantova is currently a principal 
investigator of the project 'Linking climate change mitigation, energy security 
and regional development in climate and energy model regions in Austria' 
(LINKS) project, supported by the Austrian Climate Research Program. She 
is also involved into the project 'MENA Sustainable ELECtricity Trajectories 
Energy for sustainable development in North Africa and the Middle East' 
(MENA-SELECT) supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The work of Dr. Komendantova 
includes more than 60 publications, including contributions to Global 
Corruption Report (Transparency International), Global Assessment Report 
(GAR) report and Global Renewable Energy Report (REN21). She was granted 
awards from the Academic Council of the United Nations as well as the Julius 
Raab Foundation. She received a number of invitations to speak at high-level 
forums such as at the Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the 
European Commission, NATO, Energy Community Secretariat and Energy 
Charter Forum.
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RTE
RTE	 is	 the	French	 transmission	system	operator	and	has	 to	provide	economical,	 reliable	and	
clean	access	to	electrical	power,	regarding	3	objectives:	optimizing	operation	of	the	French	pow-
er	system,	second	by	second,	seeing	to	the	security	of	supply	for	our	customers,	with	access	
to	economical,	reliable	and	secure	electricity,	now	and	tomorrow	and	adapting	the	transmission	
system	to	facilitate	the	energy	transition.	With	nearly	105,000	km	of	lines,	RTE	operates	a	largest	
grid	in	Europe.	46.2%	of	extra-high	voltage	lines	(400,000	and	225,000	volts)	transmit	electric-
ity	over	long	distances	and	to	48	cross-border	connections	with	the	neighboring	countries.	The	
lines	at	150,000,	90,000	and	63,000	volts	are	designed	for	regional	sub-transmission.	RTE	fos-
ters	constant	dialogue	with	his	European	partners,	specifically	through	the	European	Network	of	
Transmission	System	Operators	for	Electricity,	ENTSO-E,	of	which	he	is	an	active	member.
Eric Andreini
Since 1983, the career of Eric within EDF and RTE included performance of 
different jobs in the field of generation and transmission energy, particularly 
in maintenance, engineering and management of teams as for the acitvities of 
French electric network, such as Deputy Director of RTE’s regional area for 
Paris and Normandy, General Manager of RTE’s regional control center for 
Finance West area and Engineer graduate of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure 
d’Arts & Métiers 
Eric joined the European Affairs Division at its inception in January 2012. He 
is in charge of the topics of asset management, maintenance and engineering 
of the grid at the European level. Thus, he is a chairman of the working 
group Asset Implementation and Management of ENTSO-E. He also assures 
the internal coordination for RTE of the ENTSO-E’s activities in Asset 
Management and does the link with the operational departments of RTE 
specially National Expertise, Maintenance and R&D.
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Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH)
Laboratory	for	Safety	Analysis	led	by	Prof.	Dr.	Wolfgang	Kröger	was	established	in	1990	within	the	
Institute	of	Energy	Technology	at	the	Department	of	Mechanical	and	Process	Engineering,	ETH	
Zurich.	Research	and	teaching	activities	have	been	focused	on	the	modeling	and	simulation	of	
large-scale	technical	systems	with	regard	to	reliability,	vulnerability	and	risk.	We	have	developed	
frameworks,	methods	and	tools	to	meet	current	requirements	and	future	challenges	to	systems	
design	and	operations.	Main	projects	aimed	at	(a)	providing	methods	and	data	suitable	to	model,	
analyze/simulate	and	optimize	complex	engineered	systems	such	as	critical	infrastructures	in	the	
energy,	transportation	and	ICT	domain,	and	their	interconnectedness,(b)	developing	a	framework	
for	comprehensive	risk	and	vulnerability	analysis	and	related	management	strategies,	(c)	provid-
ing	tools	for	decision	making	processes	and	applying	them	within	programs	of	critical	infrastruc-
ture	protection.	Furthermore,	efforts	have	been	made	to	put	technical	risks	into	a	broader	societal	
context	and	to	shape	evolving	concepts	such	as	“resilience”.
Prof. Dr.-Ing. habil. Wolfgang Kröger
Wolfgang Kröger, born in Germany, has been full professor of Safety 
Technology at the ETH Zurich since 1990 and director of the Laboratory 
for Safety Analysis, Department of Mechanical and Process Engineering. 
Simultaneously, before being elected Founding Rector of the International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC), Geneva, in 2003 he headed nuclear energy 
and safety research at the Swiss national Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI), where he 
was also on the board of directors. After his retirement early 2011 he became 
the executive director of the newly established ETH Risk Center and stepped 
back from this position by end of 2014. Presently he is acting as an advisor 
and consultant on future technical systems. Prof. Kröger studied mechanical 
engineering at the RWTH Aachen, Germany, and completed his doctorate 
in 1974, his habilitation thesis followed in 1986. Nowadays, he is chiefly 
involved in methodical issues pertaining to modelling and analysis of complex 
interdependent technical systems like critical infrastructures. He strives for 
reducing associated risks and to increasing their resilience. He is engaged in 
putting the assessment and management of technological risks into a broader 
context and providing advanced tools for decision-making processes.  Inter 
alia he is elected member of the Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences 
heading the topical platform “Risk” and has been awarded “Distinguished 
Affiliate Professor” by the TU Munich. Most recently, he is member of the 
International Review Group of the Japanese Nuclear Safety Institute and 
served on the ad-hoc Advisory Group on “EU Energy Roadmap 2050” and 
as expert on OSCE missions to Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. He authored/
contributed to numerous publications and books, the latest on “Radioactive 
Waste”, “Vulnerable Systems”, “Networks of Networks”, all published by 
Springer.
115
Authors and organisations
Prof. Dr. Giovanni Sansavini
Giovanni Sansavini joined ETH Zurich in June, 2013, as an Assistant Professor 
of Reliability and Risk Engineering in the Department of Mechanical and 
Process Engineering (D-MAVT). He received his B.A. in Energy Engineering 
in 2003 and his M.A. in Nuclear Engineering in 2005 from Politecnico di 
Milano (POLIMI). In 2010, as a member of the Atlantis Dual Doctoral Degree 
Program, he received his Doctoral Degree in Radiation Science and Technology 
from POLIMI and his Doctoral Degree in Mechanical Engineering from 
Virginia Tech. His doctoral dissertations aimed at developing a methodology 
for critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment from the standpoint of 
complex systems theory.
Reliability and Risk Engineering Laboratory led by Prof. Dr. Giovanni 
Sansavini was established in June 2013 within the Institute of Energy 
Technology at the Department of Mechanical and Process Engineering, ETH 
Zurich. Research at the Reliability and Risk Engineering Laboratory is aimed 
at the development of hybrid analytical and computational tools suitable for 
analyzing and simulating failure behavior of engineered complex systems. We 
aim to quantitatively define and estimate reliability, risk and resilience within 
these systems. We focus on highly integrated energy-carrier networks, energy 
supply with high penetrations of renewable energy sources, communication, 
transport, and other physically networked critical infrastructures. Our 
main research areas include: modeling and protection against cascading 
failures in interdependent energy-carrier networks, e.g. electric power and 
gas supply systems; vulnerability analysis of interdependent cyber-physical 
infrastructures, e.g. Smart Grid communication networks; optimum 
performance restoration after disruptions; decision making for energy 
systems under uncertainty.
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Virginia Tech
Virginia	Tech	(VT)	is	a	public	land-grant	university	founded	in	1872	in	the	State	of	Virginia,	USA.	
Virginia	Tech	 is	dedicated	to	the	discovery	and	dissemination	of	knowledge	through	teaching,	
research,	and	engagement	with	the	community,	following	its	motto	“Invent	the	Future.”	One	of	
VT’s	priority	objectives	is	international	collaboration,	such	the	efforts	between	the	Energy	Institute	
at	JKU	and	VT’s	Department	of	Agricultural	and	Applied	Economics	(AAEA)	that	led	to	this	book	
chapter.	 	 The	AAEA	department	 at	 VT	has	 traditional	 research	 strength	 in	 environmental	 and	
energy	economics,	applied	econometrics,	food	and	health	economics,	development	economics	
and	international	trade.	
The	Pamplin	College	of	Business	is	ranked	among the	top	50	undergraduate	business	schools	
in	the	United	States	by	U.S.	News	&	World	Report.	It	is	one	of	eight	different	colleges	at	Virginia	
Tech,	which	offers	240	undergraduate	and	graduate	degree	programs	to	more	than	31,000	stu-
dents.	Virginia	Tech	manages	a	research	portfolio	of	$513	million,	including	a	number	of	projects	
in	resilience,	communications,	and	sustainable	electric	power.
Christopher Zobel
Christopher W. Zobel is the R.B. Pamplin Professor of Business Information 
Technology in the Pamplin College of Business at Virginia Tech.  He earned 
a Ph.D. in Systems Engineering from the University of Virginia, and an M.S. 
in Mathematics from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.   His 
primary research interests include disaster operations management and 
humanitarian supply chains, and he has published his work in journals 
such as Decision Sciences, Decision Support Systems, and the Journal of 
Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain Management, among others.  He 
is one of the co-editors of Advances in Managing Humanitarian Operations, 
which is part of Springer’s International Series in Operations Research & 
Management Science. Dr. Zobel is currently serving as one of the Co-Directors 
of Virginia Tech’s Interdisciplinary Graduate Education Program in Disaster 
Resilience, and he was a 2015 Fulbright Scholar in Karlsruhe, Germany.  He 
is on the Board of Directors of the International Association for the Study of 
Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM), and 
he is an active member of the Decision Sciences Institute (DSI), the Institute 
for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), and the 
Production and Operations Management Society (POMS).
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Klaus Moeltner
The VT authors, Klaus Moeltner and Jed Cohen, both work within the 
environmental and energy economics, and applied econometrics field groups. 
They have been engaged in research on energy reliability and economic 
implications of power outages for the last several years. Dr. Moeltner is 
an economist with expertise in environmental and resource economics 
and applied econometrics. The primary focus of his research program is 
to estimate the monetary value to society of environmental amenities and 
natural resources, such as clean air and water, forest health, reduction of 
flood risk, reliable energy, and recreational opportunities. These values are 
critical for an informed comparison of benefits and costs of environmental 
policy interventions. In recent years, Dr. Moeltner has fostered collaborative 
efforts between the Energy Institute (EI) at the Johannes Kepler University 
(JKU) in Linz, Austria, and his own workplace in the United States, Virginia 
Tech (VT) University in Blacksburg, Virginia. As part of this collaboration, 
he participated in several grant-funded projects on energy reliability and 
the acceptability of energy-related infrastructure that were administered by 
the EI-JKU. He was the keynote speaker at the symposium on the “Public 
Acceptance of Electricity Infrastructure,” held at JKU in June 2014. Over the 
years Dr. Moeltner published in all leading journals of his field, as well as in 
highly ranked journals of general economic interest. He was the PI or Co-PI 
for over 20 grant-funded projects totaling close to $3 million. He also holds 
the position of Co-editor for Environmental and Resource Economics, a top 
field journal.
Jed Cohen
Jed Cohen is a PhD candidate and researcher in the Applied and Agricultural 
Economics Department at Virginia Tech University, USA. Jed worked for 
a year at the Energy Institute at Johannes Kepler University as a project 
associate. He continues to collaborate with European colleagues on research 
projects relating to the de-carbonization and associated restructuring of the 
European electricity grid. Jed specializes in econometric techniques applying 
them to a wide range of contexts in economics including: energy, forestry, 
environment, and climate change. Jed has authored numerous noteworthy 
publications in his short career including contributions to leading energy 
and environmental economic journals. Jed also received the 2013 award for 
Outstanding Master’s Thesis from the national Agricultural and Applied 
Economics Association for his work on the economic impact of forest pests. 
Jed hopes to continue his research into energy and environmental issues with 
a focus on the impact of climate change to aid in the global movement toward 
low carbon energy systems.
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Willis Towers Watson and Willis Re 
Willis	 Towers	Watson	 is	 a	 leading	global	 advisory,	broking	and	solutions	company	 that	 helps	
clients	around	the	world	turn	risk	into	a	path	for	growth.	With	roots	dating	to	1828,	Willis	Towers	
Watson	has	39,000	employees	in	more	than	120	countries.	It	designs	and	delivers	solutions	that	
manage	risk,	optimize	benefits,	cultivate	talent,	and	expands	the	power	of	capital	to	protect	and	
strengthen	institutions	and	individuals.	Corporate	Risk	and	Broking	(CRB)	provides	a	broad	range	
of	risk	advice	and	insurance	broking	services	to	clients	ranging	from	small	businesses	to	multina-
tional	corporations.	The	mission	is	to	help	clients	to	become	more	resilient	in	an	increasingly	com-
plex	and	risky	world,	so	that	they	can	secure	their	existing	business	and	develop	new	ones.	Willis	
Re	is	one	of	the	world’s	leading	reinsurance	advisors	and	a	member	of	the	newly	merged	Willis	
Towers	Watson	serving	80%	of	the	world’s	1,000	largest	companies.	Its	core	focus	is	to	provide	a	
comprehensive	suite	of	solutions	to	help	clients	manage,	analyze	and	measure	risk	and	capital	–	
through	investment	advice,	advanced	analytics,	structuring	and	completing	transactions,	issuing	
securities	and	placing	risk,	to	identify	and	quantify	sources	of	risk,	and	how	they	interrelate,	using	
a	wide	range	of	innovative	analytical	tools	and	techniques.	The	tools	includes	a	complete	set	of	
commercial	models	supported	by	our	own	proprietary	models	providing	additional	insight.	The	
Willis	Research	Network	further	supports	our	risk	quantification	through	open	academic	research	
and	the	development	of	new	risk	models	and	applications.	The	ethos	of	the	Willis	Research	Net-
work	is	to	provide	an	open	forum	for	the	advancement	of	the	science	of	extreme	events	–	creating	
close	collaboration	between	universities,	insurers,	reinsurers,	catastrophe	modeling	companies,	
government	research	institutions	and	non-governmental	organizations.
Marc Lehmann
Marc Lehmann joined Willis Towers Watson in October 2008 as founding 
member of the Strategic Risk Consulting team in London. His primary 
responsibility is to coordinate, manage and deliver a wide range of natural 
hazard risk consulting services (including catastrophe modelling and risk 
engineering assessments) for the Willis global corporate client base. The list of 
clients Marc has worked for, both at Willis and in previous positions includes 
some of the major public, commercial and industrial organizations around the 
world. Prior to Willis Marc was Principal and Business Development Director 
for the global engineering firm ABS Consulting (formerly EQE International), 
where his responsibilities included the undertaking and management of 
various Natural and Man-Made Hazard risk management assignments for 
industrial clients such as conducting property surveys for earthquake, storm 
and flood hazards to assist clients in their risk transfer decisions, as well 
as identifying and implementing risk mitigation solutions. Marc’s earlier 
experience included working a senior structural design engineer on a number 
of international construction projects for companies such as Ove Arup & 
Partners, Battle McCarthy, Systra and Calatrava Valls. Marc holds engineering 
degrees from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich and 
Imperial College, London and is fluent in English, French and German.
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Torolf Hamm
Torolf Hamm joined Willis Towers Watson in 2011 and now leads the 
Natural Catastrophe Strategic Risk Management Consulting team in 
London. His primary responsibility is to manage natural and man-made 
hazard risk consulting projects (including catastrophe modelling and risk 
engineering assessments) for large global organisations. Torolf has a strong 
track record of delivering risk financing and risk mitigation projects across 
all sectors, including energy and oil & gas companies. Prior to Willis Towers 
Watson, Torolf worked as Senior Catastrophe Modeller and Technical Lead 
Vulnerability Engineer for Risk Management Solutions (RMS), where he was 
responsible for the development of the vulnerability and building inventory 
model for the RMS UK’08 Flood Model and the upcoming RMS Euro Flood 
Extension Model. He led and participated in various Catastrophe Response. 
Missions that included the 2007 Kent Earthquake, June 2007 UK Summer 
Inland Floods and the July 2009 Inland Floods in Austria. While at RMS Torolf 
also was strongly involved in the development of the RMS Euro Windstorm 
’11 Inventory and Industry Exposure Model (IED). Torolf ’s earlier experience 
included working as a Principle Buildings Materials Consultant on a number 
of high profile projects, in some cases as expert witness for STATS Limited 
(now RSK STATS Limited). Torolf holds a PhD in Engineering Geology from 
Imperial College and a German Diploma in Geology (Dipl.Geol) from the 
RWTH Aachen. 
Brigitte Balthasar
Brigitte joined Willis Re Analytics in 2009 as a catastrophe risk analyst. Working 
in different regional teams such as Japan, Latin America and Europe as well as 
locations (London, Washington D.C. and Paris) she has 7 years of catastrophe 
modelling experience and is leading the Catastrophe Management Services 
team for Germany, Austria and Switzerland since 2011. She is currently based 
in Munich, Germany.  In her current position, her primary responsibility is 
to coordinate, manage and deliver a wide range of catastrophe risk consulting 
services for the Willis Re client base in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. 
Moreover she engages in the Willis Research Network in the field of global 
risk assessments and climate change mitigation. Relatedly, she conducted 
her secondment with the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) in Geneva in early 2011. In her role as a consultant 
she co-authored the Global Assessment Report of disaster risk reduction 
and developed recommendations for its further development. Before joining 
Willis, Brigitte was a high school teacher instructing mathematics and 
geography in Germany, and acquired a certification in bilingual education. 
She conducted her studies at the Universidad de Zaragoza (Spain) and the 
Albert-Ludwigs-University Freiburg (Germany). The latter awarded her MSc 
degrees in geography, mathematics and instructional design. She is fluent in 
English and German.
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